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OVERVIEW OF COUNTRY PROGRAMME EVALUATIONS
DFID has a rolling programme of  Country Programme Evaluations (CPEs) with 5 or 6 evaluations
of  countries or regions per year. A synthesis report pulling together findings from 5 recent CPEs
is also produced annually. CPEs are challenging evaluations attempting to provide an overview of
the entire DFID programme over a 5 year time frame and evaluate whether DFID made appropriate
strategic choices in the given context and delivered effectively.  CPEs are ideally undertaken in the
year prior to development of  a new Country Assistance Plan, as they are designed to meet DFID’s
needs for lessons that can inform future strategy and programming, as well as accountability for
funds spent at country level. CPEs are intended for a wide audience including DFID’s country 
office staff  and partners, senior DFID managers in the relevant regional divisions and members of
the public/other stakeholders. 
Each CPE is managed by DFID’s Evaluation Department and carried out by 4-6 independent 
international consultants with a mixture of  evaluation and development skills. The terms of  
reference for the CPE programme include a generic evaluation framework closely linked to 
standard evaluation criteria; this is customised a little for each individual evaluation (and annexed
to the report). For CPEs, interpretation of  each of  the evaluation criteria is as follows:
Relevance –  CPEs should provide high quality, well evidenced material and judgements on whether
‘DFID did the right things’ 
Effectiveness – CPEs should examine key interventions and partnerships and identify and explain 
successes and failures
Efficiency – CPEs should tell a narrative around the allocation of  resources (financial and staffing)
to deliver the results DFID was hoping to achieve
Impact – CPEs cannot produce new information on impacts attributable to DFID, but should 
consider DFID’s contribution to long term outcomes
Sustainability – CPEs should discuss evidence on progress towards sustainability in terms of  
ownership of  reforms, capacity development and resilience to risks.
Typically CPEs comprise a one week inception mission to the country to make contacts, scope the
boundaries of  the evaluation, customise the generic evaluation matrix and make decisions around
issues such as field visits. The main CPE fieldwork then takes place around a month later and lasts
up to three weeks. DFID’s Evaluation Department provides each evaluation team with a large 
documentary evidence base comprising strategies, project/programme information and context
material sourced from a thorough search of  paper and electronic files, DFID’s intranet system and
the internet. During the fieldwork the team interview stakeholders in country and current and past
DFID staff. A list of  people consulted is annexed to each study. 
The views expressed in CPE reports are those of  the independent authors. The country office can 
comment on these in a ‘management response’ within the Evaluation report. CPE reports are 
quality assured by an independent consultant who has no other involvement in the CPE programme. 
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Preface
The evaluation of DFID’s regional assistance plan (RAP) in Central Asia, South Caucasus
and Moldova (CASCM) is one of a series commissioned by DFID’s Evaluation 
Department (EvD). The studies are intended to improve performance, contribute to lesson
learning and inform the development of future strategy at regional and country level. 
Collectively the evaluations are important in terms of DFID’s corporate accountability and
enable wider lessons across the organisation to be identified and shared.
The evaluation was carried out by a team of independent consultants led by an ITAD/
Verulam consortium. The process was managed by Iain Murray and Karen Kiernan of EvD.
The evaluation was particularly challenging given the scope and variety of the DFID 
programme in five countries across a diverse region and EvD would like to acknowledge
the contribution made by the evaluation team itself and thank DFID staff and development
partners who engaged freely with the study. 
EvD is encouraged that the CASCM team found the evaluation findings and 
recommendations useful in planning for the next phase of programming in the region,
which will be formed around country plans rather than another RAP. We will be 
following up on the recommendations to ensure that DFID, in CASCM countries and 
Corporate Divisions, does give them due consideration.
Nick York
Head of Evaluation Department 
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Executive Summary
S1 The Central Asia, South Caucasus and Moldova (CASCM) Regional Programme
Evaluation (RPE) assesses the relevance, effectiveness, and efficiency of the Department for
International Development’s (DFID) programme in this ‘region’ between 2002 and 2007.
The evaluation seeks as far as it is possible to identify the sustainability of the changes 
supported by DFID and the outcome of the objectives that were set. The evaluation draws
conclusions and makes recommendations to inform DFID’s delivery of programmes 
covering similar regional contexts both geo-politically and in terms of their development
challenges. This evaluation is one of the periodic independent evaluations undertaken to 
support DFID’s performance management system. The primary audience for these 
evaluations is the UK government and DFID senior managers including heads of country
offices, though they may be of interest others interested in DFID’s work.
S2 Large parts of Europe and Central Asia have undergone unprecedented political,
economic, and social change since 1989, when the Soviet Union began to break up. The 
economic collapse plunged the newly independent countries into poverty and coupled with
the challenges of moving towards more democratic models of governance this presented the
rationale for substantial external support. Since 1997 DFID has been responsible for the
UK’s development assistance to these countries which by 2002 had reduced, as others
improved their economic development, to a small group spread across this ‘region’ with 
little obvious synergy beyond their common recent history.
S3 By 2007 the group had reduced further to the current five CASCM countries which
are making differential progress towards Middle Income Country (MIC) status and thus
DFID graduation with Armenia and Georgia having achieved MIC status, Moldova 
expected to by 2009, and the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan expected to take considerably
longer. Their identity is with the sub-region or country with little wider sense of ‘region’.
From a DFID perspective MIC graduation and programme closure has become the 
assumed trajectory with the two countries in Central Asia being the exceptions.
Strategic Development
S4 The evaluation period is covered by two DFID strategy papers: the Central Asia and
South Caucasus Strategy Paper (CASCSP) 2000 - 2003 and the Moldova Country 
Strategy Paper (CSP) 2000; followed by the CASCM Regional Assistance Plan (RAP) 2004
–2007. The evaluation focuses primarily on period covered by the RAP as it is the most 
recent and complete strategy.
S5 The RAP was based on sound and thorough analysis seeking common themes to
link the disparate elements across the five countries with three country level and two 
regional level objectives. However it sought to impose an artificial sense of region without
addressing the underlying differences and similarities amongst the group which fall into
three distinct sub-regions – two in Central Asia, two in the South Caucasus and Moldova
as on outlier. As a result the RAP has, in practice, been permissive providing a framework
and principles with country level planning based on a subset of the five RAP objectives.
S6 For this evaluation the five RAP objectives were taken as the strategic basis for
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analysing the programme – its strategic relevance, efficiency and effectiveness, impact and
sustainability. It should be noted that in addition to the programme covered directly by the
RAP DFID also provides substantial multilateral investment through the World Bank and
more specifically the European Commission (EC) and European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (EBRD). These investments are taken into account but are not covered
as comprehensively in the evaluation as is the bilateral programme.
Relevance
S7 The evaluation concludes that the three RAP Country Level Objectives – 
governance/institutions; pro-poor growth; and conflict prevention/peace building - were
relevant to the problems of all the CASCM countries when the RAP was prepared and
their relevance has continued. The evaluation also found that the two RAP Regional Level
Objectives – HIV/AIDS, and trade/regional development – were relevant at country and
regional level and their relevance has increased over the intervening years.
S8 There is little sense of region about the programme with the one common element
– Russia - the elephant in the room. This omission presents a paradoxical gap in the 
relevance of the RAP – at the level of context Russian is seen as the single critical 
unifying link between the five CASCM countries and yet in terms of its contemporary role
in trade, investment, migration, and political influence it is not given prominence in any of
the objectives.
S9 The evaluation concludes that at the level of strategy the RAP has substantial 
relevance across the ‘region’ though this is at the level of a ‘lowest common denominator’,
setting a baseline of individual country strategies and not addressing the sub-regional and
wider geopolitical elements. In terms of delivery (interventions and approaches) however 
relevance is much more significant at country, sub-regional and regional level.
S10 The RAP objectives appear to be based on the assumption that the CASCM 
countries followed a similar trajectory - from Soviet Republic to Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS); followed by a period of fragile state building, absent civil society,
and economic crisis; then emerging statehood leading to Middle Income Country (MIC)
status. The evidence suggests that these transitions are not linear processes and countries
have followed different routes. Was there a model for transition behind the CSPs/RAP?
What understandings informed the strategic approach?
S11 In practice there appears to have been a shift in project and programme emphasis
from livelihoods to public administration and from general civil society support to more 
focused public accountability/demand side promotion. The five objectives still stand as 
appropriate pillars but beg some key questions – what is pro poor sustainable growth? Is 
public administration reform poverty focused? How much support is required to promote
democratic processes in countries where civil society development has been severely 
neglected and non state actors excluded? 
S12 The types of intervention and engagement became more ambitious and complex as
confidence grew. For example the Strategic Impact Funds (SIF), project based technical
assistance (TA), joint investments, sector wide programmes, and policy influence at country
level. There was differential experience of this mix between countries but all were present
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across the region and some good practice emerged.
S13 Partnership experience seems to be uneven. The best examples were where DFID
ensured sustainable change in partner practice (e.g. water in The Kyrgyz Republic) or has
empowered Government leadership in new ways of working (e.g. Medium Term 
Expenditure Framework, Public Sector Reform, and regional planning in Armenia). The 
latter examples were not dependent on joint projects though all have informed DFID’s 
contribution to harmonised working.
S14 Programme development since the early support to the CIS seemed to reflect DFID
adviser cadre strengths – livelihoods, giving way to governance/social development as the
balance of adviser skills changed. More recently a country focus has dominated with an 
emphasis on governance/public sector management. 
S15 Overall there was sound activity to output monitoring and effective project 
management. However the attempt to implement monitoring of the objectives at strategy
level through the RAP Monitoring Framework proved cumbersome. The outputs were not
used for planning or refocusing at regional level so there was little incentive for staff to 
invest the time. Nevertheless the monitoring data was useful and the framework could have
been more supportive for the programme.
Effectiveness and Efficiency
S16 There is evidence of good partner engagement and a range of interventions that
were used effectively. The CASCM team seemed very responsive to changing objectives
and priorities at country level.
S17 The pro-poor growth theme was not well defined or developed during the RAP 
period despite some well established good practice at earlier stages.
S18 Limiting conflict prevention and peace building activity to the Global Conflict 
Prevention Pool (GCPP) reduced the potential effectiveness. Synergies could have been
built with other civil society initiatives and DFID programme resources used to complement
the small scale projects. Lessons could have been learnt from experience elsewhere (i.e. the
Africa Conflict Prevention Pool - ACPP) and deeper links could have been developed with
the other Departments involved.
S19 The impact of the sub-regional HIV/AIDS objective suggests limited effectiveness
to date as the programme is only just becoming established. Although the Central Asia
HIV/AIDS Programme (CARHAP) is highly strategic from an epidemiological 
perspective, it could benefit from stronger linkages between prevention and treatment/care
and by addressing mobility, including cross border movement, for high risk groups.
S20 Both the regional objectives have not been given priority. In part this is a function
of the country focus and in part the lack of management commitment to the regional
agenda. AIDS mainstreaming has not been taken on and there is limited effectiveness on
trade and regional development. Mainstreaming HIV and AIDS was actually not an
appropriate objective given the low/concentrated epidemic situation and was only included
to try to push the HIV and AIDS envelop at the time. This was identified but not made 
Executive Summary
vii
explicit. It is important to ensure objectives are appropriate and achievable and to record
changes in strategic focus.
S21 Modest in-country human and financial resources have delivered high profile and
effective interventions. There is a need to empower and support in-country teams in order
to maximise the benefits and flexibility they bring. Where CASCM has invested that 
support it has been effective.
S22 Managing a regional programme with a split between country based administrative
teams largely comprising staff appointed in country (SAIC) and advisers mainly London
based is not straightforward. At times the London programme management and adviser
group seem to have worked independently of the in-country teams and work pressures have
reduced communication across disciplines and country experience. As a consequence there
has not been sufficient emphasis given to cross region learning and the development of 
positive synergies around regional identity.
S23 The division of support for the livelihoods portfolio between governance and 
social development inputs has resulted in a loss of coherence in the growth stream and some
loss of momentum on rural and regional development. This has added to the imbalance
with the governance and institutional development objective dominating all country 
programmes.
S24 There has been some efficient use of consultant inputs where synergies between 
international and national expertise has been built and smaller teams have operated flexibly.
Larger consultancy inputs with ‘blue print’ models did not take account of contextual 
diversity and they have had less impact and do not seem to have been cost effective.
Impact and Sustainability
S25 There is clear evidence of impact in terms of capacity building across all projects and
programmes. In particular the evaluation found significant impact in relation to Government
public administration, financial management and planning systems. The benefits were more
focused and realistic than in larger Public Sector Reform (PSR) initiatives which need to
be longer term and are more sophisticated and complex and therefore less appropriate as a
programme draws to a close. 
S26 Beneficiary impact in terms of income poverty, health, AIDS was much less clearly
identifiable. For small scale programmes operating in challenging contexts achieving such
impacts at scale is overambitious and more specific and targeted gains are more relevant.
S27 The evaluation questioned the degree of adherence to Paris principles is such small
programmes where there is not wide donor involvement. A more pragmatic approach with
trade-offs in favour of project level impact, individual donor accountability, and DFID wide
priorities (e.g. achievement of the Millennium Development Goals - MDGs) may have
been more efficient and realistic given the timescale as DFID moved towards graduation.
S28 The use of civil society institutions as an entry point to conflict prevention and 
reduction requires improved monitoring to assess impact. Outcomes are primarily at the
process level, which though appropriate need a distinct set of indicators. It was therefore less
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easy to assess the impact of much of the conflict related investment or comment on the 
sustainability of what often appear as a disconnected set of small scale interventions.
S29 Sustainability is the biggest issue facing a programme with so much graduation in
process. Ambitious programmes and consultants’ desire for extensions detract from the 
imperatives of closure. More attention is required on influencing future donor partner 
programmes and Government policy. Scaling up for graduation requires more 
administrative resources to concentrate effort on ensuring continuity and the policy focus
rather than more or new project level activity.
S30 Preparation for programme closure should have started even earlier than has been
the case in CASCM.As soon as graduation is anticipated exit strategies need to be built into
all programme/project designs to ensure programme sustainability as well as prepare for
graduation. The sustainability of policy influence through multilateral investments is more
critical that short term project performance and this should be reflected in programme 
direction.
Executive Summary
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CASCM Strengths and Weaknesses
Strengths:
S31 Some excellent practice at country level – competent and capable staff in 
country offices supported by technical and policy expertise through advisers and 
consultant TA. Clear evidence of value for money at the country level.
S32 Strong project management skills in London and within country teams that have
ensured effective delivery of a range of project interventions.
S33 A valiant attempt to use a results based monitoring framework for the RAP
that has been monitored and reported against consistently with the framework used as the
basis for some sound lesson learning.
S34 A clear country led approach being adopted across the region grounded in the
alignment principle of responding to partner government led agendas.
S35 Strong, honest and open relationships developed with partner governments and
development partners. Early warning of and clear communication around graduation 
decisions have been given well in advance and have been understood and accepted – if 
reluctantly by some.
S36 DFID is valued for its flexibility and its ability to respond to other development
partner agendas. This includes its ability and willingness to support analytical work and in
health, the challenging aspects of HIV/AIDs.
S37 A good record of working with Other Government Departments especially, but
not solely, through the GCPP process. DFID is particularly valued for its conflict analysis 
regionally and within the GCPP partnership.
S38 The CASCM programme has included some exemplary practice that can inform
other MICs/small scale programmes. These include flexibility, country focus, strong 
government engagement and a select and limited range of interventions. The evaluation
found a select and limited range of interventions that are clear, well targeted, time bound
and effectively delivered.  These interventions often achieved an impact beyond the scale of
DFID’s programme.
Weaknesses:
S39 The concept of the ‘CASCM Region’ proved aspirational and was never 
realised. The emphasis on a country and project approach resulted in the synergies, lesson
learning and complementarities of the region not being fully developed or realised.
S40 The over complex nature of the results framework, limited ownership by the
team, and the lack of application at management level reduced its impact. However the
sustained attempt to apply a model that was able to be implemented across the region did
yield lessons that can be applied to similar regional programmes.
S41 Harmonisation needs to move beyond joint projects. The influencing role with
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other Development Partners could have built more on the resources within the Europe and
Central Asia Department (ECAD) and on cross regional experience. In some cases excess
effort was put into donor coordination and in others sustainability of investments were not
ensured.
S42 The involvement of advisers in London in regional and country development
has not always been well structured resulting in differential support and weak 
communication. Staff turnover has also impacted on communication and programme 
effectiveness.
S43 Country engagement could have been even better with more cross region
learning and linkages including increasing understanding of cross border concerns such as
migration – of particular importance when considering the transmission of HIV/AIDs and
in addressing conflict.
Lessons Learnt
S44 A strategic mix of interventions in small country programmes appear to be
the most effective way of delivering aid. These interventions including joint donor 
strategy; small scale strategic impact fund; stand-alone programmes and policy influence
were implemented by DFID with selective consultancy support. Relationships and 
continuity are more important than in larger programmes and this should be taken into
account in assessing administrative costs and staffing.
S45 Early graduation planning builds a positive atmosphere for exit and effective
strategies for continuity. Good practice includes honest and open dialogue with 
Government and development partners, attention to the sustainability of strategic 
interventions and impact as well as project level continuity, and effective engagement with
the multilateral agencies that will be the vehicles for continued DFID investment.The 
continuity of the policy level relationship directly and through multilaterals needs more 
attention than project and office closures. Graduation is most effective where it is seen as a
strategic process and managed accordingly.
S46 SAIC staff can be very effective professionally and are cost effective but they
need consistent support and supervision if these benefits are to be optimised.
Direction and delegation of authority can be undermined if approaches to working with
local staff are not consistent. Ensuring SAIC colleagues are full team members with the
knowledge and understanding to represent and influence effectively makes a significant 
impact on programme performance.
S47 Small in-country teams comprising a mix of SAIC and UK staff with delegated
authority are cost effective and deliver significant impact. Such teams can have greater
potential than UK based teams given the capacity to work flexibly, responding to local 
demands. This requires  and effective management support from colleagues in
London.
S48 Well regarded implementing consultants promoting DFID objectives can add
technical strength to SAIC offices without advisers. Management of small country 
programmes with SAIC leads in-country works well at project level but less so at more
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strategic levels where regular support and supervision is essential.
S49 Adviser capacity can be over-stretched where their responsibility covers a 
significant number of small country programmes. More flexible working, team working,
and increased attention to policy level working, influencing, and the development and 
maintenance of strategic partnerships is essential. 
S50 Stand alone programmes are effective for targeted technical changes, less so
for more complex and lengthy strategic development – such as PSR – which requires
joint donor activities and longer term engagement for extra leverage. A platform approach
to PSR, as currently being tested in the Kyrgyz Republic, seems to allow for adequate 
sequencing of reforms and government buy-in.
S51 Lessons from good practice at country level (e.g. around harmonisation in the
Kyrgyz Republic, Public Administration Reform - PAR in Moldova and Armenia,
regional development in Armenia) have been significant and meaningful. There are 
excellent examples of counterpart learning at individual and systemic levels; influencing
and developing donor partnerships; and engagement at policy level. These lessons should be
recorded and disseminated as part of regional/departmental learning.
S52 Political will is essential where investment and presence is limited. In the 
absence of government buy-in focus on projects and programmes that can stand alone and
guarantee some success. Development partners including DFID should consider whether
they should step back from ambitious corporate objectives in such cases and provide 
assistance only where there is strong (and genuine) government demand.
S53 PSR in transition countries is not a ‘one size fits all’ approach. Similarities in
PSR approaches in CASCM point to the replication of similar models and suggest that 
previous lessons learnt, context or appropriateness of models have not been taken into 
account. A deeper appreciation of the political context and history together with an 
awareness of the political economy and political processes is required during design and 
implementation.
S54 Strategic Funds (SIF in CASCM) can be an effective lever in small country
programmes. CASCM has demonstrated some successes though there can be a risk of
NGOs becoming dependent on the small SIF grants 
S55 In emerging/young democracies support for civil society to develop systems,
processes and skills for accountability and responsiveness in service delivery and wider 
governance processes requires more sustained investment
S56 Conflicts are local and specific; regional approaches are not always relevant.
More local (sub-regional) analysis, integrated planning, and coordination around specific
country level inputs would be an asset.
S57 Sector wide approaches can be successful even in difficult contexts and 
benefit from sequenced and integrated development with bespoke supportive TA –
demonstrated by the Health Sector Wide Approach (SWAp) in the Kyrgyz Republic in
combination with the Health Programme Analysis Project (HPAP). It would be useful to
explore the importance of HPAP for the success of the SWAp and whether similar HPAP
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projects should be developed alongside SWAps.
S58 If a ‘region’ composed of a number of small country programmes is to be more than
an administrative unit then the synergies, diversity and socio-economic links need to be
more effectively taken into account not only in developing regional plans and 
strategies but also in the management of the programme. 
Major Recommendations
S59 The recommendations arising from the evaluation can be grouped under four broad
headings – managing graduation and exit; graduation policy; working with MICs and small
programmes; and recommendations for the team managing the CASCM region as it moves
to a new phase.
S60 To improve the Management of Graduation and Exit we recommend that 
managers in DFID offices and programmes approaching graduation:
• Plan and begin the graduation or exit strategy at least three years in advance as this
fits with programme cycles and ensures effective resource management as well as
early attention and engagement with Government and other partners.
• More emphasis should be given to engagement with Government and 
Development Partners in preparing for graduation at country, strategic, and impact
levels in addition to individual project and programme planning.
• Manage the budget as graduation approaches in an effective way, maintaining/
increasing the level of investment and utilising resources to ensure policy level 
continuity and project/programme sustainability through partnerships with 
multilaterals, and high profile exit vehicles.
• Strengthen,mandate, and support country offices to focus on the graduation process
as a priority. As graduation approaches additional staff resources focused on 
ensuring continuity and building policy synergies with multilateral partners may be
required – the assumption of a wind down as programmes reduce can undermine
the benefits of past investments. 
• Use management links to multilaterals (i.e. ECAD links to EC in the case of
CASCM), regional experience and other DFID entry points to support the process.
S61 To improve graduation policy we recommend that DFID senior management:
• Strengthen capacity for policy advocacy towards multilateral institutions before, 
during and after graduation. Although DFID will continue its support to MIC 
countries through its multilateral contribution, there is a strong scepticism in some
CASCM countries that multilateral institutions will not fill the gap that DFID leaves
behind. Addressing these concerns is part and parcel of effective graduation.
• Acknowledge that poverty is multi-dimensional and that the level of national income
alone is not representative of a country’s state of development. Graduation strategy
Executive Summary
xiii
should be adjusted accordingly to take into account MDGs and DFID’s overall
recognition that poverty is a multidimensional problem.
S62 To support work with MICs and regional groups of small country programmes
we recommend that responsible DFID geographic departments:
• Develop a range of policy/impact indicators not just the MIC status to track progress
as a country approaches MIC – income poverty, inequality, civil society development,
democratisation and participation. This will ensure that the programme reflects 
actual needs and decisions are based on a comprehensive view of current and future
development.
• Keep to a country focus and engagement with development partners rather than
high cost involvement in harmonisation structures for developing influence and 
policy leverage – a value for money approach – especially where graduation in likely
to be a short-medium to term possibility. 
• Refrain from frontloading aid money through budget support or large technical 
assistance projects unless there is enough guarantee that such interventions will 
support greater efficiency and effectiveness.
• Take a strategic and flexible approach utilising small scale (e.g. Strategic Fund) 
investments and project level opportunities that have clear and specific impact.
• Use partnerships to effectively maximise investment, achieve leverage and build for
the sustainability of programme objectives.
• Develop simple output based monitoring systems for regional strategies, learning
lessons from the CASCM RAP monitoring framework, integrating them with other
reporting cycles related to the Directors Development Plan (DDP) and Public 
Service Agreements (PSAs), with lines of accountability at management level clearly
defined.
S63 Specific to the CASCM Region we recommend that the CASCM Team
Leader/Head of ECAD:
• Commission a study and lesson learning exercise for the group of Regional 
Development Programmes that builds on their experience and the collective 
insights from this approach to pro poor growth.
• Focus on preparing for the transition (through linkages to EC and WB projects) and
policy continuity in Georgia and Armenia, rather than just the practical aspects of
project administration and office closure; resourcing the country team to deliver the
sustainability of DFID’s contribution at objective and strategic level not just the 
effective closure of project interventions. 
• Review and revise the Moldova graduation/exit plan now with a stronger focus on
strategic engagement, the continuity of DFID objectives and sustainable investment
through multilaterals.
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• Develop a strategy for the continuity of support for the Central Asia programmes
in Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic taking account of the fragile state context
and the sub regional linkages in addition to the pro-poor country led model that has
been established.The strategy should address the need for appropriate management
beyond the CASCM/ECAD era with a long term commitment to scale up support.
• Appoint a sub-regional coordinator to oversee and monitor conflict within CASCM
as part of the GCPP implementation learning lessons from similar approaches
elsewhere and linking to wider DFID and Other Government Department policy
and programme activity at country level.
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ACPP Africa Conflict Prevention Pool
ADB Asian Development Bank
APSREP Armenia Public Sector Reform Programme
AR Annual Review
ARDEP Armenia Regional Development Programme
ARV Antiretroviral
CA Central Asia
CAAP Central Asia AIDS Programme
CAP Country Action Plan
CARHAP Central Asia HIV/AIDS Programme
CARS Central Asia Republics
CASC Central Asia and South Caucasus
CASCM Central Asia, South Caucasus and Moldova
CASCSP Central Asia and South Caucasus Strategic Plan
CCCAC Centre of Contemporary Central Asia and Caucasus
CDS Country Development Strategy
CIP Country Implementation Plan
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CRF Country Results Framework
CSEED Central and South East Europe Department
CSO Civil Society Organisation
CSP Country Strategy Paper
DAC Development Assistance Committee
DDP Directors Delivery Plan 
Defra Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
DFID Department for International Development
DP Development Partner
EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EC European Commission
ECAD Europe and Central Asia Department
EECAD Eastern Europe and Central Asia Department
EEWH Eastern Europe and Western Hemisphere
EfE Environment for Europe 
EGPRSP Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
EITI Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
Abbreviations
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ENP European Neighbourhood Policy
ENPAP European Neighbourhood Policy Action Plan
ENPI European Neighbourhood and Partnership Initiative
ETC Early Transition Country
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EvD Evaluation Development
FA Financial Assistance
FCO Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FSU Former Soviet Union
GCPP Global Conflict Prevention Pool
GDP Gross Domestic Profit
GF Global Fund 
GNI Gross National Income
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HMG Her Majesty’s Government
HPAP Health Programme Analysis Project
HR Human Resources
HQ Head Quarters
ICHD International Centre for Human Development
IDA International Development Assistance
IDU Injecting Drug User
IFI International Finance Institution
ILO International Labour Organisation
IMF International Monetary Fund
IRAI IDA Resource Allocation Index
JCSS Joint Country Support Strategy
KHF Know How Fund
LMIC Lower Middle Income Country
MANAS Health Programme (Kyrgyz Republic)
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1. Introduction and Methods 
Introduction 
1.1 This evaluation examines the performance of the programme of United Kingdom 
development assistance provided by the Department for International Development (DFID) to 
Central Asia, the South Caucasus and Moldova (CASCM) during the five year period from 
April 2002 to March 2007. DFID’s performance management system is supported by periodic 
independent evaluations at project, programme, sector and thematic level. The primary 
audience for these evaluations is the UK government and DFID senior managers including 
heads of country offices. The purpose of this evaluation was to assess the relevance of 
DFID’s strategies to individual country policies and DFID’s own corporate objectives; the 
choices of aid interventions and their effectiveness; and DFID’s added value as a 
development partner and the impact of its programme on poverty. 
1.2 Currently support to the five CASCM countries, Tajikistan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Georgia, 
Armenia and Moldova, is managed by a single DFID team and treated as a ‘region’ for 
administrative purposes. The CASCM region previously included most of the 12 members of 
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) receiving support from DFID. The size of the 
group has reduced as poverty has declined and as economies have improved. DFID expect 
that bilateral support will in future focus only on Moldova, Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz 
Republic, and that the current strategy, the Regional Assistance Plan (RAP) for the CASCM 
region, will be the last. Lessons from this evaluation are therefore particularly pertinent for DFID 
support to similar groups of small country programmes, economies achieving Middle Income 
Country1 (MIC) status, and programmes where DFID is planning to close its bilateral programme. 
1.3 The evaluation of CASCM is the first of two regional evaluations amongst the 2007-08 series 
of independent Country and Regional Programme Evaluations (CPEs and RPEs) 
commissioned by the Evaluation Department (EvD) of DFID. EvD is responsible for four or 
five such evaluations each year in support of DFID’s performance management system. 
During 2007-08 five evaluations are proposed and the consortium led by ITAD has been 
contracted to provide the evaluation teams. 
Approach 
1.4 The CPEs and RPEs undertaken during 2007-08 follow a standard approach (Annex 1) 
drawing on the evaluation criteria (Box 1) developed by the Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) of the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 
A generic evaluation matrix has been developed by the evaluation consultants and EvD. This 
matrix groups 40 questions under the five DAC criteria together with a section for lessons and 
recommendations. These are ‘light touch’ evaluations with three weeks for collecting data on 
effectiveness, impact and sustainability through documentation review and interviews. No 
                                                 
 
1 The World Bank defines middle-income countries as having a per capita income of between US$1,025 and US$6,055 
for fiscal 2007 
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projects or programmes were visited in the field and no primary data collection took place. 
Whilst the independent evaluation team are responsible for the assessment the process has 
been as participatory as possible with EvD and the CASCM team involved throughout in 
finalising the matrix and in feedback sessions to test emerging conclusions and share findings. 
1.5 For the CASCM RPE a three day inception visit to the London based DFID team was made in 
June 2007 to plan the evaluation, collect documentation, and conduct briefing interviews. 
During this visit additional questions from the CASCM team were integrated into the generic 
matrix and adjustments were made to the evaluation approach based on these questions and 
issues raised by DFID staff. An inception note was issued summarising the approach to be 
taken and incorporating the final matrix to which a further six questions were added and other 
amendments made (the CASCM RPE matrix is at Annex 2 with the changes shown in red). 
1.6 During July 2007 the evaluation team undertook the main documentation review and held 
interviews with DFID staff and other key informants in London. Groups of three team 
members visited Moldova, Armenia, and the Kyrgyz Republic for three days in each case and 
Box 1: OECD DAC Evaluation Criteria 
1. Relevance—(“Did we do the right thing?”)The extent to which the objectives of a development 
intervention are consistent with beneficiaries’ requirements, country needs, global priorities and 
partners’ and donors’ policies. 
  - To what extent are the objectives of the intervention still valid? 
  - Are the activities and outputs consistent with the overall goal and its attainment? 
  - Are the activities and outputs consistent with the intended impacts and effects? 
2. Effectiveness—(“Did we do what we said we would?”) The extent to which the development 
intervention’s objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their 
relative importance. 
  - To what extent were the objectives achieved / are likely to be achieved? 
  - What major factors influenced the achievement or non-achievement of the objectives? 
3. Efficiency—(“Did we make good use of funds, staff and time?) “A measure of how 
economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time etc.) are converted to results. 
  -  Were activities cost-efficient? 
  -  Were objectives achieved on time? 
  -  Was the intervention implemented in the most efficient way compared to alternatives? 
4. Impact—(“Results”) Positive and negative, primary and secondary long-term effects produced 
by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended. 
  - What has happened as a result of the intervention? 
  - What real difference has the intervention made to the beneficiaries? 
  - How many people have been affected? 
5. Sustainability—(“Will positive results endure?”) What are the expected continued benefits of a 
development intervention after it is completed and the probability of continued long-term impact? 
The resilience to risk of the net benefit flows over time. 
  - To what extent did the benefits of the intervention continue after donor support ceased? 
  - What were the major factors which influenced the achievement or non-achievement of 
sustainability of the intervention? 
Sources: The DAC Principles for the Evaluation of Development Assistance, OECD (1991), 
Glossary of Terms Used in Evaluation, in 'Methods and Procedures in Aid Evaluation', OECD 
(1986), and the Glossary of Evaluation and Results Based Management (RBM) Terms, OECD 
(2000). 
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met with as wide a range of stakeholders as possible (Annex 3 lists all those interviewed and 
Annex 4 summarises the findings from the three country visits). In addition, telephone 
conference calls were held with the DFID staff in Tajikistan and Georgia, thus ensuring 
participation from the DFID teams in all five countries supported under the CASCM region. 
Methodology 
1.7 The documentation review focused on the annual reports, and formal reviews of all the 
projects and programmes undertaken during 2002-2007. These contemporary assessments of 
effectiveness and impact were reviewed with reference to the objectives in the strategies that 
covered the evaluation period. The strategies themselves, any evaluations or studies 
undertaken in the preparation of the strategies and file records indicating decisions taken to 
change or adjust the strategic direction were also reviewed. The RAP Monitoring Framework 
developed in 20052 provided country level and organisational effectiveness reports which 
were reviewed. The experience of using the framework and other elements of self evaluation 
were discussed with the CASCM team. Finally financial data was analysed to assess spending 
levels throughout the period and administrative costs during the final year. 
1.8 Interviews and discussions with individuals and groups of DFID staff, donor representatives, 
Government officials, contractors, civil society representatives and service users gave 
qualitative assessments of the perceived impact and effectiveness of DFID’s programme and 
presence in the CASCM region. The findings from semi structured interviews were 
triangulated with findings from other sources to build up a comprehensive view of the ways 
in which the strategic objectives had been pursued through projects and programmes, policy 
engagement, influence and representation. Emerging findings were shared with the CASCM 
team to test hypotheses and understandings. 
Report Structure 
1.9 The remaining chapters of this report present the findings of the CASCM RPE. Chapter 2 
describes the political, economic and social context; the role of external support and the level 
of development assistance are then reviewed together with the history of DFID’s assistance 
since 2002. Chapter 3 presents the findings with respect to the relevance of DFID’s strategic 
objectives, their alignment with corporate policy, and that of Government and other partners; 
how risk was assessed, and how resources were allocated and results gathered. Chapter 4 
looks at the dual aspects of programme effectiveness and efficiency. The focus is on the 
delivery of the strategies, the results achieved; efficiency in application of financial and 
human resources; and achievements in terms of aid effectiveness. Chapter 5 reviews the 
impact and sustainability of the outcomes at country and regional level with respect to the 
objectives set in the RAP and other strategies and with regard to reform and change. Finally 
Chapter 6 presents the conclusions of the evaluation and a set of lessons and 
recommendations. 
                                                 
 
2 The Framework was developed through a negotiated process by the CASCM Country and London teams, supported 
by the PARC (Performance Assessment Resource Centre), over an initial 8 month time frame in 2005, and refined in 
2006.  
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2. Context 
2.1 This chapter provides the context for DFID’s assistance in the CASCM region. It starts with 
an overview of the situation in the countries covered by the CASCM region then describes the 
pattern of development aid provided to these countries 2002-07. Finally DFID’s support 
within that context is summarised. 
The CASCM Region 
2.2 The broad set of nine countries that comprised DFID’s ‘CASCM region’ in 2002 were the 
former Soviet republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, The Kyrgyz Republic 
Republic, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan (Figure 1). 
Figure 1. Map of countries in the CASCM region 
 
2.3 From 1997 to 2003, support was under the auspices of the Eastern Europe and Western 
Hemisphere division (EEWH), covered by two departments: the Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia Department (EECAD) and the Central and South Eastern European Department 
(CSEED) who were responsible for programmes including those in Central Asia, the South 
Caucasus and Moldova (EECAD), and the Western Balkans (CSEED). The two departments 
were merged in January 2003, shortly after the first wave of accession countries graduated 
from DFID support. The merger created the Europe and Central Asia Department (ECAD) 
department, which currently encompasses three teams: CASCM, Western Balkans, and 
European Neighbourhood. 
2.4 Following the break-up of the Soviet Union in late 1991 the nine countries in CASCM, 
together with Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus formed the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS)3 The CASCM programme has generally focused on the poorest seven of the CIS 
countries – what the international finance institutions called the CIS-74. However, precisely 
                                                 
 
3 Turkmenistan is now only an associate member. 
4 The CIS-7 are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. 
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which of the nine CASCM countries the programme has concentrated on, and organisationally 
how the country programmes are managed within the DFID structure has varied over time.  
2.5 During 2000-03 a regional programme covered the Central Asia and South Caucasus (CASC) 
countries, with the Moldova programme having its own country strategy. The Regional CASC 
Strategy separated the eight countries into three levels of engagement: 
? Focal countries: Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyz Republic 
? Limited activity5: Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan 
? Monitoring: Tajikistan (activity dependent on the security situation) 
2.6 In 2002, prior to the departmental merger, there was discussion as to whether the Central 
Asian Republics (CARs) should be part of Asia Division or remain in EEWH/ECAD6. They 
stayed within ECAD. During the 2003 CASCM strategic review, Moldova’s position was also 
reviewed, to assess whether it sat better within a New Neighbours/Wider Europe initiative or 
with the CIS countries7. It joined the CASC cluster to form the current CASCM grouping.  
2.7 Thus for the Regional Assistance Plan (RAP) period (2004-2007), Moldova was included, and 
the levels of engagement with the different countries were revised: 
? Bilateral programmes, and focal countries for the current ‘CASCM region’: Armenia, 
Georgia, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Tajikistan8 9 
? Constructive engagement: Uzbekistan (economic & political reform), Kazakhstan 
(EITI10 & HIV/AIDS), Azerbaijan (monitoring oil development) 
? Watching brief, through multilateral: Turkmenistan 
Political, Social and Economic Country Context 
2.8 CASCM is geographically broad, spanning Asia and Europe; the CACSM countries however 
all share the common heritage of being formerly part of the Soviet Union. They attained 
independence in 1991, following the break-up of the Soviet Union, and joined the CIS. They 
all faced similar challenges, primarily related to state-building in new nations: to develop 
democratic and pluralistic governance; to address the low domestic managerial and decision-
making capacity; to implement transition to a market-based economy, and to re-establish 
economic growth after the most severe and prolonged economic collapse of the 20th Century11. 
                                                 
 
5 ‘We believe that in the conditions that currently prevail our efforts towards poverty elimination would have a limited 
impact’ (CSP, 2000). 
6 Memo from PS to Management Board (30/11/01) 
7 Background paper (n.d.) produced for the 2003 CASCM strategic review 
8 This grouping of the five poorest CIS countries might be considered a CIS-5, or ‘the RAP 5’. 
9 There were in fact full bilateral programmes in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan at the start of the RAP period and DFID 
maintains a role in Uzbekistan through the regional HIV/AIDS programme 
10 Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
11 OPM, 2003 
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A further challenge was to reduce poverty in the wake of this economic decline12 and the 
collapse of the comprehensive social welfare systems that operated under the Soviet regime.  
2.9 All the CASCM countries have small populations - only Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are in 
excess of 10 million people (Table 1). They all suffered from large input and output losses 
after independence and the Russian economic crisis (Figure 2). While GDP growth recovered 
by the middle of the 1990s, it has taken longer to achieve pre-1990 levels, except for those 
countries with oil and gas reserves (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan). 
However, despite this shared heritage, the CASCM countries vary considerably in size, 
culture, natural resources and economic potential, and have demonstrated divergent attitudes 
to economic and democratic reform. 
2.10 According to OECD DAC criteria, the CASCM countries are either in ‘Other Low Income 
Country’ (OLIC) or ‘Lower Middle Income Country’ (LMIC) bands, based on per capita 
Gross National Income (GNI) in 200413. The OLICs, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Tajikistan, 
and Uzbekistan, are poor countries with high levels of inequality and per capita GDP, ranging 
from $1,202 to $1,935. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are all 
classified as LMICs. They also have significant levels of inequality and per capita GDP that 
varies greatly ranging from $2,844 in Georgia to $7,440 in Kazakhstan in 2004 (Table 1). The 
proportion of the population living on less than $2/day ranges from less than 2% in Azerbaijan 
to nearly 64% in Moldova. Nonetheless, of the ‘RAP-5’ countries, Armenia and Georgia were 
reclassified to Middle Income Country (MIC) status by the DAC from January 2006, and 
Moldova is expected to follow in January 2009.14 By contrast in 200515 the Kyrgyz Republic 
was judged to be some 25 years away from gaining MIC status and Tajikistan 45 years away.  
Figure 2. Growth of GDP (%), in the decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union 
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Source: DFID’s Central Asia, South Caucasus and Moldova Programme: Strategic Review. OPM, 2003 
 
                                                 
 
12 In 1989, in these transition economies, about 14 million people were living under a poverty line of $4/day. By mid-
1996, it increased to about 147 million or one person in three. The sharp increase in poverty was caused by falling 
growth and rising income inequality. Source: Economic Well-Being IDT, DFID (2000) 
13 These categories are applicable for reporting on aid flows 2005-2007. Source: Statistical Annex of the 2006 
Development Co-operation Report, OECD DAC. 
http://www.oecd.org/document/9/0,3343,en_2825_495602_1893129_1_1_1_1,00.html 
14 Senior Level Meeting of the Development Assistance Committee, held in Paris on 6-7 December 2005 
15 Analysis based on WB World Development Indicators – EMOTP 
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2.11 With the exception of Kazakhstan, all the countries have Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers 
(PRSPs) in place; most were produced in 2003-2004. In 2003 the Overseas Development 
Institute found that equitable growth, employment and social welfare are generally higher 
priorities than ‘poverty reduction’16, and that there was uncertain ownership by governments 
of the PRSP process. Subsequently some CASCM countries have produced second generation 
PRSPs that are more operational and have greater government ownership. 
2.12 While the CASCM countries share a common history, their future continues to be influenced 
by the large geopolitical players in the region. The European Union (EU) has continued to 
expand; with Romania acceding in 2006, Moldova, the poorest country in Europe, and now on 
the eastern border of the EU, has accession aspirations. The EU presents political and 
economic opportunities not available to the Central Asian countries which are in a  
‘geo-strategic’ position between the three ‘giants’ - China, India and Russia17. Russia and 
China in particular are increasingly influential in Central Asia18; China as an aid provider, and 
Russia as a destination for economic migrants. Remittances are important across the region; 
for example, nearly 40% of Moldova’s and Tajikistan’s gross domestic product (GDP) are 
accounted for by remittances (Table 1).  
2.13 Conflict, posing threats to both national and regional stability, is evident throughout the 
region. Many of the conflicts can be traced to the imposition of borders early in the Soviet era 
that did not reflect ethnic or geographical boundaries. Others, such as the Transnistria conflict 
in Moldova reflect post-independence political differences and allegiances, with Russia 
having an important influence. From the UK perspective, conflict prevention19 is dealt with as 
a tripartite cross-Whitehall issue though the Global Conflict Prevention Pool, which involves 
DFID, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), and the Ministry of Defence (MoD).  
2.14 All countries in the region have had to face the challenge of instituting new systems of 
governance. Many are following western parliamentary and market-based systems and these 
are slowly acquiring legitimacy. However, the process is slow, requiring new relationships 
between central and local government, the private sector, civil society and the individual. At 
present all the countries are placed towards the bottom third of Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI), with four amongst the worst performers (Table 1) - these 
countries face the challenge of overcoming high levels of endemic corruption. Traditionally 
civil society has not been proactive within the region, and relationships between civil society 
actors and the State are not well developed. However experience varies and there are signs of 
development encouraged by participatory initiatives during the period of the evaluation. 
2.15 According to the International Labour Organisation20 (ILO), across the CIS, women have 
generally reached a higher level of education, professional training, high economic activity 
and active participation in public life than men. However, as economic restructuring continues 
and the labour market becomes more competitive, employers in some sectors and especially in 
                                                 
 
16 ODI (2003).  Experience with PRSPs in Transition Countries. Synthesis Note 6. PRSP Monitoring Project 
17 Verena Fritz (2007). Central Asia: Governance, geopolitics and development challenges.  Briefing Paper 20. ODI.  
18 The formation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in 2001 is indicative of the influence of China and 
Russia in Central Asia. (http://www.sectsco.org/html/00026.html) 
19 Terrorism and migration are also cross-Whitehall issues in the region.  
20 Gender Equity section of the ILO Sub-regional Office for East Europe & Central Asia: 
http://www.ilo.ru/gender/cisgnrl.html 
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Central Asia, tend to preferentially hire male employees. Generally, women are paid 30% to 
50% less than men, and unequal pay is the top priority issue in all the CIS countries. Access to 
justice for women is deficient in the region, as well as the information on rights and 
legislation. Equality between women and men is constitutionally guaranteed in all CIS 
countries. At the same time, there is a huge gap between theory and practice of 
implementation of basic equality standards. There is neither specialised anti-discriminatory 
legislation existing nor the institutions to make justice accessible In general, one may state 
that there is a considerable high-level resistance across the CIS to a gender equality issue and 
its interpretation, partly because there is a view that equality between men and women was 
achieved during the soviet era. However the ILO considers that compared to most countries of 
the world, the CIS states are reasonably advanced in issues related to equal possibilities for 
men and women in the world of work.  
2.16 There is a looming HIV/AIDS epidemic in Central Asia, linked to injecting drug use, and the 
region as a whole suffers from the environmental legacy of Soviet central planning, which 
used low-level technology and disregarded environmental protection. The Aral Sea is an 
extreme example of environmental damage caused by centrally-planned agriculture, and parts 
of Azerbaijan are among the most polluted in the world. 
Context
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Table 1. Development Indicators for CASCM countries21 
 Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Moldova Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan 
Total population (millions), 2004 3.0 8.4 4.5 14.8 3.3 3.8 3.4 2.5 14.0 
Proportion living below $1/day, 2003± 2.0 3.7 6.5 2.0 2.0 2.0 7.4 - 2.0 
Proportion living below $2/day, 2003±± 39.5 4.7 84.6 16.4 18.6 31.1 84.6 - 2.4 
GDP per capita (PPP $), 2004 4,101 4,153 2,844 7,440 1,935 1,729 1,202 4,584 1,869 
GDP per capita annual growth rate (%), 2004 - - -4.2 - -2.3 -6.1 -6.8 - - 
ODA as % of GDP, 2004 8.3 2.1 6.1 0.7 11.7 4.5 11.6 0.6 2.1 
Total debt service as % of GDP (2004) 3.5 2.8 4.2 21.5 7.3 9.6 4.9 - 7.1 
Remittances as % of GDP (2006)† 18.3 4.0 6.4 0.2 27.4 36.2 36.2 - - 
Public expenditure (as % of GDP)          
- on health (2003-04) 1.2 0.9 1.0 2.0 2.2 3.9 0.9 2.6 2.4 
- on education (2002-04*) 3.2 3.3 2.9 2.4 4.4 4.9 2.8 3.9 9.4 
- on military (2004) 2.6 1.8 1.4 1.0 2.9 0.4 2.2 - - 
- on debt servicing (2004) 3.5 2.8 4.2 21.5 7.3 9.6 4.9 - 7.1 
Corruption Perception Index ranking, 2006** 93 130 99 111 142 79 142 142 151 
Sources: HDR, 2006, and UNSTATS MDG statistics 
±  UNstat, 2003  
±± World Bank Global Monitoring Report 2005 
† Migration and Remittances Factbook. (2006). Dilip Ratha & Zhimei Xu, Migration and Remittances Team, Development Prospects Group, World Bank. 
* Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, 1990 
** Transparency International; 1 = least corrupt, 163 = most corrupt 
 
                                                 
 
21 The quality and availability of statistics is a challenge in the region, and DFID has been addressing this through a series of projects supporting the National Bureaux of 
Statistics. However, statistics do need to be treated with caution. 
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Development Assistance 
2.17 Between 2001 and 2005, UK aided countries in the CASCM region received nearly $9 billion 
in foreign aid, $114 million of this from the UK – an average of $2.5 million per country per 
year (Table 2). Annex 5 gives full breakdown by donor source. 
Table 2. Net Official Development Assistance Flows to CASCM countries 2001-2005 
 All figures in £ millions sterling 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Total % of total 
Recipient                                                                           
Donor               
Armenia                
UK 2.38 1.67 3.15 6.56 6.22 19.98 1.68% 
All Donors 198.39 293.46 248.75 253.79 193.27 1187.66 100% 
Azerbaijan                
UK 1.15 0.47 0.29 0.16 0.04 2.11 0.16% 
All Donors 231.96 349.31 300.57 175.96 223.43 1281.23 100% 
Georgia                
UK 5.69 3.87 3.41 3.12 3.34 19.43 1.33% 
All Donors 299.99 312.51 225.62 314.49 309.77 1462.38 100% 
Kazakhstan                
UK 0.85 1.13 1.88 1.76 1.65 7.27 0.66% 
All Donors 147.88 188.24 269.97 267.71 229.23 1103.03 100% 
Kyrgyz Republic                
UK 2.39 4.47 7.07 6.29 9.36 29.58 2.68% 
All Donors 188.91 185.62 199.84 261.09 268.45 1103.91 100% 
Moldova               
UK 2.53 3.32 5.31 4.86 2.96 18.98 2.74% 
All Donors 122.36 141.68 117.94 119.5 191.75 693.23 100% 
Tajikistan                
UK 0.93 3.27 1.09 1.52 4.4 11.21 1.16% 
All Donors 169.27 168.32 147.84 243.15 241.37 969.95 100% 
Turkmenistan                
UK 0.12 0.24 0.67 0.11 0.05 1.19 0.58% 
All Donors 71.76 40.52 27.16 37.24 28.25 204.93 100% 
Uzbekistan               
UK 0.76 1.37 0.59 1.45 0.55 4.72 0.49% 
All Donors 153.13 189.25 194.55 245.63 172.33 954.89 100% 
At Current prices 
Source OECD.Stat.  Data extract 23/08/07 
2.18 The five current CASCM countries were all partly dependent on aid (Table 1) in 200422, 
reflecting their recent difficult fiscal positions, and lack of significant natural resources. The 
situation is changing in some cases with Armenia and Moldova no longer viewed as aid 
                                                 
 
22 ODA as % of GDP (2004) between 4.7% and 11.7%, though remittances are more significant 
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dependent. Key donors/lenders include the World Bank (WB), the EC and the United States, 
with particular bilateral donors being important in individual countries (e.g. the US in 
Moldova). The US’s Millennium Challenge Account (MCA23) operates in Armenia, Georgia, 
the Kyrgyz Republic, and Moldova. Although only the Kyrgyz Republic is classified as a 
heavily indebted country, Armenia, Moldova and Georgia qualify for debt relief under the 
UK Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI). 
2.19 EC aid has focused on the Technical Assistance to the CIS (TACIS) programme, a project 
based instrument. In 2007, the EC introduced the European Neighbourhood and Partnership 
Initiative (ENPI), the assistance programme for the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), 
which aims to share the benefits of the EU’s 2004 enlargement with neighbouring countries. 
This instrument covers only European countries while Central Asian countries are covered by 
the Development Cooperation Instrument, the EC instrument that provides assistance to all 
developing countries in Latin America, Asia and Africa. 
2.20 Donor involvement in the region is relatively recent (less than 15 years). During the 1990s, 
donors were over-optimistic in predicting how quickly legislative and regulatory reforms 
would have positive development impacts. Donor co-ordination has until recently been poor, 
a problem exacerbated by governments that have not been able to strongly define their own 
poverty reduction priorities. However, significant progress is now being made on donor  
co-ordination, for example with joint donor fora in the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan, and 
development of Joint Country Support Strategies, for example with WB, the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB), the Swiss (SDC) and DFID in the Kyrgyz Republic.  
DFID Assistance 
2.21 DFID allocations to the region have stabilised at about £20 million per annum (Table 3), 
though this masks changes in the allocations to individual countries (Annex 6). Allocations to 
Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan are limited (less than £20,000 per annum), and allocations to 
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are small and declining (£802,000 and £277,000 respectively in 
2005/06, and £37,000 and £11,000 respectively in 2006/0724). Allocations to Armenia, 
Georgia, Moldova, and Tajikistan have grown from about £1 - £2 million per annum to 
stabilise at £2.5 - £3.5 million per annum. The allocation to the Kyrgyz Republic has seen 
rapid growth from £2 million to £7 million per annum over the evaluation period. Similar 
growth in the aid framework is now planned for Tajikistan. 
Table 3. DFID Allocations to CASCM and EMAAD 2001/02 to 2006/0725 
Source: DFID Department Report 2007 Annex 2, Table 4.  
                                                 
 
23 www.mca.gov 
24 DFID (2007) Statistics in Development 2007.  
25 A fuller table with a breakdown by country is presented in Annex 6 
Outturn (£ million) 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 (estimate) 
CASCM 10.4 14.9 15.3 18.2 20.1       19.8 
Total Europe/Central Asia 86.2 82.9 68.5 55.8 46.6       43.6 
Total EMAAD 247.0 226.8 445.9 259.1 218.3     184.6 
CASCM as % of ECAD 12% 18% 22% 33% 43%      45% 
CASCM as % of EMAAD 4.2% 6.6% 3.4% 7.0% 9.2%    10.7% 
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2.22 DFID’s assistance to the region can be traced through three stages: the Know How Fund 
(KHF) (1989 – 1997), London-based programmes, and programmes run from in-country 
offices26. The latter two stages can both be seen as divided into two parts:  
(i) London-based programmes captured first in the Support for Transition 
Countries: a New Strategy (1998), and then in the CASC CSP (2000) – 
progression to DFID country offices started to occur during this period  
(ii) Country offices mainly with staff appointed in-country (SAIC); the exceptions 
being the Kyrgyz Republic where there has been a UK appointed head of office 
since April 2004, Tajikistan with a UK appointed head since January 2006, and 
very recently two UK appointed advisers covering Central Asia and based in 
Tajikistan (Governance) and the Kyrgyz Republic (Social Development) 
together with a SAIC economist also based in Tajikistan. 
2.23 The KHF was a programme of bilateral technical assistance provided by the UK Government 
for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia after the break-up of the 
Soviet Union. It aimed to support the process of transition to a pluralist democracy and a 
market economy in a way which promoted and recognised the interests of all levels of 
society. The KHF provided technical assistance and capacity development in a projectised 
form, and was characteristic of aid in the mid-1990s in that it funded many relatively small 
activities. Its core sectors were finance/banking, privatisation, employment/small business 
development, and management training. Key features included: speed of response; deploying 
UK expertise, supporting UK investment, and emphasising the UK’s comparative advantage; 
openness to outside requests and ideas from a variety of sources; more emphasis on flexibility 
in implementation than on detailed initial design; and avoidance of government processes, but 
a willingness to work with reformers inside and outside government (Faint, 2004). 
2.24 There was concern that the KHF was too free-market oriented, insufficiently targeted towards 
poverty and social issues, and that it worked in sectoral silos. Hence DFID began working on 
a new regional strategy for transition countries. Thus, since the KHF, DFID’s aid to the 
region has been outlined in country and regional strategy papers. While the portfolio 
continues to include small project-shaped activity (such as Strategic Impact Funds), it has 
evolved to become more programmatic, with larger programmes, and some sector and general 
budget support. Following the progression through the three stages of assistance outlined 
above, the focus of DFID’s programmes in the region has followed a similar trajectory. Its 
activities have progressed from the capacity building orientation of the KHF; through an 
emphasis on economic growth through rural development and livelihoods assistance, and 
support to nascent civil society during the CSP era; to support to reforms in public 
administration, public financial management, social assistance services, regional (or local) 
development and continued support to reduce conflict during the current RAP period. The 
focus on growth switched from promoting livelihoods to helping governments “to develop 
and implement policies that promote sustainable, broad-based growth”, as it was felt that 
other development partners were better place to support private sector activities. 
                                                 
 
26 Faint, T. (2004). Review of DFID/ODA’s Programmes in Accession Countries. Evaluation Report EV650. DFID 
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3. Relevance of DFID’s Strategy for CASCM 
3.1 The evaluation period 2002-2007 is covered by the latter part of the two 2000-2003 
strategies set out in the Central Asia and South Caucasus Strategy Paper (CASC SP) 
and the Moldova Country Strategy Paper (CSP); together with the 2004-2007 Regional 
Assistance Plan (RAP). Beneath the RAP are Country Implementation Plans (CIPs) that 
set out annual country level plans. This chapter presents the findings of the evaluation 
with respect to the relevance of these strategies – addressing the question – how far did 
DFID’s strategic approach allow it to remain relevant? 
The Developing Strategy 
3.2 The CASC SP set a country level focus on i) good central and local public 
administration with a focus on social protection and community based social cohesion 
ii) enabling environment for economic growth, rural development and environmental 
protection & iii) health systems with a poverty focus. Regionally, democracy, rights 
and civil society development were prioritised alongside regional integration and 
stability. (CASC SP p.9, E2, 3 and 5) 
3.3 A review conducted as part of the RAP preparations (OPM 2003) focused on the CIS-7 
grouping of the poorest countries. The review saw DFID as well regarded, successful at 
project level, effective and under pressure to expand from Governments. However, it 
also found a lack of coherence, partner confusion over intent, weak linkages with 
Embassies, the potential of country offices not realised and ineffective communication. 
3.4 The OPM review presented options for the future which highlighted the lack of logic in 
what had emerged as a region based on the CIS-7 poor countries. Central Asia, South 
Caucasus and Moldova are three distinct geographic areas with increasingly less in 
common as the distance from the CIS increased in time, and as their distance from 
Brussels increases. (Facletti et al 2002). 
3.5 Both the CASC SP and the Moldova CSP took a more strategic approach than the 
earlier KHF which set as its central objective support for the process of political and 
economic transition – from command to market based economies and from totalitarian 
systems to pluralist democracies (Faint 2004 Para 4.2). The strategy papers were in line 
with DFID policy as set out in the 1997 White Paper and the analysis reflected the 
increase in poverty following the economic collapse of the 1990s, the internal and 
regional conflicts, the pressures of independence and the varying economic situations. 
The strategy was one of cautious programme expansion in selected cases moving from 
the broader scale of the KHF to more country specific and country based programming. 
3.6 The pre-RAP review recommended a strategy of engagement, no sector restrictions but 
no increase in total aid, a focus on impact, flexibility and an improved role for country 
offices. It suggested that budget support was not appropriate for DFID but they should 
consider a focus on strengthening public expenditure management processes etc in 
those countries where a high level of aid dependence is likely to continue. (OPM 2003 
p26). The RAP followed this approach with a bilateral focus on the five core countries 
and with engagement but less investment in the remainder of the CIS-7. 
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3.7 The RAP focused on five objectives which the RPE took as the strategic basis for 
analysing the programme. These five objectifies comprise three country level themes: i) 
governance and institutional environment for poverty reduction; ii) pro-poor growth 
and iii) conflict resolution and peace building; together with two regional themes: a) 
HIV/AIDS and b) trade and cooperation (Annex 7). These objectives are broadly 
similar to those of the CASC SP (Annex 8) showing a level of continuity of objectives. 
Thus the RAP built on the developments of the CSP period and was based on sound 
and thorough analysis seeking common themes to link disparate elements. The lessons 
of stronger engagement utilising effective country teams were taken on board and just 
as the CASC SP and Moldova CSP sought to build the country presence the RAP set 
out to strengthen it further. 
3.8 The focus of the first country theme ‘improving governance and the institutional 
environment for poverty reduction’ was to help governments in the CASCM region to 
improve the formulation and implementation of policy through improved planning, 
prioritising, and budgeting and more participatory approaches. DFID has also continued 
its support for sustaining and enhancing the provision of basic public services (notably 
health) in a number of CASCM countries, based on pre-RAP activities. The second 
country theme ‘pro-poor growth’ (PPG) begs the question ‘what is sustainable Pro-
Poor Growth?’ as there is no clear single exposition of what PPG means for CASCM, 
or an analysis of how it was to achieve it at the programme level. It is not explained in 
the RAP and is confounded by several programmes in the governance theme having 
PPG aspects. The third country theme was to ‘strengthen the UK’s contribution to 
conflict resolution and peace building’. However the only programmatic tool was the 
Global Conflict Prevention Pool (GCPP). In Moldova and South Caucasus DFID took a 
‘lead administrative’ role on the GCPP whilst in the remainder of the RAP countries it 
held a watching brief. 
3.9 For the first regional theme, ‘HIV/AIDS’, the RAP specified the mainstreaming of 
HIV/AIDS within each of DFID’s country programmes and the development of a sub-
regional HIV programme in Central Asia. Both were meant to mitigate the possible 
negative impact of HIV on reform and poverty reduction in CASCM. In the event the 
focus has been on the sub-regional programme. The second regional theme ‘regional 
trade and cooperation’ is the least evidenced of the five objectives with slow 
development and little continuity with previous initiatives. By 2005 DFID concluded 
that economic cooperation and trade facilitation would be better left to multilateral 
institutions and the EU in particular. This built on the RAP priority on ‘working with 
EU partners to ensure that EC policies on the New Neighbours Initiative and TACIS 
contribute more effectively to political and economic reforms’ (RAP, 2004, 11). The 
relevance of a regional approach was initially deemed strong in Central Asia but across 
CASCM the regional approach was quickly lost, possibly due to the absence of regional 
organisations as potential partners, but also in the case of Central Asia, misguided 
expectations that countries like The Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan 
would welcome some cross-border initiatives. 
3.10 Thus the rationale, relevance and level of implementation varied across the five 
objectives and across the five core countries. However the RAP set out a stronger 
strategic framework than had been suggested during its preparation and was over 
ambitious in expecting a level of coherence amongst the five priority countries. An 
artificial sense of region was promoted alongside the enhanced country level focus 
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introducing a tension that was potentially unsustainable. In seeking to impose a unity 
across a set of quite divergent countries the RAP undermined its own strengths. 
Further, the single common factor – the Russia dimension – is presented in the RAP 
simply as context. Despite being central to political and economic development in all 
five countries Russia does not feature in the country or regional trade and cooperation 
objectives.  
3.11 In the event the RAP became permissive, providing only a framework and principles 
with country level planning based on a small subset of the RAP objectives. The critical 
strategic choices that followed in 2005 and 2006 were determined more by corporate 
priorities than a CASCM regional perspective, they were: 
i.) speedier progress towards graduation in line with MIC status and in response to 
the DFID 90/10 policy (Medium Term Plans documents 2005); 
ii) support for Poverty Reduction Budget Support (PRBS) which did not seem to 
take account of the analysis behind the RAP, fragile state policy, Millennium 
Development Goal (MDG) progress, or other country specific factors; 
iii) the emphasis on longer term engagement with the Kyrgyz Republic and 
Tajikistan which shifted interest away from the South Caucasus to the poorer 
Central Asian countries despite the fragile political context; and 
iv) selected sector engagement, advocated as a way of limiting investment yet at 
odds with the view of the pre-RAP assessment that there ‘does not appear to be a 
strong case for pre-defining or limiting the sectoral scope of the programme ... 
DFID’s approach should be to focus on identifying strategic opportunities’ (OPM 
2003, p26) 
3.12 Despite the lack of regional coherence and the deviation from the original strategic 
direction, strategies and objectives were increasingly aligned with the development 
needs and policy priorities of the constituent countries, especially at project level. 
3.13 The CSAC SP and Moldova CSP both summarise the intended approach, but in neither 
case did they continue to provide effective guidance on priorities, nor do they appear to 
have been referred to in subsequent decision-making. They also lacked a framework of 
objectives and indicators that could facilitate evaluation of the effectiveness of the 
programme. In practice the national programmes developed within the Programme 
Areas are set out in the three Country Annexes (Armenia, Georgia and the Kyrgyz 
Republic) to the CASC SP and in the Moldova CSP. 
3.14 This increased country level focus continued into the RAP period, though it depended 
on the capacity of the individual country offices which continued to rely largely on 
SAIC staffing (except in Central Asia where UK appointed staff have been placed).  
Project Orientation 
3.15 In practice, a pattern of project based programming, well informed by country level 
engagement emerged, influenced in some cases by specific adviser interest. The heavy 
emphasis on Objective 1 (the governance and institutional environment for poverty 
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reduction) and within that a focus on government budgeting and public administration 
reform initiatives has skewed the RAP strategy. Country level developments have been 
retro-fitted into the RAP rather than a strong regional strategic direction being set. 
3.16 The net result, reflected in the CIPs which are essentially project related, was a 
country/project directed strategy based more on short/medium term country level 
perceptions than any deeper analysis. MDG performance does not appear to have had a 
major influence on the strategies or the CIPs. The RAP records the expected MDG 
performance quoting World Bank data (World Bank 2003) which suggested that the 
deterioration in education provision threatens the Universal Primary Education (UPE) 
MDG in a number of countries, and that none of the countries appears likely to achieve 
the objective of halting and reversing HIV/AIDS. Performance on maternal and child 
mortality also provides little grounds for anticipating that these MDGs will be 
achieved. Moldova and Tajikistan were judged the least likely to achieve halving of the 
incidence of income poverty and hunger. However with the exception of the health 
programmes, this evidence does not seem to have influenced programme developments 
and MIC status seems to have become the main criterion for graduation. 
3.17 Alignment with PRSPs was given priority within the RAP and has been monitored as 
part of the RAP Monitoring Framework. Whilst it is unclear how far PRSP 
achievement was an active aspect of programme management decisions and 
supervision, at individual country level support for PRSP development and donor 
policy dialogue have contributed to the strengthening of countries’ PRS commitments. 
Annex 9 shows the progress achieved in each country between the start of the RAP in 
2004 and the most recent monitoring reports in 2007. 
Corporate Priorities 
3.18 Corporate sector strategies in relation to Public Finance Management (PFM), PRSP 
support, health sector reform and HIV/AIDS are evident in project and programme 
development. As noted above (para.3.16) corporate policy around middle income status 
became the major factor in moving towards graduation and planning the exit from 
individual countries. In addition the work on conflict, implemented exclusively through 
the GCPP, follows DFID guidance and has examples of good practice in influencing 
the development of a more strategic approach. 
3.19 In the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan Paris principles have been used to endorse an 
emphasis on donor harmonisation, particularly evidenced in the development of Joint 
Country Support Strategies (JCSS) and the endorsement of Country Development 
Strategies (CDS). In other countries, as well as an emphasis on PFM and support to 
MTEF, PRSP related budgeting has put DFID in a lead role in terms of donor 
coordination and government alignment. 
3.20 The actual regional strategies (both the CASC SP and the RAP) were clearly in line 
with corporate strategies and guidance in that they followed White Paper, Pro-poor, 
PFM, HIV/AIDS and conflict strategies and guidance. As noted the strategy in practice 
(implementation) became dominated by MIC policy in London, with government 
alignment especially around budgeting and PFM processes being the dominant strategy 
at country level. 
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3.21 The main changes in strategy were (prior to the evaluation period but significant to it); 
the coherent DFID approach following the move from KHF to CSP; the focus on 4 and 
subsequently 5 key countries which started during the CACS SP period and has been 
refined during the RAP period; the enhanced attempt at a coherent regional strategy 
through the RAP and the corporate pressure, in line with a strict interpretation of the 
MIC policy to limit the programme and move systematically to graduation. 
3.22 Adaptations, especially to the CASC SP and RAP implementation, were in line with 
practice found through other evaluations where CSPs/CAPs/RAPs tend to have reduced 
impact once the team that were involved in their development move on. In addition 
they have been seen to become subsumed in terms of strategic influence by corporate 
policy and senior management/political imperatives. Changes were pragmatic in terms 
of country level issues but increasingly influenced by factors beyond the region. Sub 
regional factors do not seem to have played a major role except in staffing in Central 
Asia. The response to Central Asia has been different but apart from the sub-regional 
AIDS programme there seems no distinctive sub-region wide strategy. 
3.23 In essence what began as an attempt to impose cohesion on a small but diverse group of 
countries was unsustainable and has defaulted into a set of country level plans with a 
resource framework and programme timeframe determined at the centre. A key issue is 
whether a CASCM RAP should have been attempted. With so little sense of region and 
staff relating more to sub-regions and individual countries greater emphasis should 
have been placed on country level planning within a looser grouping that related to the 
common UK management unit. However these countries do share the soviet experience 
and the post-soviet poverty, economic collapse and consequent state fragility. This 
argues for greater synergies, shared approaches and learning across the region. This has 
not been exploited to the extent that might have been. 
3.24 We conclude therefore that the DFID programme and strategy (particularly focusing on 
the RAP) was relevant to the region in the context of individual countries and that 
specific objectives relate well to identified need. However some activities were largely 
based on pre-RAP experience with little consistency at the regional level and no 
mechanisms for cross country learning. The benefits of creating the CASCM region 
were therefore not realised at the regional level. 
Risk Management 
3.25 Fiduciary risk was given high priority by both DFID and other development partners, 
reflecting donor concerns that their money does not go missing. Sound public finance 
management is of course also needed to support poverty reduction goals through an 
efficient use of public money. DFID systematically assessed the external risks attached 
to Public Sector Reform (PSR)-related programmes in their annual reviews. 
3.26 For example the two programmes in Armenia, the Armenia Public Sector Reform 
Programme (APSREP) and the Armenia Regional Development Programme (ARDEP) 
were assessed as medium risk in the project memoranda and in the annual reviews. The 
main risks to APSREP were identified as lack of government buy-in and lack of 
assistance in the roll-out of pilot experience from the World Bank project. DFID was 
not successful in taking appropriate actions to minimise these risks and it was decided 
not to extend the programme beyond early 2007. 
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3.27 Operational risks are also well addressed in the sector wide programmes. For example 
in the health sector programme in the Kyrgyz Republic risks are discussed at each bi-
annual summit and solutions proposed. A risk mitigation framework, whose design and 
implementation was led by DFID, is regularly updated and facilitates the strengthening 
of fiduciary risk mitigation where DFID is providing support to the government in 
strengthening fiduciary issues and financial management systems. 
3.28 Overall, there was no systematic attempt to assess the external risks (i.e. political 
governance, economic and fiduciary) and the internal factors influencing country 
and/or regional strategy. Political governance risks were nonetheless assessed more 
thoroughly in the more fragile environments of Central Asia. In the Kyrgyz Republic, 
the Poverty Reduction Support Credit (GSAC) Programme was rated as high risk, 
reflecting ‘political and administrative uncertainty and increasing donor activities in 
PFM, which, whilst welcomed in principle, may lead to duplication and complications 
if not managed well’. DFID was able to maintain momentum for the programme 
through high-level policy dialogue and work on a PFM Action Plan to coordinate 
activities with other donors. 
3.29 In relation to conflict related activities risk assessments are not documented in the same 
way as development programmes, however regional dynamics have the potential for a 
major impact on security. This is particularly true in the Ferghana valley region, which 
though in the south of the Kyrgyz Republic also encompasses parts of Uzbekistan and 
Tajikistan with problems of political cooperation, border management and inter-ethnic 
accord. There are concerns that any overspill of conflict in Uzbekistan could upset the 
ethnic balance in the Kyrgyz Republic part of the valley. In 1999-2000 for instance, 
there were a series of incursions by Islamist militants, from their bases in Tajikistan. 
3.30 At regional level, the RAP sought to identify the ‘foreseeable risks to successful 
reforms and poverty reduction in CASCM countries’ and appropriate measures to 
mitigate these risks. One of the foreseeable risks was ‘political instability, insufficient 
government capacity and lack of political commitment’. In CASCM countries, 
resistance to change is as much political as institutional – for example, any changes in 
selected Ministries need to be supported by new rules and regulations. The slow pace of 
reforms was inevitable yet the risk that this entailed was not fully taken on board by 
DFID. DFID’s ability to influence policy also varied greatly from one country to 
another – evaluating DFID’s ability to influence policy at an early stage of the project 
cycle is important in order to minimise the risks, or stimulate revision of the logframe. 
3.31 Overall the risk assessment at project and programme level seems appropriate 
compared to similar interventions and country contexts. Regional risk assessment and 
monitoring was less thorough and frequently did not extend beyond country office 
reporting. More generally, country based SAIC staff played a key role in monitoring 
the political context and in identifying likely risks due to political changes, movement 
of key champions etc. This contributed to a comprehensive country level perspective 
which was effectively drawn on at all levels. 
Portfolio Profile 
3.32 Whilst the current portfolio follows the five RAP objectives which are clearly linked 
with the earlier objectives in the CASC CS and Moldova CSP (Annex 7), DFID’s 
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programme and financial recording systems use sector based categories which do not 
clearly identify which projects and programmes relate to which objective (Annex 10, 
Table A). This has implications for planning and monitoring and reinforces more 
country based project approaches. Whilst some of the allocations by objective were 
presentational to a degree the resource allocation and expenditure data, (reviewed in 
Chapter 4 and set out in detail in Annex 10) suggests that over 75% of the CASCM 
Programme (public administration, basic services and accountability) falls under 
country Objective 1 with relatively low commitments under Objective 2 and negligible 
spending under Objective 5. As Objective 3 is delivered through the GCPP instrument 
the budget does not appear within the DFID data; Objective 4 – HIV/AIDS is only 
delivered in Central Asia.  
3.33 The Armenia programme is almost completely under the public administration aspects 
of Objective 1 with additional GCPP projects. Other non project interventions include 
support for aid effectiveness and work around European integration. Georgia has a 
similar emphasis with 85% of project commitments under Objective 1 (public 
administration and basic services, primarily health) with GCPP and European 
Neighbourhood support. Moldova has a broader project spread but again most falls 
under Objective 1 given that the regional development initiatives here as in Armenia 
are essentially related to planning and regional governance. 
3.34 In Central Asia both country programmes are expanding and the portfolio is more 
varied. The programme in the Kyrgyz Republic which accounts for 30% of the overall 
CASCM commitment covers all five objectives. However around 70% still falls under 
Objective 1. Tajikistan currently accounts for 12% of the total programme; this 
portfolio is also more varied. There is a clear trend over the five years of growth in 
Objective 1 (governance) and a marked decline in Objective 2 (pro-poor growth) with 
the balance amongst the other three remaining much the same. 
3.35 Specific interventions related to improving governance and the institutional 
environment for poverty reduction (country Objective 1) are: 
- Moldova – administrative governance (Medium Term Expenditure Framework 
(MTEF), Central Administration Reform, Court of Accounts, Improving Social 
Agricultural Statistics, Regional Administrative Reform); budget support (Poverty 
Reduction Structural Credit); accountability (Expert Grup and Adept) 
- Armenia – administrative governance (Armenia Public Sector Reform 
Programme - APSREP), Programme Budgeting Project); regional administrative 
reform (Armenia Regional Development Programme - ARDEP); accountability 
(ARDEP) 
- The Kyrgyz Republic – administrative governance (Public Finance Management 
(PFM)); basic services (Bishkek Hospital Re-organization, MANAS Health 
Reform/Health Programme Analysis Project - HPAP, Manas Taalimi, Sector 
Wide Approach programme - SWAp, Rural Hygiene, Rural Water and 
Sanitation); accountability (Village Investment Programme - VIP)  
- Georgia – administrative governance (PFM, Support to Social Statistics, Civil 
Society Public Policy Reform, Civil Registry and Documentation); basic services 
(Georgia Health II, primary health care (PHC)) 
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3.36 The pro-poor growth (country Objective 2) portfolio has two main elements: specific 
growth related interventions at country level and a set of policy level interventions to 
support the engagement of International Finance Institutions (especially WB) and 
multilateral donors (EBRD) with PRSPs giving higher priority to social and poverty 
impacts. In addition there is a stream of London based work, mainly with the EC, under 
the infrastructure adviser. 
3.37 The specific growth interventions mainly support economic development in rural areas 
through enterprise promotion and working on the enabling environment. There was a 
set of livelihoods projects across the wider region (including Russia and Ukraine), 
under the former Livelihoods Adviser. These were followed by a suite of further 
enterprise support and regional development projects. Thus we have: 
- Moldova - Sustainable Rural Livelihoods Pilot Project (SRLPP), Support to the 
Rural Investment and Services Project (S-RISP), Support to the Loan Guarantee 
Fund (LGF), Moldova Social Investment Fund (MSIF) the growth element of the 
Regional Development Programme though this is primarily an administrative 
governance programme and the new Social Assistance Project (co-financed by the 
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency - Sida) - though again 
this is actually under Objective 1. 
- Armenia – ARDEP though this is more specifically regional governance capacity 
development for local level planning for growth and the delivery basic services.  
- The Kyrgyz Republic – Aspects of the support to VIP though the main thrust is 
community development t for accountability and thus the project primarily relates 
to Objective 1, Sustainable Livelihoods for Livestock Producing Communities 
- Tajikistan - Zarafshan Valley (combination of district planning and support to 
agriculture (especially micro-loans), Third Party Arbitration Courts 
3.38 The interventions in support of conflict prevention and peace building (country 
Objective 3) are limited to activities supported through the GCPP (Box 2). Strategy is 
developed collectively by the three partners, DFID, MoD and the FCO, and 
administered centrally. Each partner acts as the lead agency in assigned countries. For 
DFID this comprises: 
- Moldova - Peace Building Framework (PBF) (2003 – 2007). The programme 
had four key components: strengthening the NGO sector in Moldova, and in turn 
CBOs in Transnistria and Gagauz Yeri; supporting, training and monitoring 
journalist outputs in Moldova and Transnistria; raising peace building and 
awareness among national and international actors; and encouraging conflict 
debate e.g. through exchanges and website. 
- Armenia, Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh - Consortium Initiative (CI), (2003-
2006 plus one year extension). CI has three elements, each led by a UK-based 
NGO: (1) political, through the South Caucasus Parliamentary Initiative (SCPI); 
(2) civil society capacity building, through three NGO coalitions in Armenia, NK 
and Azerbaijan. (3) media development, exchange and public awareness  
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- South Caucasus, Moldova - Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) £194,000 (plus 
co-funding). Began September 2006. CMI leads the Civil Society Participation in 
European Neighbourhood Policy – A Regional Approach to Conflict Resolution. 
3.39 The CASCM team in London attends inter-departmental policy meetings and is 
responsible for the 'lead' agency portfolio of GCPP projects (Moldova, Armenia, 
Georgia). In addition, DFID pays for a consultancy post within the FCO that 
administers and reports on the GCPP portfolio for Russia and other Former Soviet 
Union (FSU) countries. This consultancy has also had a much appreciated input into 
improving the M&E systems for the GCPP. However this objective seems to have little 
interface with the rest of the CASCM programme with limited involvement in-country 
except where DFID has the lead responsibility and no coordination with other 
interventions notably those that relate to civil society. 
                                                 
 
27 Annual Report 2007: Development on the Record, DFID, pp.266-267 
Box 2: Global Conflict Prevention Pool 
1. The Global Conflict Prevention Pool and the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool were set 
up in 2001 by the UK government with the aim of reducing the number of people around 
the world whose lives are affected by violent conflict and, ultimately, of cutting the 
number of conflicts that occur. It was born out of the ‘joined-up government’ initiative, 
which encourages departments to integrate their policy-making and programme delivery. 
The Pool has brought together the conflict prevention work of the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (FCO), Ministry of Defence (MOD) and Department for 
International Development (DFID), helping them increase the impact of what they do 
through better coordination and common Strategies. Each department shares a common 
Public Sector Agreement target: ‘Improved effectiveness of the UK contribution to 
conflict prevention and management, as demonstrated by a reduction in the number of 
people whose lives are affected by violent conflict and a reduction in potential sources of 
conflict, where the UK can make a significant contribution. 
2. Both Pools are overseen by Cabinet committees comprising the Foreign Secretary, the 
Secretary of State for International Development, the Defence Secretary and the Chief 
Secretary to the Treasury. DFID chairs the Africa Pool, the FCO the Global Pool. Each 
Pool is managed at working level by a joint steering team made up of officials from each 
department. These Pool steering teams prepare an agreed view of priorities for UK work 
on conflict prevention, recommend budgets for delivering programmes and develop 
processes for Pool management. 
3. The GCPP has 12 geographical or thematic strategies, plus three further strategies 
aiming to strengthen the conflict prevention capabilities of European and international 
organisations. The GCPP initially (2002) comprised contributions from each department 
(MoD, FCO and DFID), plus a contribution from the Treasury. After the first year, this 
was changed and now GCPP is funded entirely from the Treasury. Therefore, DFID’s 
total departmental spending on conflict prevention in 2007 (£40.17 million, of which 
£12.59 million was for Global allocations -i.e. after subtracting sub-Saharan Africa and 
PCRU)27 is in addition to the GCPP.   
The GCPP budget 2006/07 amounts to £74 million, the largest proportion of which is spent by the 
MoD on peacekeeping operations. 
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3.40 Regional Issue 1 – counter the spread of HIV/AIDS (Objective 4) has two aspects 
within the RAP – a sub-regional intervention in Central Asia and the mainstreaming of 
the HIV/AIDS agenda across the region. The latter has not been implemented and the 
interventions therefore comprise: 
- The Central Asia HIV/AIDS Programme (CARHAP) in The Kyrgys Republic, 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (2005 – 2009) mainly focused on harm reduction; and 
- The World Bank/DFID Central ASIA AIDS Project (CAAP) in the Kyrgyz 
Republic, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan focused on regional 
coordination, policy development and service delivery. 
- The strengthening of UNAIDS in Almati including funding two positions - an 
M&E officer and a Policy Officer, although the latter position was not filled.  
3.41 Regional Issue 2 – regional trade and cooperation (Objective 5) has the smallest 
number of interventions. Regional initiatives over recent years have included: work 
around the environment linked to the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) Project Preparation Committee and the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (EITI); transition (early transition countries initiative) again 
linked to EBRD; education; and NGO/civil society support. With regard to the 
promotion of EITI in Central Asia, the closure of DFID office in Kazakhstan – by far 
the main oil producer– means that momentum to promote this initiative on a regional 
basis has declined. DFID, however, continues to support the EITI Secretariat in 
Azerbaijan. Trade initiatives have focused on EU accession and neighbourhood status 
together with WTO accession. Central Asia has a different set of trading partners than 
the South Caucasus with Russia the only common link. An assessment of regional 
working was carried out and has informed the emphases indicated and the pattern of 
work with Russia but this does not justify the very low priority that has continued to be 
given to this aspect of the programme. 
Choice of Interventions 
3.42 KFH was a project based model and interventions at the pre-evaluation stage were all 
similar Technical Assistance (TA) and Financial Assistance (FA) projects. During the 
CSP period larger and more comprehensive TA projects were developed but the 
intervention span remained relatively conservative. During the RAP period sector 
support (Health SWAp in the Kyrgyz Republic) and moves towards budget support 
through pooled arrangements (contribution to the World Bank’s Poverty reduction 
Support Credit - PRSC - in Moldova and Structural Adjustment Credit in Georgia) 
introduced a wider range of interventions. Nevertheless the mix of interventions varied 
from one country to another. Not all countries had access to the short-term strategic 
impact fund. The bulk of medium-term DFID assistance was technical assistance, 
although capital investment was also delivered in some of the regional development 
and social statistical projects. In most countries a joint donor approach was actively 
promoted. 
3.43 A significant change in DFID strategy was its renewed consideration for the delivery of 
direct budget support in the region. Until 2005, DFID had not provided budget support 
to CASCM countries taking the view that: 
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• Budgets have not been big enough to merit consideration of PRBS;  
• High levels of fiduciary risk, coupled with a lack of consensus amongst donors 
and within host country governments on how to improve; 
• The fragile political environment of many CASCM countries. 
3.44 Following this new strategic priority, budget support for Armenia and Georgia was 
ruled out on the basis that too little time was left before graduation. In Moldova, where 
fiduciary risk was high but declining, it was agreed that DFID would contribute £3m 
through the World Bank PRSC MDTF. Initial steps (e.g. sector support and TA support 
to WB budget support in the Kyrgyz Republic) are being taken in Central Asia although 
stronger government commitment to poverty reduction and sound public finance 
management is required. 
3.45 In terms of non project/programme interventions the country offices in the Kyrgyz 
Republic and Tajikistan have taken a strong leadership role in donor harmonisation (the 
JCSS developments) and alignment with government planning and development (the 
CDS support). To a lesser extent where SAIC heads of country offices were well 
established (Armenia until Dec 2006, Georgia until mid 2006) influencing interventions 
amongst the donor partners and through close liaison with government were in 
evidence. Thus there were clear differences between Central Asia – budget support, 
sector support; South Caucasus - no new project initiatives beyond 2005, but strong 
influencing role through existing programme; and Moldova - no new initiatives. 
3.46 Comprehensive diagnostic studies of the strengths and weaknesses of public 
administration in CASCM countries, except perhaps for Moldova, seem to be lacking 
.As a result PSR interventions do not seem to differentiate between countries or the 
political economy/governance context with political fragility, growth, movement to 
MIC status and MDG performance varying but the interventions being similar across 
the board. Design and implementation appear heavily consultant influenced rather than 
context specific. That doesn’t necessarily lead to problems but difficulties have 
occurred where pace of change, political will, resource flows etc. (all of which are 
political economy of governance related) result in delays. Consultant frustration seems 
more a factor of “they don’t appreciate what we’re doing” than of sensitivity to context. 
3.47 Accountability based interventions also do not seem to take account of context, 
including the post soviet responses of the public and weak civil society. Artificial 
NGOs created to deliver programmes replicate models which are more relevant to 
contexts where civil society is able to respond and take up challenges. In this regard, 
recent public accountability interventions do not seem to have built on the earlier 
democratic transition experience especially in Central Asia where the capacity building 
work undertaken by INTRAC28 could have been developed further. 
                                                 
 
28 INTRAC is a UK based NGO that works as an International NGO Training and Research Centre 
strengthening civil society through consultancy research and training. INTRAC was contracted by DFID to 
provide capacity building support in Central Asia and has also undertaken other research and consultancy in the 
region. 
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3.48 The portfolio clearly fits with the objectives set out in the RAP. However there is little 
sense of regional awareness in the design or delivery of interventions and little by way 
of cross country sharing and learning. The balance is skewed towards Objective 1 and 
the regional agenda has weakened over time. Whilst there is cohesion at country level 
there does not appear to have been a strong enough focus on building synergies and 
balance across the region. 
Partnership Working 
3.49 The RPE found good evidence of long term relationship building with governments. 
This has been a feature throughout the evaluation period with OPM reporting in 2003 
that during the CSP DFID was ‘well-regarded as a donor – and despite the small size of 
the national programmes, is generally seen as the, or one of the, most effective donor 
agencies...[there is] a strong demand for continuation from national governments’. 
3.50 Government partners in the three countries visited during the evaluation expressed 
similar appreciation. The depth of relationships (institutional and personal); sensitivity 
to government needs; quality of TA support; access; and responsiveness/flexibility 
were all commented on. This enabled movement from small scale projects, through 
major TA interventions to sector support (in the Kyrgyz Republic, health sector support 
moved from hospital improvement through sub-sector planning to a SWAp); and good 
practice in linking up small scale budget related TA (MTEF development) to broader 
policy based budgeting around the PRSP and PSR (Armenia). The only evidence of 
local government linkages being made was with the regional administration under 
ARDEP where government officers showed clear appreciation of the project purpose 
and outputs suggesting good practice by consultants and DFID; and some successful 
attempts to involve local authorities in the Kyrgyz Republic PFM programme. 
3.51 Government ownership was encouraged during the implementation of most 
programmes, requiring DFID and its consultants to be responsive to the specific 
requests of government counterparts. For examples, an output of the Kyrgyz Republic 
GSAC TA logframe was dropped on the Chamber of Account request. In Armenia, the 
Terms of Reference of the Programme Budgeting Project (PBP) were revised to reflect 
the government’s preferences for a “deepening approach” rather than “broadening – 
whole of government approach” to introduce programme budgeting. In Georgia, 
adjustments were made to the Health Programme to reflect demands of the new 
government. 
3.52 Evidence was found of sound graduation planning with good communication to 
government partners. The approach is articulated in the Communication Strategy for its 
medium term engagement developed by CASCM in early 2006 (1/01/06). In addition 
CASCM shows a clear position on informing UK Parliament and Ministers, in a series 
of submissions to the Permanent Undersecretary of State (PUSS) and the Secretary of 
State (SoS). 
3.53 Civil society linkages and understanding were well developed particularly under the 
capacity building activities undertaken by INTRAC in Central Asia. However, there is 
less evidence of effective project and programme practice where quasi-NGOs were 
developed through projects (Rural Development Centre –RDC- and WB VIP in the 
Kyrgyz Republic). There was some good accountability work in Armenia and evidence 
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of civil society connections for GCPP work. Civil Society contacts in all three countries 
visited were positive about DFID though they wished for more and continued civil 
society support explaining in one case that ‘economic development is not the same as 
democratic development’.(Young Lawyers Association in Yerevan) 
3.54 Apart from the key implementing agencies themselves, NGOs are largely artificial 
communities of interested citizens, generally viewed either as natural opposition 
movements to government or as simple service delivery agents. Developing a more 
productive relationship with government and donors would require a broader range of 
activities in monitoring service delivery, researching popular needs, and developing 
potential policy agendas. For example, in the Kyrgyz Republic DFID might consider 
assisting NGOs and state institutions to provide more protection to migrants. Also, in 
Tajikistan, a recent case study highlighted the comparative advantage of funding NGOs 
or think tanks that would have the flexibility to response to diverse issues connected 
with livelihood, political and economic rights and wellbeing of migrants29. 
3.55 There is regular contact with the EC and the World Bank (WB) across the region. DFID 
also works closely with the ADB in Central Asia (notably in the Kyrgyz Republic) and 
with EBRD through London Head Quarters (HQ). Engagement with the EC seems to 
be more difficult where EU accession/neighbourhood status is less significant. DFID 
has been actively involved in promoting multi donor coordination but individual 
bilateral relationships are more confused e.g. an unclear definition of silent partnerships 
with Sida. Relationships often depend on individual contact by the head of office and 
with staff changes (Georgia and Armenia) this has been disrupted. Similarly changes in 
WB teams have weakened a previously strong relationship in Armenia and created a 
potential hiatus in the Kyrgyz Republic. 
3.56 DFID did not work with any key regional institutions – most of them being either 
dormant, or covering different regional boundaries. The relevance and effectiveness of 
a regional approach to development assistance when there is no potential regional 
institutional framework is questionable.  
3.57 Relationships with the FCO at country level are generally positive.  However where 
DFID is co-located within the Embassy differences in employment practices and levels 
of delegation to SAIC staff can hamper good communication.  Enhanced teamworking 
across departments and stronger support from London could enhance joint working. 
3.58 At Whitehall level beyond security, conflict and peace building CASCM has the usual 
cross department relationships with some good practice in relation to the environment. 
3.59 Donor coordination has been given a high priority in all CASCM countries; in Moldova 
where working relationships with the EC have priority; in South Caucasus where EC, 
WB, UN and bilateral links are strong; and in Central Asia where they also engage with 
the ADB. DFID country teams play a key role in coordination and have been 
particularly pro-active in the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan, where coordination 
extends to a lead role in both harmonisation (JCSS) and alignment (CDP) initiatives. 
                                                 
 
29 Case Study: Migration and Poverty Reduction in Tajikistan (author: Jones, undated) 
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Here there is a clear strategic imperative and harmonisation and alignment (Paris 
Principles) are part of emerging country level post RAP strategies. In Georgia and 
Armenia the engagement in harmonisation has been affected by staff changes. 
Coordination mechanisms are extensive in Armenia with multiple theme groups 
convened by UNDP but there seems little harmonised activity beyond information 
exchange. In Moldova (see country note) the investment in harmonisation seems 
excessive and may not be cost effective given the graduation trajectory. There is little 
region wide harmonisation with other donors not sharing the CASCM administrative 
unit. However there could be scope at sub regional level for more joined up strategy 
and harmonised engagement. 
3.60 There is evidence of good communication in-country with development partners 
reporting a clear understanding of DFID direction and intent. DFID’s graduation policy 
was less well appreciated or understood but this may be the way communication was 
received rather than how it was given reflecting a desire by development partners to 
encourage DFID to stay. London based management and Departmental and Divisional 
Directors have been effectively used to convey difficult messages to government and 
development partners and to engage at senior levels. 
Cross Cutting Strategies 
3.61 DFID does not seem to have had strategies for mainstreaming cross cutting issues 
within the CASCM region beyond those set at corporate level. Whilst there may be no 
significant regional and country level issues that require a specific approach this 
suggests a lack of emphasis and priority which seems to be reflected in practice. 
3.62 There was no discrete Gender Strategy in the Moldova CSP or CASC SP. The RAP 
includes a gender perspective to its analysis of inequality but there is no explicit 
prioritisation of gender in terms of mainstreaming or gender policy although it was 
given prominence by the social development advisers and key members of the in-
country teams. 
3.63 Alongside the HIV/AIDS regional programme in Central Asia, the mainstreaming of 
HIV/AIDS was also specified in the RAP objectives. However, there was no initial 
follow up and following the decision in 2005 to limit the scale of the whole CASCM 
regional programme no further action on mainstreaming was taken. At country level, 
some discussion has taken place, i.e. in the Kyrgyz Republic the mainstreaming of 
HIV/AIDS has been explored as part of sector wide working but no action has resulted.  
3.64 In the current low and concentrated epidemic situation, mainstreaming of HIV is not a 
top priority. Putting mainstreaming on DFID’s agenda around 2003/2004 was intended 
to stimulate discussion and ensure that HIV/AIDS would be looked at systematically. 
3.65 The environment is a significant issue in the region; mainly ‘brown’ environmental 
issues - soil erosion, and ‘gray’ issues – industrial/urban pollution part of the Soviet 
legacy. Earlier in the period there were specific country focused environmental 
initiatives but now DFID’s assistance, which focuses on moving to clean(er) energy, is 
largely channelled through European initiatives. These include the EC Central Asia 
Strategy for Water; Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) 
Environment for Europe (EfE), channelled through DFID; Project Preparation 
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Committee as part of EfE advice on environmental investments; Partners for 
Environmental Cooperation in Europe (PECE); and the EBRD Sustainable Energy 
Initiative (SEI). The cross-Whitehall working with Defra, and European-scale 
initiatives are very appropriate responses. With Defra facing budget and headcount 
cuts, and CASCM ceasing to exist as an entity, ECAD must ensure that sufficient 
momentum is maintained in these areas. 
Resources 
3.66 The DFID Aid Framework for CASCM, as set out in the CASC SP and the Moldova 
CSP, showed a total commitment to the CASCM region of £8.75m in 2000/01 rising to 
£10.25m in 20002/03. The allocation for 2002/03 was subsequently revised to 
£13.84m. Allocations to continued to rise too £14.7m in 2003/04, £16.1m in 2004/05, 
and £22.8m in 2005/06 before dropping to £19.7m in 2006/07. The increased resources 
were provided as part of the general increase in DFID budgets. Budgets were not 
known when the CASC SP and the Moldova CSP were drafted but increases were 
expected when the RAP was prepared. 
3.67 Of this allocation spend in Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Tajikistan remained within 
the RAP planned limits whereas that in the Kyrgyz Republic grew; doubling in 2005/06 
with a commensurate cut in the expenditure on regional activities. 
3.68 Since the budget allocations were not linked to the RAP objectives it is not possible to 
say how far the strategies were appropriate to the level of resources anticipated. 
Country level strategies including the decision to limit developments in the South 
Caucasus and Moldova prior to expected graduation and the decision not to pursue 
regional work are reflected in the allocations and the expenditure. 
3.69 Based on the financial information provided by CASCM the evaluation team analysed 
the levels of spending and the financial performance of the programme. Table A in 
Annex 10 sets out the spend by sector and each country’s proportion of overall spend in 
the sector 2004/5 - 2006/7. The notes in the annex summarise the analysis of the trends 
which supports the conclusion that over 75% of the programme is under Objective 1 
(para. 3.32). 
3.70 It appears that the CASC SP and the Moldova CSP were adequately resourced and this 
supported the move from the KHF multi-project financing to a more coherent country 
focused programme. However all the CASCM country programmes remained relatively 
small, and a huge gap existed between the resources anticipated and the ambitious 
objectives of the RAP. Similarly the 2005 decisions to restrict spend and headcount and 
hasten graduation were appropriate in a pragmatic sense as well as being responsive to 
corporate pressures. These decisions effectively set new priorities for CASCM within 
which the RAP objectives took lower priority. The modified strategy was more 
appropriate to the level of resources and the changing corporate context. However at 
individual programme level there is some evidence that DFID assistance may have 
been “too much too soon”. For example disbursing £3.3m over three years on social 
assistance in Moldova (with Sida acting as a silent partner) seems excessive – given the 
limited absorption capacity of the Ministry in charge. 
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3.71 In terms of human resources the geographic spread of adviser inputs covers not only 
CASCM but the whole of ECAD for some disciplines (statistics, health, and 
infrastructure/environment.). Whilst the project workload may not appear excessive, 
travel and the need for knowledge of a wide range of countries has stretched capacity, 
reinforcing the country and adviser focus and reducing the space available for regional 
and country level work. 
3.72 Prior to 2004 most programmes were managed from London with limited in-country 
presence provided by SAIC teams. Despite the low levels of programme expenditure 
quite a large London based team was need to cover all countries in the region. 
3.73 Task allocation changed significantly over the 2002-07 period, as country office staff 
spent more time on processes (donor dialogue) and less time on project management. 
This required new skills, such as influencing, as well as support from the CASCM team 
in London. Access to more advisers, notably governance advisers, would have helped 
in this regard. A further issue impacting on country offices was staff turnover in 
London; this seems to have the most significant effect on Armenia. 
3.74 One of the limitations in the allocation of resources at regional level was not so much 
about the level of resources available but the absence of a systematic approach to share 
experience across similar programmes in the region. The location of advisers in London 
and the relative imbalance of adviser and programme management staffing aggravated 
this and weakened capacity to respond to the challenges of the strategy. 
Results focus 
3.75 Good logframes and attention to results in Output to Purpose Reviews (OPRs) and 
Annual Reviews (ARs) show that project interventions are results focused and 
monitorable. Interviews with contractors and project partners revealed that they acted 
on the recommendations and follow up actions in OPRs and ARs, making adjustments 
to refocus in line with programme objectives. In specific cases the results orientation in 
ARs was confirmed by partners and contractors (e.g. APSREP, ARDEP, and RWSS). 
3.76 Design, direction and resources at project level have been revised based on these well 
carried out reviews. However there is less evidence of revision at programme, country 
or regional level. For example the slow results in APSREP and ARDEP could have led 
to revision of other reforms, a different role for country based staff, adjustments to 
projects of other donors requiring revision of staff time, and may have led to 
reconsideration of the ambitious nature of similar reforms elsewhere in the region. We 
conclude that CASCM manages well at project level but does not utilise these results 
and lessons for higher level learning and management decisions. 
3.77 The RAP monitoring framework was a well-conceived initiative not seen in most 
country or regional programmes, but it was over designed and underused. The 
monitoring framework design process was lengthy and the framework over complex. 
For example Version 2 of the Users’ Guide, produced in December 2006 with only a 
year of the RAP left, is far too lengthy; a 186 page guide to monitor a RAP that is 30 
pages long. The Country Results Frameworks were completed well (possibly due to 
good progress chasing) and are coherent with programme performance at country level. 
The reporting and discussion at In-Weeks provided a structure for peer review but 
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comparison across countries is only documented once and it appears that aggregation at 
regional level was never attempted. This process provided added value for country 
teams but there is little evidence of the monitoring framework results informing 
management decisions. The organisational effectiveness data was also well recorded 
and covered key issues but there seems to have been no related management decisions. 
3.78 The continued use of the monitoring framework indicates a level of diligence and 
commitment that was not reinforced. The framework enabled country decisions to be 
tracked and provided a monitorable narrative of progress. It could have been used more 
effectively for regional level decisions and as the basis for support to country teams and 
for resource decisions.  
3.79 Graduation – exit of DFID – is a decision that is informed by Government Policy 
(Foreign Policy as well as Development Policy), the stage of economic development 
(MIC status), the presence of alternative development support (EC and other EU 
member states in particular), as well as the results of DFID’s programme performance. 
The graduation decisions for CASCM, though triggered by MIC indicators, clearly took 
account of other donor activity and poverty impact (Mid Term Options and Submissions 
2005). However the final decisions seem to have been driven by managerial pressures 
to reduce the ECAD programme. 
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4. CASCM Programme Effectiveness and Efficiency 
4.1 One of the key performance measures of any development programme is its success in 
engaging with the processes of change and development within the country or countries 
concerned and the delivery of results in a timely and efficient manner. An assessment 
of the extent to which the DFID CASCM Programme achieved these objectives is 
presented in this chapter. 
Delivering the Strategy 
4.2 The RAP monitoring framework shows a significant number of ‘green’ milestone 
scores (45) for Country Objective 1 compared to ‘orange’ (7) and ‘red’ (14) for 
2006/07 and the scores for preceding years show a similar trend. Progress was weaker 
under ‘basic services for the poor’ and this under-achievement is in part due to the 
overambitious nature of the objective (Armenia), government performance (linked to 
donor coordination in Moldova) and project level factors (Armenia and Kyrgyz 
Republic). For Objectives 2 and 3 there is much less data, reflecting the lower 
programme content. There is even less content in the framework related to regional 
objectives with no activity in relation to HIV/AIDS outside the sub-regional 
programme and regional cooperation limited to EC, ENP and conflict related activity. 
Table B of Annex 11 summarises the reported position as at April 2007. 
4.3 The programme bias towards Objective 1 was predictable and to an extent was 
informed by corporate emphases. However, country level decisions and adviser interest 
played a part and the programme could have been managed with greater emphasis on 
pro-poor growth (objective 2) and non-GCPP activity related to conflict (objective 3). 
At regional level the country emphasis under the CSPs was followed with a regional 
commitment at the start of the RAP period but this was not sustained. The Monitoring 
Framework results should have alerted management to the trends in performance and 
country level orientation but this does not seem to have happened. 
4.4 As time elapsed the RAP became less significant to advisers and country level staff as 
project management became a more important priority for the former and as future 
planning for graduation in Moldova and the South Caucasus and scaling up in Central 
Asia dominated attention. The view expressed by many advisers is that after an initially 
strong momentum at design stage, the RAP monitoring framework fell down the list of 
priorities, in large part because there was no clear lines of accountability at 
management level and because the RAP was not linked to other reporting cycles such 
as the Directors Delivery Plan (DDP) and Public Service Agreements (PSA). 
4.5 DFID has responded well to the shift in emphasis, from the KHF CIS wide project 
approaches, through a country focused CSP, to a more strategic RAP and now to 
graduation/scaling up as the main strategic thrust – the latter largely determined by 
senior management and ministers rather than country or regional issues. Political risks 
at country level notably in Central Asia were also managed well, though the fragile 
state nature of Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic do not seem to have led to a 
differential approach to programme development aside from the decision, based on 
internal studies by the CASCM team, not to pursue budget support. 
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4.6 At country level DFID has been surprisingly influential, given the small size of the 
programmes, through its commitment to harmonisation and coordination activity. The 
collective endorsement of PRS and MTEF models has coalesced Development 
partners’ commitments especially for other EU bilaterals and the World Bank, less so 
for the EC. DFID has responded to WB priorities in Moldova and the South Caucasus 
by providing TA support to WB lending. Government policy in the governance sphere 
seems to have been aligned to DFID interest (as much as vice versa) in Moldova and 
the South Caucasus. This is possibly a function of weaker bureaucrat and technical 
development which has been more susceptible to TA influence throughout the post 
soviet era. In Central Asia the DFID role in the development of JCSS and CDS has 
been significant, especially in the Kyrgyz Republic where it has played a sensitive 
catalytic role with both other development partners and Government. 
Results 
4.7 Of 87 purpose level scores assessed by ARs, OPRs and Project Completion Reports 
(PCRs) during the 2002-07 period, 10% scored 1, 46% 2, and 33% 330. (see Table 4 for 
country level details). This gives 56% at 2 or above compared with 81% in the 2006/07 
period (RAP Monitoring Framework Organisational Effectiveness Report). 
4.8 This divergence seems to be due to the decline in the number of interventions as the 
programme reduces in scale and increased attention given to reviews. A further factor is 
the loss of weaker performing activities in the South Caucasus where there was a larger 
proportion of lower scores. Overall results have been good and have improved during 
the period being evaluated. There are a significant number of 3’s for PSR programmes 
reflecting the particular difficulties encountered. 
4.9 Overall comments in the reviews suggest that performance is good with the apparent 
poor results being due to more complex interventions being adopted and interventions 
requiring longer timeframes before they become effective. 
4.10 The key features that influenced performance were: 
a) PSR is complex and difficult to implement especially where Government is new or 
where their capacity is weak as in these emerging states.  
b) Objectives became more ambitious shifting from relatively focused technical 
assistance to sophisticated and comprehensive changes that required a higher level of 
political will and more sustained leadership/championing. 
c) Continuing from the KHF there was a pattern early in the evaluation period of 
recruiting individual consultants for serial short term contracts. This shifted to more 
substantial contracts awarded through competitive tender to larger internationally 
experienced companies. Governments welcomed this as it brought higher quality 
                                                 
 
30 Under the DFID OPR Scoring system: 1. = Likely to be completely achieved. 2. = Likely to be largely 
achieved. 3. = Likely to be partly achieved. 
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expertise. However, individual counterparts commented that they preferred individual 
consultants who gave continuous coaching and consistent senior consultant inputs 
rather than multiple short term inputs by consultant firms. Also individual consultant 
support was bespoke and less formulaic which they feel is more appropriate. 
d) Planned and sequenced interventions are required to ensure continuity of reform. 
This was not always evident. 
e) Good practice in engaging with lead Ministries (ARDEP in Armenia) and cross 
Ministry working (GSAC in Kyrgyz Republic); less effective engagement with civil 
society; synergies with other Development Partner programmes especially the World 
Bank was variable and depended excessively on maintaining personal relationships. 
Table 4. Annual Review Purpose Scores 
Frequency of Scores Country 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Total 
Uzbekistan 1 2 1 (100%)    4 
Turkmenistan   1 (100%)    1 
Tajikistan 1 (17%) 1 (17%) 3 (50%)   1 (17%) 6 
Moldova 1 (11%) 6 (67%)    2 (22%) 9 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 
 13 (62%) 6 (29%) 2 (10%)   21 
Kazakhstan 1 (33%)  2 (67%)    3 
Georgia  2 (20%) 6 (60%) 1 (10%)  1 (10%) 10 
Regional  10 (83%) 2 (17%)    12 
Azerbaijan   3 (100%)    3 
Armenia 5 (28%) 6 (33%) 5 (28%)   2 (11%) 18 
Total 9 (10%) 40 (46%) 29 (33%) 3 (3%)  6 (7%) 87 (100%) 
Scores taken from the DFID recording system (PRISM) show the purpose level scores given by Annual Reviews. According 
to the DFID system these scores reflect the following: 
1. = Likely to be completely achieved. The outputs /purpose are well on the way to completion (or completed) 
2. = Likely to be largely achieved. There is good progress towards purpose completion and most outputs have been 
achieved, particularly the most important ones. 
3. = Likely to be partly achieved. Only partial achievement of the purpose is likely and/or achievement of some outputs. 
4. = Only likely to be achieved to a very limited extent. Purpose unlikely to be achieved but a few outputs likely to be 
achieved. 
5. = Unlikely to be achieved. No progress on outputs or purpose 
6. = Too early to judge.  It is impossible to say whether there has been any progress towards the final achievement of outputs 
or purpose. This should be used sparingly. 
4.11 Over the evaluation period, there was a switch from hiring short-term international 
consultants to hiring long-term international consultants, supported by a team of local 
consultants. This was welcomed by governments in the region. PSR and PFM 
programmes for example often require ‘constant coaching’ to monitor the real impact 
of interventions and in the case of MTEF and PBP to introduce technical changes. 
Similar process approaches were adopted in the rural development and water sectors in 
the Kyrgyz Republic and are also evident in the health sector. These changes were 
matched by flexibility in amending and adjusting the logframes as programmes 
developed further demonstrating a sensitive approach to programme management. 
4.12 Even though relatively small programmes the synergies within the DFID interventions 
were significant. Government counterparts often saw the programmes as a whole 
package rather than a set of separate interventions. As a result each programme gained 
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in relevance and efficiency. There are examples across the region from the Kyrgyz 
Republic where G-SAC TA provides cross sector links and support to health initiatives; 
to Armenia, where strong links existed between the MTEF, APSREP, and ARDEP.  
4.13 In the latter case the decision not to renew the APSREP in its final year may have been 
short-sighted. APSREP could have capitalised on the introduction of programme 
budgeting to show success in turning Ministries into policy-making entities. Similarly, 
the programme could have capitalised on DFID’s successful lobbying in introducing 
new directions for public sector reforms in the second PRSP. APSREP was over-
ambitious in its scope yet, its achievements in terms of changing mentality and creating 
enough momentum for government counterparts to be willing to continue the 
programme of reforms with or without DFID remain significant.  
4.14 Incorporating capacity building and accountability by working with both civil society 
and government has contributed to the successes even though, with the soviet 
inheritance of weak civil structures and little tradition of rights, it has been difficult. 
There are examples of good practice in Armenia around public access and civil society 
engagement in local level planning (APSREP and ARDEP) and in the rural 
development and local government initiatives in the Kyrgyz Republic. Continued 
support for this broader capacity building of democratic civil society could have 
profitably continued alongside the more project specific demand side initiatives. 
4.15 Some changes are technically easier to introduce. For example, introducing MTEF is a 
relatively simple task. On the other hand, introducing programme-based budgeting is 
more complex as it needs to involve line ministries. Similarly, trying to link the MTEF 
to the PRSP makes little sense in the absence of comprehensive operational plans. In 
Moldova, their first PRSP was not operational enough to be linked to the MTEF. Their 
new PRSP, National Development Plan, is now more operational and could feed into 
the MTEF but ideally requires continued support. 
4.16 Similarly, some changes are less politically sensitive to implement. In Moldova, where 
DFID contributes to a WB-managed MDTF to support the government’s Central 
Administration Reform programme, the government selected some interventions –
downsizing of central administration – without first introducing more complex 
measures, such as a merit-based approach to promotion. As a result, the number of staff 
in some Ministries has been reduced, but the quality of staff has failed to improve. In 
this context, discretionary actions can undermine the effectiveness of PSR programmes, 
as much as a general lack of political will.  
4.17 The Georgia Social Statistical Project – which scored 2 in the first three years of its 
implementation – is a good example of a clashing agenda between the Development 
partners and the government. As written in a Back to Office Report in December 2006 
‘the major achievement of the project, the Integrated Household Survey, has come 
under question for the quality of the data. Latest data shows that poverty has increased 
over the past year, despite economic growth; and the Prime Minister and Minister of 
Economy have questioned the validity of the data’. As the project stalled, it was agreed 
to close it down and it is now very unlikely that developments will be sustained. 
4.18 The success of individual projects also depended on London staff time and project 
allocation. The advantage of a single adviser being responsible for similar programmes 
across the region is the opportunity of sharing experience and identifying best practice. 
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Programmes in support of the statistical offices in the Kyrgyz Republic, and until 
recently, Georgia, Armenia and Moldova, were relatively successful – in part because 
London staff were able to learn and share lessons from one programme to the next. 
However the pressures of a wide span of responsibility often mitigate against such 
learning and its extension across the wider CASCM team. 
4.19 Assessing results with respect to GCPP presents a particular problem. Reporting the 
effectiveness of GCPP projects entails a high level of trust in the perceptions of the 
primary partners. The very nature of cross-border, civil society projects in countries 
without a highly developed civil society is that they require a considerable level of sub-
contracting to entities without a capacity for full accountability. The GCPP operates ‘at 
scale’ – in other words, it prefers to disburse large grants through London-based NGOs. 
These in turn subcontract national NGOs who then often sub-contract again to sub-
national entities. With budgetary constraints across all UK departments, only cursory 
project monitoring is possible.  
Efficiency 
4.20 Disbursement in 2004/05 was 7.5% above framework; in 2005/06 in was 8% below the 
framework figure and in 2006/07 even closer. This suggests that disbursements were in 
line with expectations and plans. There is no data on financial performance by objective 
or sector and little at project/programme level but overall financial management within 
CASCM at project, country and London levels seems sound. 
4.21 The recent effective devolution of responsibilities to the country office in the Kyrgyz 
Republic and currently to Tajikistan are further indicators of the good team working 
around administrative and financial tasks. It does however beg the question as to 
whether greater delegation could have been possible earlier and to what extent the level 
of staffing was appropriate for the workload. 
4.22 There are no available comparative figures for the levels of administrative cost for 
similar programmes or the staffing level of programme management teams. Geographic 
diversity, the mix of instruments and interventions and many other factors make such 
comparisons difficult. In particular only a small number of groups of countries 
managed from London remain and they have their own challenges and requirements. 
Nevertheless the level of programme management support seems generous. 
4.23 The RPE team worked closely with the Department Finance Officer (DFO) and 
managers within ECAD to build up a model of the administrative costs to enable some 
comparisons within CASCM itself. Table 5 shows a summary of administration costs 
for country offices and the London based CASCM team based on actual spend for each 
of the last three years of the RAP. This information together with the programme 
expenditure data provided the basis for the model. Overall administrative cost as a 
proportion of programme spend was 12% which gives an indication of the efficiency of 
the CASCM team. During these three years the proportion of the administration costs 
spent in-country was 41%, 36.4% and 41% respectively (see table 5). However these 
figures do not take account of how the London costs vary between the five CASCM 
countries. Table 6 attempts this analysis for 2006/07 using the data provided by ECAD. 
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Table 5. Administration costs for CASCM country offices 
and London based team 2004/5 - 2006/7 
 
2004-05 2005-06 2006-07
Country office Costs
Armenia 118,702 96,790 123,071
Gerogia 55,015 113,999 86,561
Kyrgyz Republic 179,236 203,309 265,653
Moldova 136,942 114,412 84,896
Tajikistan 136,761 81,452 206,744
626,656 609,962 766,925
London Costs
CASCM Regional Teams 40,752 113,580 86,019
CASCM Team London 813,527 894,797 938,585
London General* 43,186 56,311 70,223
897,465 1,064,688 1,094,827
Total 1,524,121 1,674,650 1,861,752
* This cost is 10% of the total admin for London (excl salaries)  
4.24 Using an apportionment of adviser time provided by ECAD and of programme 
management time based on the self reporting of staff time combined with other costs, 
the table shows the notional overall administration cost, London based costs and total 
administration cost as a proportion of programme spend for each country. 
4.25 The administrative cost per country as a proportion of total administration cost is close 
to the 12% overall average for Moldova (13%), Georgia (11%) and the Kyrgyz 
Republic (11%). Armenia is higher due to the declining scale of the programme and 
Tajikistan due to the number of UK appointed staff in a growing programme. The 
proportion of London costs to country administrative costs for the Kyrgyz Republic and 
Tajikistan is a consequence of the devolution of these two programmes. Similarly the 
larger share of total admin costs is a result of the number of UK appointed staff but 
country based staff supporting these programmes. The conclusion the RPE draws is that 
a small devolved country office with a mix of UK appointed and SAIC staff is able to 
be at least as efficient as similar programmes where the support is based in London. 
4.26 This conclusion does not detract from the positive findings with respect to the 
programme and administrative support within the CASCM team but it does suggest that 
the conventional wisdom that UK based staff in-country are expensive may mask 
efficiency savings. At the very least the need to carry out further analysis across similar 
programmes is indicated. 
4.27 The RPE found good project/programme management led by the London based 
programme management team and supported by advisers together with well maintained 
OPRs and PCRs and strong corporate reporting – all indicative of the priority given to 
project/programme work. Influencing and Government/Development Partner 
liaison/coordination led by country teams was especially strong in Central Asia where 
there were UK appointed heads of office. In Moldova and South Caucasus the strength 
of the engagement depended on the experience and confidence of the head of office and 
the extent of supervision and support from London (with some impact from the FCO 
where differential views of capacity/role of locally engaged staff was evident).  
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Table 6. Administration costs for each CASCM country 2006/07 
The table shows administration costs for 2006/7 for each of the CASCM countries including notional salary costs for the London based team of 
programme managers and advisors; and apportioning non salary administrative costs between countries and London. 
Administration Costs Moldova Armenia Georgia Tajikistan Kyrgyz Rep Total
Salaries - Advisors 1 £56,136 £21,876 £39,581 £97,553 £91,641 £306,786
Salaries - London CASCM Team 1 £58,934 £57,666 £57,666 £50,199 £50,199 £274,664
Office costs - London 2 £234,914 £229,861 £229,861 £200,096 £200,096 £1,094,827
Office costs - in-country 3 £84,896 £123,071 £86,561 £206,744 £265,653 £766,925
Total £434,879 £432,474 £413,669 £554,592 £607,588 £2,443,202
Spend on Projects 4 £2,978,117 £1,776,201 £3,319,292 £3,188,062 £5,129,932 £17,705,115
Total Spent (Projects + Admin) £3,412,996 £2,208,675 £3,732,961 £3,742,654 £5,737,520 £20,148,317
Proportion of total spent on Admin 13% 20% 11% 15% 11% 12%
Proportion of London CASCM salary costs 5 21% 21% 21% 18% 18%
Proportion of Total CASCM admin costs 18% 18% 17% 23% 25%
Note
1
2
3
4
5 Percentage used to apportion administrative costs of London CASCM team to individual countries.
The total spend includes £1,313,511 spent regionally in addition to spend in each country.
Calcuations based on annual salary divided between countries based on estimates of time spent working in each.
London costs include a) CASCM team b)regional costs and c) 37% of admin in London (based on size of CASCM team)
Costs of administering country offices, including salaries of staff appointed in country (SAIC).
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4.28 The turnover and relative inexperience of some advisors, coupled with advisory 
responsibilities across more of ECAD and in some cases all ECAD countries, has 
significantly increased the number of projects advisors are responsible for, leading to a 
reduction in capacity for policy and influencing. The more experienced project based 
programme management/administration team focus more on project/programme work 
with the more experienced advisers, in-country heads, and Team Leader/Deputy Team 
Leader leading on influence and policy. Generally there seems to be a lower priority 
given to non project work. Recent decentralisation has shifted project work to country 
offices without increasing non project work in London. In part this is a factor of the 
declining morale as some team members prepare to leave and graduation approaches. 
4.29 Most UK appointed staff are London based with country teams predominantly SAIC. 
The skill mix of advisers ‘slipped’ from growth to governance when the long term 
livelihoods adviser/consultant left and her programme responsibilities shifted to and 
was split between the Social Development and Governance Advisers. Consequently 
programme emphasis moved from livelihoods to social protection and 
governance/institutions. There was a deliberate attempt to bring lessons from livelihood 
projects into new regional programmes focusing on the wider governance context. 
4.30 During KHF long term consultants were used as ‘advisers’ in key sectors providing a 
degree of continuity which continued into the CSP with more long term involvement 
than the usual 2-3 year term for a DFID advisor. More recently staff turnover has 
increased and continuity has been disrupted. With fewer programme posts in London 
there is a limited pool of interested people who are willing or able to work on London 
based programmes like CASCM. Age and experience are thus lower in the CASCM 
and wider ECAD teams at present.  
4.31 This increases the need for appropriate staff development, supervision and work 
planning to meet the new more strategic challenges facing DFID and the importance of 
influence, continuity of impact and lesson learning as programmes move to graduation. 
Smaller programmes in MICs need more than efficient programme management if 
these limited inputs are to have maximum impact. Closer Development Partner and 
Government relationships that go beyond project level harmonisation need to be 
developed and the team may not have had the skills to make these contributions across 
such a broad spread of countries. 
4.32 Prior to 2004 there was the usual pattern of small in-country development sections 
within the Embassies, line managed by the FCO. The RAP and the OPM review 
proposed a stronger in-country role with more flexibility and delegation. The CASCM 
team leader proposed increasing in-country teams (from 19.5 to 25 in all) to give 4 staff 
in focus countries including at least one adviser post and a reduction of the London 
team from 20 (9 advisers/11 admin) to 14 (8 advisers, 6 administrators). Given the 2004 
Resource Allocation/Spending Round restrictions the DDP 2005-08 proposed reducing 
the number of country programmes and limiting expenditure on MICs. The impact on 
CASCM was to catalyse the graduation debate and limit administration cost increases. 
Thus by 2007 the London team had reduced to 15 (6 advisers, 9 administrators) and 
country teams stabilised to 17 with the increase to 4 per country only in Central Asia, 
the other focus countries remaining at 3 SAIC staff. The RAP challenges were thus 
appreciated by the Team Leader and EMAD Director but the proposals to strengthen 
the organisational structure were not implemented. London based management and 
weaker country teams continued until 2006 when devolution to Central Asia began. 
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The imbalance of London based programme management compared to advisers 
perpetuated quality programme management at the expense of a strong country led 
policy and influencing approach. 
4.33 The net result was efficient management but given the decisions to graduate more 
country level flexibility and delegation would have been useful to embed lessons and 
deepen relationships prior to closure. The decision of some staff to leave prematurely in 
Georgia and Armenia was an expected and inevitable risk but more country level 
authority and an enhanced role with specific responsibilities may have increased 
continuity at this critical stage. More time from London based managers during the pre-
graduation period is needed to address the continuity, influence and lesson learning and 
to establish patterns for future relationships which focus more on the practical aspects 
related to human resources, project and office closure. 
4.34 In addition to GCPP there has been good cross-Whitehall working with Defra in 
relation to the environment (para 3.65), around Central Asia policy with the Foreign 
Office, and in relation to EU issues. Currently CASCM countries are of limited geo-
political interest compared to others within EMAD (e.g. Russia and the EU 
accession/pre-accession countries) and as a consequence there comparatively less 
cross-Whitehall engagement. For GCPP the appointment of a consultant (funded by 
DFID though working to all three partners – DFID, MoD, FCO) has improved 
programme strategy and administration and given DFID increased leverage. The 
programme management and adviser inputs are modest compared to other parts of the 
CASCM programme. 
Aid Effectiveness 
4.35 The RPE found a surprisingly broad mix of interventions given the size and scale of 
the programmes – with joint donor strategies (e.g. JCSS in Central Asia), stand alone 
major projects (e.g. APSREP and ARDEP in Armenia), small scale strategic funds 
(especially as utilised in the Kyrgyz Republic and Moldova), sector support (health 
sector SWAp in the Kyrgyz Republic and Georgia) and PRBS through pooled finance 
(e.g. PRSC in Moldova). The shift towards budget support was encouraged by 
management (Management Board and Divisional Director Jan/April 2005) despite the 
caution in the OPM review. Also a narrowing of sector focus and a restriction of new 
initiatives was encouraged as a way of limiting investment. 
4.36 On the one hand this mix of interventions appears an effective way of delivering 
effective aid in small country programmes. However the selection does not always 
appear to have been sensitive to country context or the influencing and graduation 
context. Budget Support is a long term intervention and is of doubtful effectiveness in 
Moldova as DFID moves towards graduation. Similarly to opt for policy based 
interventions in Central Asia with its level of fragility goes against Fragile State policy. 
4.37 The classic aid effectiveness arguments seem to have been followed with the 
development of expected larger and longer term support in Central Asia – PRSP, 
MTEF, sector support, joint donor working and Government alignment behind the 
Country Development Strategies (CDSs). There is however a concern as to how 
effective this level of alignment is given the fragile state context. In the remaining 
countries the level of influence and visibility of DFID seems variable and depends 
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more on staffing and Development Partner/Government relations than the mix of 
interventions. For example DFID often relied on senior government officials to 
champion their programmes within Ministries. Targeting the mid/high-level civil 
servants is relevant to ensure continuity outside the political cycle. There is, however, a 
risk attached to assimilating champions or forward-looking government counterparts as 
“the government” should there be a change in leadership at the top. 
4.38 DFID also worked with selected sectors to promote PSR. In Armenia, selected Pilot 
Ministries were involved in the PSR Programme. Targeting specific sectors to promote 
what should be in essence whole-of-government reforms also entails a risk. Working 
with Pilot Ministries does not guarantee government buy-in at the top. This is 
particularly the case in Armenia, where an all-party government is in place. 
4.39 The relative failure of APSREP calls for lessons to be learned for similar programmes 
supported by DFID elsewhere. DFID should have awaited clear signals of support from 
the World Bank to start such an ambitious programme; close relationships with top 
decision makers and flexibility with the logframe would have also helped to influence 
and accompany the process, by focusing on a selected number of components more 
likely to succeed.  
4.40 The OPM review comment, ‘DFID should have a general strategic bias towards 
selecting activities that are in themselves short-term (and that can achieve impact 
without requiring future government financial commitments that may not be 
forthcoming), but that work within a longer-term context and understanding of change 
processes affecting a sector, and that are designed to be complementary to programmes 
that are providing greater financial resources’ (OPM 2003), suggests a more flexible 
short term opportunistic approach. The MTEF support in Armenia fits this model but 
the more substantive PSR TA that followed may be less effective given the imminent 
graduation – more time was needed for the more ambitious investment and a stronger 
emphasis on influencing other Development partners (EC and WB) may have been 
more effective than large TA projects which ideally need further phases of support. 
4.41 The evaluation found complementary approaches in terms of the range of interventions 
in most countries but raised concerns over whether some aspects of context (fragility, 
graduation, future role of other Development partners) were always taken into account. 
Synergies and learning across the region is less evident – for example, did the PSR 
interventions learn from each other? Even where a single contractor is responsible 
differences in timeframe and context do not seem to have been taken into account. 
4.42 Harmonisation has been given a high priority across the region. In part this is in 
response to the management steer (April 05) following the RAP and 2004 Spending 
Round where joint programming and shared offices were seen as efficiency gains rather 
than part of aid effectiveness. This ‘broad brush’ approach has not been sensitive to the 
country and sub-regional differences especially in terms of DFID’s own strategy of 
quick graduation (South Caucasus), medium term graduation (Moldova), and expansion 
(Central Asia). The exception is The Kyrgyz republic where DFID has played a 
strategic and catalytic role in the harmonisation process including the selection as a 
pilot country by OECD/DAC for a joint donor country strategy – the JCSS – and the 
joint support to the CDS. 
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4.43 EC and other EU bilateral donors are the main donors for DFID to influence in 
Moldova and the South Caucasus since they provide the best investment for 
continuation of DFID programming and for continued influence through EC and EU 
networks (e.g. EBRD). Engagement at country level has been mixed depending on the 
capacity and openness of the delegation. In Georgia and Moldova DFID was able to 
support advocacy activities by CSOs on promoting the EU Action Plans. DFID has also 
been able to provide support to the Government of Georgia to help them implement 
their commitments under the EU-Georgia Action Plan – notably the proposal to select 
an adviser on ENP implementation to the State Minister in charge of European 
Integration. Moldova, Georgia and Armenia have now drafted action plans to engage 
with the EU under the new European Neighbours Policy Instrument. These examples 
highlight the rationale for DFID engagement, areas of overlapping interests and actions 
for future engagement. The effectiveness of these interventions in shaping the EU 
Action Plans has been weakened by the lack of complementary support in Brussels. 
CASCM countries did not benefit from the experience of the EU team in London and 
remained isolated. The CASCM visit to Brussels in April 2006 and the follow up in 
November 2006 were rather late in the process to complement the in-country activity. 
4.44 The effectiveness of World Bank engagement has been mixed and dependent on 
specific programme and project synergies. The responsiveness of individual staff and 
heads of WB programmes has been a critical factor with changes of personnel on both 
sides causing some disruption which may have been mitigated by higher level 
engagement.  
4.45 The above discussion confirms the view that coordination at project/programme level 
alone is less stable. The process is more effective where there is more complete 
harmonisation as in the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan where DFID investment in the 
JCSS process has ensured more effective partnerships that have begun to build broader 
bases of Development Partner involvement with effective harmonisation and alignment 
involving WHO, UNICEF, World Bank, EC, SDC, ADB, and DFID in Tajikistan and 
formally ADB, WB, SDC and UN in the Kyrgyz Republic. 
4.46 Similarly alignment with Governments has been given priority with substantial formal 
effectiveness in Central Asia (CDS processes) as part of longer term strategic 
development. In Moldova and South Caucasus relationships continue to be positive 
with DFID seen as flexible, responsive and supportive. However the effectiveness in 
terms of DFID’s agenda is less clear with the emphasis on aspects of country Objective 
1 of the RAP and less effective delivery in Objective 2, and the regional objectives. 
4.47 The effectiveness of civil society engagement has been limited by need to develop 
democratic social organisation in the post soviet environment and the need for 
sustainable funding and support. DFID has been unable to deliver the latter in Moldova 
and South Caucasus though its project level engagement (e.g. PBF Moldova, APSREP 
and ARDEP Armenia) and small scale investment has been good and are based on 
sound analysis (INTRAC in Central Asia), relationships maintained by country teams 
and the GCPP process. In Central Asia more substantial investments have been possible 
(e.g. VIP, RDP) though the extremely weak and underdeveloped nature of civil society 
has limited what can be achieved. 
4.48 The Evaluation found good working relationships with other parts of the UK 
Government. However reactions to graduation from development programmes are 
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mixed, as the UK has reasons for engaging with countries that extend beyond 
development.  Balancing the range of needs requires good communication especially as 
working relationships become closer.  More sharing of policy priorities would enhance 
mutual understanding, and addressing the differences in approach to delegation to, and 
automony of locally engaged staff would improve teamworking, especially where the 
DFID head of office is locally engaged.  The networking and insights of DFID SAIC 
teams could also contribute to a more strategic approach to GCPP.  
4.49 In conclusion DFID has followed Aid Effectiveness Principles but may have overdone 
the emphasis (i.e. in Moldova) investing a disproportionate effort in donor coordination 
given the level of overall investment without being sensitive to the transaction costs. 
Generally there has been good practice in adopting Paris Principles of harmonisation 
and alignment linked to exit (Armenia and Georgia) and scaling up (Kyrgyz Republic 
and Tajikistan). MIC policy has been part of graduation/exit planning though it is 
unclear how far plans have been shared with other donors. Fragile State understandings 
have not been as influential, for example the level of emphasis given to Government 
led processes in The Kyrgyz Republic is a risk given the level of stability and less 
commitment to alignment at this stage would have been more effective. Similar 
cautions apply to Tajikistan.  
4.50 Internally, half yearly ‘In-weeks’, which provided a forum for lesson learning and 
reviewing the monitoring framework results, focussed on country level frameworks and 
were used to establish and endorse any changes of direction in programme delivery. At 
sector level, learning tended to be more project oriented, since it mainly appears to have 
taken place during project and programme reviews and depended on the extent to 
which individual advisers exchanged information and ideas. Learning within the 
department (ECAD) does not seem to have been very strong, for example the 
engagement with the EC by individual teams does not seem to have been shared. 
Communication generally has focused on the supply side – conference papers, events, 
media coverage – with only limited attempts at reputation benchmarking 
Cross Cutting Themes 
4.51 Gender is not overt in any of the governance and institutional interventions. Public 
Administration Reform (PAR) in particular seems heavily male dominated in terms of 
consultants and counterparts. The VIP programme in the Kyrgyz Republic and some of 
the earlier civil society analysis (INTRAC) does take a more gender sensitive approach 
but even here it could be stronger. Social exclusion is more prominent with ARDEP 
and VIP being strongly poverty focused and the PAR interventions, MTEF and PBP all 
having a strong pro-poor approach.  
4.52 HIV/AIDS has not been effectively mainstreamed throughout the programme other 
than in the sub-regional programme in Central Asia. Even here integration within the 
wider health sector is only at the discussion stage. 
4.53 Environmental protection has been limited to the rural development interventions 
evident at the beginning of the evaluation period and more recently in VIP and the 
water supply investments. The delivery on the environment has been at two levels; the 
operational level where some good practice has been noted as in the environmental 
appraisal at the start of VIP and the policy level through European initiatives, mainly 
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with Defra. The latter approach has demonstrated good cross-Whitehall working, 
closely tied to EC and multilateral strategies. A diverse range of topics were covered 
including solid waste (Armenia), alignment with the EU Water Directive (Moldova) 
and environmental management for nuclear waste in Kazakhstan. However, initiatives 
were mostly environmental ‘bolt-ons’ to existing projects, and hence not very strategic 
with contractors seeing them as just extra money for the project.  
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5. Development Impact of DFID’s CASCM Programme 
5.1 In this chapter, the development impacts that the support from DFID has helped to 
achieve are reviewed and the role of DFID support in strengthening the policy and 
governance environment evaluated. The overall development performance of countries 
in the CASCM region is discussed, including progress towards achieving the MDGs 
and PRSP achievements. The sustainability of the development changes and reforms 
supported by DFID is assessed along with the likelihood of the agenda being continued 
by other development partners. Finally the evaluation reviews the value added by DFID 
through gains in aid effectiveness. 
Impact of the five RAP Objectives 
5.2 Objective 1: Governance and the institutional environment for poverty reduction. 
DFID has helped CASCM governments to make and implement policy, by primarily 
focusing on processes. One salient question is to what extent the governments own, and 
are truly committed to, the package of reforms that DFID and other development 
partners support. All have publicly stated their intent to pursue Objective 1 and have 
pushed through reforms, albeit slowly and partially. The impact that this may have on 
effective policy implementation and eventually, progress towards poverty reduction is 
hard to measure. There are nonetheless claims that improved governance has translated 
into higher economic growth in the region. Overall, however, implementation capacity 
remains very weak and longer term investment is required.  
5.3 Evidence of the contributions made by DFID includes the fact that MTEFs are in place, 
pro-poor budgeting models are being adopted in all five countries, and progress in 
administrative reform in Moldova and Armenia has been made. There is also evidence 
of incremental improvements in governance and institutional capacity in Moldova, 
Armenia and the Kyrgyz Republic. Based on RPE visits, ARs and Country Results 
Frameworks (CRFs) there is evidence of impact in terms of service delivery in health 
and water in the Kyrgyz Republic and emerging evidence in Tajikistan. 
5.4 One of the most tangible impacts that government counterparts specifically identified in 
the PSR interventions was DFID’s contribution to changing mindset and introducing 
new ways of working within public administration. As one senior official said 
‘Ministries may be re-organised every 5-10 years, yet old habits remain entrenched, and 
patronage and clientelism continue’. Although organisational changes may be 
necessary (and this is often where there are the most delays – because of vested interest 
and lack of political will), what is needed in CASCM countries is a stronger focus on 
raising awareness, introducing new tools, and changing mindset. Hence, the main 
success of the APSREP has been linked to its work on redefining the role and 
responsibility of the country’s civil service. All government counterparts involved in 
DFID programmes highly appreciated the series of seminars held during the 
implementation of the project – especially those involving regional exchanges – as well 
as the provision of guidelines and other written materials.  
5.5 There is evidence of impact under Objective 2: pro-poor growth. from the rural and 
regional development programmes developed during the CSP periods when for 
example, S-RISP contributed to the establishment of 1285 new rural businesses; a 40% 
Development Impact of DFID’s CASCM Programme
 
48  
average increase in incomes for owners of new rural businesses; creation of 12 
permanent Third Party Arbitration Court (TPAC) offices; and the establishment of 12 
new Savings and Credit Associations. It was a resource intensive ‘project-shaped’ 
model that was difficult to take to scale and that did not lend itself to making sufficient 
regional social and economic policy impact. Subsequently there has been less impact as 
the programme under this objective has declined. 
5.6 The slow start to the regional development initiatives (ARDEP in Armenia and 
Moldova), which as noted focus more on governance reform than growth, and the 
limited growth impact of the civil society initiatives (VIP in the Kyrgyz Republic) have 
resulted in little significant contemporary impact with respect to the growth objective. 
5.7 The key impact of Objective 3: resolution of conflicts and peace building is at 
strategy level with cross Whitehall management of GCPP. Otherwise impact is at the 
individual GCPP project level; However, there are no specific indicators in places to 
show process impact at this project level. UK inter-departmental linkages (MoD, DFID 
and FCO) and the development of common approaches through the GCPP have been 
exemplary. The danger is that graduation to a watching brief only and/or the 
‘regionalization’ of instruments and staff inputs may result in setbacks in-country. 
Lessons derived from the specificities of Moldova and South Caucasus may not easily 
translate into new approaches within bilateral programmes in the Kyrgyz Republic and 
Tajikistan. Nevertheless, at the policy level (conflict analysis and the newly developing 
monitoring tools) the GCPP has the potential for lasting impact. 
5.8 For the first regional issue and Objective 4: HIV/AIDS, the number of people (IDU, 
sex workers and their clients and Men have sex with Men (MSM)) actually benefiting 
from prevention and treatment services provided are quite small compared to the 
estimated number of these sub-populations. Also antiretroviral (ARV) therapy is not 
available in most countries, meaning that HIV positive IDU, sex workers and MSM, 
mostly do not have access to ARVs. In terms of policy and strategy development, 
CARHAP/DFID has been able to influence the national strategic plans for HIV and 
AIDS so that harm reduction has been reflected in the plan. DFID also has been able to 
influence the Global Fund (GF) and WB projects through the provision of TA and 
through participation in the development, management coordination bodies and 
supervisory activities of these programmes. 
5.9 Wider impact across the region has suffered through the failure to mainstream 
HIV/AIDS beyond Central Asia. With respect to health more generally, whilst as the 
delivery of basic services this falls under Objective 1, it is appropriate to mention here 
that it is questionable how much the sector support to health in the Kyrgyz Republic 
has impacted on health outcomes. However, the health sector reforms have contributed 
to improved accountability and responsiveness and the health SWAp in the Kyrgyz 
Republic is a model for the rest of the region. DFID, together with other development 
partners, has been instrumental in reaching this stage of a national owned health 
strategy, donor harmonization, and a joint Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) 
framework. However DFID made a strategic choice to support a sector wide approach 
in this sector as it was more open to collaboration and had less problems with 
corruption than other sectors. 
5.10 Under the second regional theme, Objective 5: regional trade and cooperation, there 
is little impact in either. Despite the key role of regional rural development work and 
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more recently the reported successful role in Brussels (see RAP Monitoring Report 
2006) the limited investment of resources, and blocks to regional links have prevented 
much impact. 
Policy and Governance Environment 
5.11 The main international data sources that can be used to monitor progress under 
governance are the World Bank’s International Development Association Resource 
Allocation Index (IRAI, formerly CPIA). Other sources include the World Bank’s 
Doing Business Report and Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index 
(TI CPI), International Monetary Fund (IMF) Country Reports, as well as Public 
Expenditure Reviews (PERs) and PEFAs. 
5.12 Evidence from these sources suggests that the heavy investment in governance and 
public institutional frameworks may have resulted in some capacity improvement. The 
new TI CPI report shows improvements for CIS states where EU accession has made 
an impact. This is the case of Armenia and to a greater extent Georgia however the CPI 
scores for Moldova, Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic have marginally declined. 
Other indicators, confirmed by discussions during the evaluation, suggest that the 
policy and governance environment is improving as a result of the effect of increased 
alignment and harmonisation, both strongly advocated by DFID. Beyond this it is 
difficult to attribute impact in this area to the DFID interventions. 
5.13 Overall the policy and governance environment in Moldova, Armenia and Georgia is 
heavily influenced by the possibility of EU accession and neighbourhood status 
whereas in Central Asia it is informed by the regional roles of Russia, China and the 
group of western development partners. 
Progress towards development outcomes, MDGs, and PRSP achievements 
5.14 Given the size and scale of the DFID programmes in all the CASCM countries it is 
unwise to attribute any progress towards major development outcomes. As set out 
above it is possible to identify impacts under all five objectives where the DFID 
contribution is significant. In particular the impact of the governance and institutional 
support under Objective 1 is evident in all five core countries and wider impact in the 
health sector, as a consequence of alignment and harmonisation efforts, is evident in 
Central Asia. DFID is punching well above its weight. However the stage of 
development, particular contextual issues, the decisions to graduate from most of the 
region, and the relative size of the DFID programmes all mitigate against DFID being 
able to claim to have made a major contribution to development overall. 
5.15 Reporting against MDGs in the CASCM region brings a number of problems. These 
are discussed in an ECAD How to Note31, and are summarized in Box 3. There are four 
main sources of information used to report progress: countries’ own MDG Progress 
                                                 
 
31 ECAD (Sept 2006). How To: Report on Progress Towards the Millennium Development Goals, in Europe and 
Central Asia. DFID.  
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Reports – these do not facilitate 
regional comparisons as targets 
are nationalized; the World Bank 
Europe and Central Asia (ECA) 
department’s assessment32 - these 
do permit comparisons, but are 
based on single indicators per 
target; the UN Statistics Division 
MDG statistics33, which are 
patchy in places; and annual 
assessments made by DFID’s 
Country-Led Approaches 
(CLEAR) team, using these and 
other sources – these are designed 
for internal decision making 
purposes, not publication. 
5.16 Figure 3 shows the summary 
from the World Bank assessment 
of progress. Further detail of the 
data on achievements is given in 
Annex 12. 
5.17 The key headline is that none of the CACSM countries except Azerbaijan is likely to 
halve poverty by 2015 (MDG1). The lower income countries face particularly difficult 
challenges in achieving the MDGs34. Notably, Moldova is unlikely to meet four MDGs, 
Georgia five and Tajikistan six. 
5.18 The health MDGs present the largest challenge. The region is facing a rapid increase in 
HIV/AIDS, as well as TB. Denial, stigma, and the institutional challenges of providing 
services to marginalised and vulnerable groups remain serious obstacles to progress in 
stemming the numbers of people living with, and dying from AIDS related diseases. As 
Box 3 explains the primary HIV/AIDS indicators do not reveal the depth of the 
epidemic in the region, but infection rate data shows the scale of the problem in 
Moldova35 and Uzbekistan. 
5.19 The most encouraging achievements are for the MDG3 - gender equality in education. 
This is due to the tradition in the region of equal access to education and does not seem 
directly related to any development partner activity. 
5.20 MDG performance is clearly poor across the region. In the short term the DFID support 
to governance and institutional capacity will not have an immediate impact on the 
delivery of basic services. Only the HIV/AIDS interventions can be expected to 
contribute to improvements in the expected MDG outcomes. It is more likely that 
                                                 
 
32 World Bank (2005). MDG Progress and Prospects in Europe and Central Asia.  
33 http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/default.aspx 
34 World Bank (2005) 
35 Where DFID isn’t involved in HIV/AIDS 
Box 3: MDG reporting CASCM 
In summary, the problems for reporting progress 
towards MDGs in region are: 
? Using a 1990 baseline conceals a period 
immediately after this when social indicators 
dipped dramatically. Also the CASCM countries 
were then soviet republics, and soviet statistical 
systems did not measure MDG-type indicators. 
Data continues to be unreliable in some countries 
? Being a region with very cold winters, a higher 
poverty line (e.g. $2/day) is needed to account for 
heating and other costs 
? Gender inequality is skewed against men in 
some places for some indicators such as life 
expectancy and post-primary education 
? The HIV/AIDS indicators are more tailored to 
epidemics driven by sexual behaviours and are 
less relevant for the concentrated epidemics in 
Central Asia where transmission is primarily 
through injecting drug users. 
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DFID’s investment in alignment and the development of strong pro-poor CDS and 
budgeting systems will contribute to change in the longer term. 
Figure 3. Prospects of CASCM countries achieving the global MDGs 
MDG1 MDG2 MDG3 MDG4 MDG5 MDG6 MDG7
Income 
poverty
School 
enrollment
Gender 
equality in 
school
Maternal 
mortality
Maternal 
mortality
HIV/AIDS, 
malaria 
and other 
diseases
Water 
access
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Georgia
Kyrgyz Rep
Kazakhstan
Moldova
Tajikistan
Uzbekistan
MDG target likley to be achieved
To difficult to tell whether MDG target will be achieved
MDG target unlikley to be achieved
Inadaquate data to tell whether MDG target will be achieved  
Source: World Bank (2005). MDG Progress and Prospects in Europe and Central Asia36. 
5.21 As discussed above support to the development of pro-poor policy and budgeting has 
been a priority across the region. The impact in terms of PRSP progress (Annex 9) 
cannot be attributed solely to DFID inputs but given the emphasis and the specific 
focused TA and other support, together with the role played by DFID in coordinating 
with other development partners, their role is clearly significant. 
5.22 Table B of Annex 9 shows not only the progress achieved in each country but also the 
role of DFID. This evidence confirms the conclusion drawn earlier in the evaluation 
that this was a critical strategic contribution of DFID. It also suggests that progress with 
PRSP and related budgetary and administrative reforms is a major impact of the DFID 
CASCM programme overall. 
Sustainability 
5.23 Sustainability within the CASCM region needs to be looked at from two perspectives. 
For those countries expected to graduate in the foreseeable future the concern is with 
maintaining continuity; firstly through other development partners providing future 
support that builds on and extends what the DFID support has achieved, as well as 
DFID continuing to provide support through multilateral channels, notably the EC. In 
those countries where DFID expects to continue to provide bilateral programme 
support beyond the CASCM RAP period (Central Asia) sustainability needs to be seen 
                                                 
 
36 Turkmenistan is not reported on here. 
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in terms of the viability of the continuing programme and the sustainability of the 
impact of specific interventions. 
5.24 In Moldova, Armenia and Georgia government capacity has been built through project 
interventions and there seems a sufficient degree of stability at senior levels for this to 
be sustained. However the slow start to some work (e.g. ARDEPs) is putting substantial 
pressure on the remaining time and it is doubtful whether significant capacity will be 
built to be sustainable. Some linkages to EC and WB projects are in place but the 
different modalities and styles of TA may limit the transfer of knowledge and skills and 
thus sustainability.  
5.25 There is a risk that things could be left unfinished when DFID wraps up its 
programmes. Some tools (MTEF, PBP, M & E) have just been introduced and need to 
be tested and adjusted to the country’s context. In other cases the scaling up of the 
reform agenda (e.g. APSREP) as the programme draws to a close may have been 
overambitious and certainly requires planned and coordinated integration with any 
future support. Without access to international expertise, the slow but steady 
transformative process may stall. Handing over DFID’s programmes (and the country 
and project management experience) to other development partners is essential.  
5.26 In the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan the reforms are yet to show major impact but the 
expected continued involvement of DFID will build sustainability if the degree of 
harmonisation is maintained and the political fragility does not disrupt the political 
leadership and bureaucratic capacity. Both programmes show a thoughtful and strategic 
development of programme support that is giving high priority to the principles of 
alignment and harmonisation. More investment in civil society and the application of 
lessons from other fragile state programmes will ensure that both programmes continue 
to develop effective and sustainable pro-poor support. 
5.27 Overall knowledge and know-how transfer needs to be institutionalised for TA to have 
a sustainable impact. In most CASCM countries, local experts are unlikely to stay in 
public administration after the project comes to an end. This is because there is little 
incentive for them to stay (low salary and no merit-based promotion system). In many 
CASCM countries, TA projects drive public policy. This means in effect that local 
administrative capacity to make and implement policy has not necessarily improved. 
5.28 Most programmes have tried to work on institutional development through training and 
organisational changes. A good example is the Policy Development Group at the 
Ministry of Finance in the Kyrgyz Republic where civil servants are selected to work 
on policy issues on a rotating basis. Organisational changes such as APSREP can also 
be beneficial.  
5.29 For PSR and PFM programmes to have a sustainable impact, DFID and other 
development partners need to stop avoiding some of the structural issues. Public 
administration in many CASCM countries will remain weak unless it can attract highly-
qualified and motivated people. This means providing higher salaries. This is all the 
more pressing given that the next generation of young people is likely to be less well 
educated than former generations, as a result of a decline in education standards. 
Another challenge is corruption. Tighter budgeting procedures and tracking, as well as 
automation, can support the reduction of institutionalised corruption but ultimately 
behavioural changes are needed. On low salaries, civil servants will continue to seek 
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other means of livelihood, and when possible use their position to make extra revenues. 
Schemes which involve some topping up of salaries by donors can be considered. 
5.30 The impact of supporting advocacy, accountability and voice activities by civil society 
has been significant and could be sustained, if efforts are made to disseminate their 
work. CSOs are often urban, elite-based and close to governments. Identifying 
independent CSOs is crucial and their effort to make the government more responsive, 
transparent, and accountable should be encouraged. Development partners including 
DFID, by promoting inclusive dialogue around PRSP and EU Action Plans, have 
created new channels of communication which include CSOs.  
5.31 These efforts towards sustainability focus attention on the graduation and pre-
graduation process. Preparing for the closure of a programme should start as earlier as 
possible. Rather than winding down towards the end there is often a need for increasing 
involvement – in particular the presence of UK appointed staff to ensure leadership and 
visibility in the transition process. In Armenia and Georgia the graduation planning has 
been very effective particularly in communicating the decision to government and in 
preparing for the practical processes of ending projects/programmes, closing offices 
and addressing human resource issues. However, more could have been done at the 
strategic level working with partners to ensure continuity at the strategic level and 
sustainability in the critical areas of DFID impact. For example strengthening the future 
EC relationships, and raising strategic questions about subsequent phases of work 
which will now be developed without DFID involvement. A more comprehensive and 
strategic graduation plan and process – including actions at project, programme and 
strategic impact levels - would ensure all these challenges are met. 
5.32 The evaluation found more uncertainty amongst development partners than within 
government. Clearly seeing DFID preparing to graduate raises questions about the 
rationale for their own programme as well concerns over who or how the DFID ‘void’ 
will be filled. Giving time to address these issues in a sensitive way with relevant DFID 
involvement presents another opportunity to ensure continuity and sustainability, not 
just of interventions but also of ideas and approaches. 
5.33 With government there are possibilities to celebrate the transition and use that process 
to give messages and reach agreements leading to lesson learning and discussion 
around policy issues as a way of building for the future as an ex-bilateral donor. 
5.34 These suggestions around graduation fall naturally out of this evaluation since the 
decision and process have been such an integral part of the RAP period. Sustainability 
of the UK interest in the region since the post soviet support began in the early 1990’s 
and DFID’s development contribution in particular has a wider regional dimension and 
presents a further opportunity for CASCM learning and transition beyond country level 
graduation. 
Gains in Aid Effectiveness 
5.35 Aid effectiveness can make a major contribution to sustainability ensuring project and 
programme continuity through support from other development partners and ensuring 
synergies amongst development partners around common policy agreements reached 
with governments. In the case of CSACM where DFID expects to graduate from three 
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of the five countries in the near future it is project and programme sustainability that 
may be most significant alongside the maintenance of a strong policy relationship with 
the EC. Wider investment in harmonisation may not be as productive especially given 
the limited number of development partners present. Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz 
Republic are different as DFID and other development partners notably the World Bank 
and ADB are likely to remain engaged for longer. Here sustainability and impact can be 
enhanced through effective harmonisation, alignment and other Paris principles. 
5.36 DFID has played a significant role in leading the development partner interest, 
harmonisation and alignment in the Kyrgyz Republic and effectively facilitating the 
process. This has been very successful with little evidence of any negative reaction. 
Tajikistan is beginning to move in a similar direction. The UK appointed heads of 
office and the longer timeframe are features of both programmes and the aid 
effectiveness gains are significant and can be built on. 
5.37  In the remaining three countries DFID has been a strong voice for harmonisation and 
has committed resources but no clear leadership seems to be emerging and continuity is 
a worry, as is the level of investment as the programme draws to a close. In Moldova 
the evaluation considered that the investment in coordination and harmonisation may 
not have been fully justified or cost effective. In Armenia and Georgia staff changes 
have disrupted relationships but the DFID role is still critical. 
5.38 DFID has been an advocate for a Paris based approach at country level within the 
region amongst other development partners both bilateral and multilateral. This 
contribution has been complemented by engagement with the EC and with EU member 
states. ECAD has not always worked in a fully coordinated way around this aspect of 
aid effectiveness and the good practice at country level especially within CASCM does 
not seem to have been drawn on sufficiently. Just as the evaluation began with 
questions about the nature of the region as a coherent geographic unit we conclude with 
questions about the degree of country, region and department links and the synergies 
these bring to aid effectiveness in this unique and fascinating context. 
5.39 Overall we conclude that in a diverse context of small country programmes a strict 
adherence to Paris principles needs to be balanced with a sense of proportionality and 
an awareness of the timeframe of DFID’s engagement. Where engagement is likely to 
be of limited duration shorter term goals that relate directly to programme impact 
should have priority. Where a longer term relationship is expected then alignment and 
harmonisation may be given more emphasis but even here they need to be balanced 
with other policy considerations – notably the range of wider development partner 
involvement, the degree of political and development fragility, and the approach to 
poverty reduction. Given the role of the EC and other EU member states in all CASCM 
countries a more strategic approach to aid effectiveness with a stronger European 
perspective would have been advisable with stronger leadership from the London team 
around the approach to aid effectiveness and the implications from programme 
direction. 
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6. Lessons and Recommendations 
6.1 This final chapter draws on the evidence of the evaluation as presented earlier in the 
report to highlight the strengths and weaknesses of the DFID CASCM Programme, the 
lessons that have emerged and to make recommendations for the CASCM team as the 
programme reduces, the wider ECAD management as it takes forward DFID’s support 
within this region and others within DFID with responsibility for similar programmes.  
Strengths of the DFID CASCM Programme 
6.2 The CASCM programme has achieved a great deal in a relatively short period with a 
reducing set of partner countries and priorities. During some fifteen years from the 
break up of the Soviet Union to the present support has been provided to the group of 
emerging independent countries. Over the five years of the evaluation the programme 
focus on the remaining five countries has reduced further as DFID has concentrated on 
improvements in social and economic performance with a pro-poor perspective. 
6.3 The key strengths identified by the evaluation include: 
• Some excellent practice at country level – competent and capable staff in 
country offices supported by technical and policy expertise through advisers and 
consultant TA. Clear evidence of value for money at the country level. 
• Strong project management skills in London and the country teams that have 
ensured effective delivery of a range of project interventions. 
• A valiant attempt to use a results based framework for the RAP that has been 
monitored and reported against consistently with the framework used as the basis 
for some lesson learning. 
• A clear country led approach being adopted across the region grounded in the 
alignment principle of responding to partner government led agendas. 
• Strong, honest and open relationships developed with partner governments and 
development partners. Early warning of and clear communication around 
graduation decisions have been given well in advance and have been understood 
and accepted – if reluctantly by some. 
• DFID is valued for its flexibility and its ability to respond to other 
development partner agendas. This includes its ability and willingness to support 
analytical work and in health, the challenging aspects of HIV/AIDs. 
• A good record of working with Other Government Departments especially, 
but not solely, through the GCPP process. DFID is particularly valued for its 
conflict analysis regionally and within the GCPP partnership. 
• The CASCM programme has included some exemplary practice that can 
inform other MICs/small scale programmes. These include flexibility, country 
focus, strong government engagement and a select and limited range of 
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interventions. The latter clear and well targeted interventions that are time bound 
and effectively delivered have often achieved an impact beyond the scale of 
DFID’s programme. 
Weaknesses of the DFID CASCM Programme 
6.4 Areas where the evaluation found room for improvement and challenges not adequately 
met include: 
• The concept of the ‘CASCM Region’ proved aspirational and was never 
realised. The emphasis on a country and project approach resulted in the 
synergies, lesson learning and complementarities of the region not being fully 
developed or realised. 
• The over complex nature of the results framework, limited ownership by the 
team, and the lack of application at management level reduced its impact. 
However the sustained attempt to apply a model that was able to be implemented 
across the region did yield lessons that can be applied to similar regional 
programmes. 
• Harmonisation needs to move beyond joint projects. The influencing role with 
other Development Partners could have built more on the resources within ECAD 
and on cross regional experience. In some cases excess effort was put into donor 
coordination and in others sustainability of investments were not ensured. 
• The involvement of advisers in London in regional and country development 
has not always been well structured resulting in differential support and weak 
communication. Staff turnover has also impacted on communication and 
programme effectiveness 
• Country engagement could have been even better with more cross region 
learning and linkages including increasing understanding of cross border 
concerns such as migration – of particular importance when considering the 
transmission of HIV/AIDs and in addressing conflict. 
Lessons 
6.5 The main lessons identified are: 
6.5.1 A strategic mix of specific, well targeted interventions appears to be the most 
effective way of delivering aid in small country programmes. These interventions 
including joint donor strategy; small scale strategic impact funds; stand-alone 
programmes and policy influence; are best implemented by DFID directly with 
selective consultancy support. Relationships and continuity are more important than 
in larger programmes and this should be taken into account in assessing 
administrative costs and staffing. 
6.5.2 Early graduation planning builds a positive atmosphere for exit and effective 
strategies for continuity. Good practice includes honest and open dialogue with 
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Government and development partners, attention to the sustainability of strategic 
interventions and impact as well as project level continuity, and effective engagement 
with the multilateral agencies that will be the vehicles for continued DFID 
investment. The continuity of the policy level relationship directly and through 
multilaterals needs more attention than project and office closures. Graduation is most 
effective where it is seen as a strategic process and managed accordingly. 
6.5.3 SAIC staff can be very effective professionally and are cost effective but they 
need consistent support and supervision if these benefits are to be optimised. 
Direction and delegation of authority can be undermined if approaches to working 
with local staff are not consistent within DFID and across Other Government 
Departments. Ensuring SAIC colleagues are full team members with the knowledge 
and understanding to represent and influence effectively makes a significant impact 
on programme performance. 
6.5.4 Small in-country teams comprising a mix of SAIC and UK staff with delegated 
authority are cost effective and deliver significant impact. Such teams can have 
greater potential than UK based teams especially given the capacity to work flexibly, 
responding to local demands. This requires sensitive and effective management 
support from colleagues in London. 
6.5.5 Well regarded implementing consultants promoting DFID objectives can add 
technical strength to SAIC offices without advisers. Management of small country 
programmes with SAIC leads in country works well at project level but less so at 
more strategic levels where regular support and supervision is essential. 
6.5.6 Adviser capacity can be over-stretched where their responsibility covers a 
significant number of small country programmes. More flexible working, team 
working, and increased attention to policy level working, influencing, and the 
development and maintenance of strategic partnerships is essential.  
6.5.7 Stand alone programmes are effective for targeted specific technical changes, 
less so for more complex and lengthy strategic development – such as Public 
Sector Reform – which requires joint donor activities and longer term engagement for 
extra leverage. A platform approach to PSR, as currently being tested in the Kyrgyz 
Republic, seems to allow for adequate sequencing of reforms and government buy-in. 
6.5.8 Lessons from good practice at country level (e.g. around harmonisation in the 
Kyrgyz Republic, PAR in Moldova and Armenia, regional development in 
Armenia) have been significant and meaningful. There are excellent examples of 
counterpart learning at individual and systemic levels; influencing and developing 
donor partnerships; and engagement at policy level. These lessons should be recorded 
and disseminated as part of regional/departmental learning. 
6.5.9 Political will is essential where investment and presence is limited. In the absence 
of government buy-in focus on projects and programmes that can stand alone and 
guarantee some success. Development partners including DFID should consider 
whether they should step back from ambitious corporate objectives in such cases and 
provide assistance only where there is strong (and genuine) government demand. 
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6.5.10 PSR in transition countries is not a ‘one size fits all’ approach. Similarities in PSR 
approaches in CASCM point to the replication of similar models and suggest that 
previous lessons learnt, context or appropriateness of models have not been taken into 
account. A deeper appreciation of the political context and history together with an 
awareness of the political economy and political processes is required during design 
and implementation. 
6.5.11 Strategic Funds (SIF in CASCM) can be effective levers in small country 
programmes. CASCM has demonstrated some successes though there can be a risk 
of NGOs becoming dependent on the small SIF grants.  
6.5.12 In emerging/young democracies support for civil society to develop systems, 
processes and skills for accountability and responsiveness in service delivery and 
wider governance processes requires more sustained investment.  
6.5.13 Conflicts are local and specific; regional approaches are not always relevant. 
More local (sub-regional) analysis, integrated planning, and coordination around 
specific country level inputs would be an asset. 
6.5.14 Sector wide approaches can be successful even in difficult contexts and benefit 
from sequenced and integrated development with bespoke supportive TA – 
demonstrated by the Health SWAp in the Kyrgyz Republic in combination with 
HPAP. It would be useful to explore the importance of HPAP for the success of the 
SWAp and whether similar HPAP projects should be developed alongside SWAps. 
6.5.15 If a ‘region’ composed of a number of small country programmes is to be more than 
an administrative unit then the synergies, diversity and socio-economic links need 
to be more effectively taken into account not only in developing regional plans  
and strategies but also in the management of the programme.  
Recommendations 
6.6 The recommendations arising from the evaluation can be grouped under four broad 
headings – managing graduation and exit; graduation policy; working with MICs and 
small programmes; and recommendations for the team managing the CASCM region as 
it moves to a new phase. 
6.7 To improve the Management of Graduation and Exit we recommend that 
managers in DFID offices and programmes approaching graduation: 
• Plan and begin the graduation or exit strategy at least three years in advance as 
this fits with programme cycles and ensures effective resource management as 
well as early attention and engagement with Government and other partners. 
• More emphasis should be given to engagement with Government and 
Development Partners in preparing for graduation at country, strategic, and impact 
levels in addition to individual project and programme planning. 
• Manage the budget as graduation approaches in an effective way, 
maintaining/increasing the level of investment and utilising resources to ensure 
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policy level continuity, linkages with future multilateral; projects/programmes, 
support for joint programmes, and high profile exit vehicles. 
• Strengthen, mandate, and support country offices to focus on the graduation 
process as a priority. As graduation approaches additional staff resources focused 
on ensuring continuity and building policy synergies with multilateral partners 
may be required – the assumption of a ‘wind down’ as programmes reduce can 
undermine the benefits of past investments.  
• Use management links to multilaterals (i.e. ECAD links to EC in the case of 
CASCM), regional experience and other DFID entry points to support the process. 
6.8 To improve graduation policy we recommend that DFID senior management: 
• Strengthen capacity for policy advocacy towards multilateral institutions before, 
during and after graduation. Although DFID will continue its support to MIC 
countries through its multilateral contribution, there is a strong scepticism in some 
CASCM countries that multilateral institutions will not fill the gap that DFID 
leaves behind. Addressing these concerns is part and parcel of effective graduation. 
• Acknowledge that poverty is multi-dimensional and that the level of national 
income alone is not representative of a country’s state of development. Graduation 
strategy should be adjusted accordingly to take into account MDGs and DFID’s 
overall recognition that poverty is a multidimensional problem. 
6.9 To support work with MICs and regional groups of small country programmes we 
recommend that DFID geographic departments: 
• Develop a range of policy/impact indicators not just the MIC status to track 
progress as a country approaches MIC – income poverty, inequality, civil society 
development, democratisation and participation. This will ensure that the 
programme reflects actual needs and decisions are based on a comprehensive view 
of current and future development. 
• Keep to a country focus and engagement with development partners rather than 
high cost involvement in harmonisation structures for developing influence and 
policy leverage – a value for money approach – especially where graduation in 
likely to be a short-medium to term possibility.  
• Refrain from frontloading aid money through budget support or large technical 
assistance projects unless there is enough guarantee that such interventions will 
support greater efficiency and effectiveness. 
• Take a strategic and flexible approach utilising small scale (e.g. Strategic Fund) 
investments and project level opportunities that have clear and specific impact. 
• Use partnerships to effectively maximise investment, achieve leverage and build 
for the sustainability of programme objectives.  
• Develop simple output based monitoring systems for regional strategies, learning 
lessons from the CASCM RAP monitoring framework, integrating them with other 
reporting cycles related to the Directors Development Plan and Public Service 
Agreements, with lines of accountability at management level clearly defined. 
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6.10 Specific to the CASCM Region we recommend that the CASCM Team 
Leader/Head of ECAD: 
• Commission a study and lesson learning exercise for the group of Regional 
Development Programmes that builds on their experience and the collective 
insights from this approach to pro poor growth. 
• Focus on preparing for the transition (through linkages to EC and WB projects) and 
policy continuity in Georgia and Armenia, rather than just the practical aspects of 
project administration and office closure; resourcing the country team to deliver the 
sustainability of DFID’s contribution at objective and strategic level not just the 
effective closure of project interventions. 
• Review and revise the Moldova graduation/exit plan now with a stronger focus on 
strategic engagement, the continuity of DFID objectives and sustainable 
investment through multilaterals. 
• Develop a strategy for the continuity of support for the Central Asia programmes in 
Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic taking account of the fragile state context and 
the sub regional linkages in addition to the pro-poor country led model that has 
been established. The strategy should address the need for appropriate management 
beyond the CASCM/ECAD era with a long term commitment to scale up support.  
• Appoint a sub-regional coordinator to oversee and monitor conflict within CASCM 
as part of the GCPP implementation learning lessons from similar approaches 
elsewhere and linking to wider DFID and Other Government Department policy 
and programme activity at country level.  
7. Management Response
7.1 We welcome the main findings of this evaluation and they have already influenced our
planning in the Europe and Central Asia region. In particular we welcome the confirmation
that our programme objectives were relevant to the countries covered, and that the quality
and impact of our programme management and country level work are high.We are pleased
with the confirmation that we have maintained strong and open relationships with
governments and partners, and also acrossWhitehall.This is reflected in examples of policy
influencing and joint working.The report also confirms the value for money of our relatively
small programmes using modest programme and human resources.
7.2 The report’s comments that the concept of a CASCM RAP region was aspirational are fair.
These countries are separated by large distances and political and cultural contexts. But they
face similar challenges in terms of building effective states and moving towards functioning
market economies. Hence the shared objectives were appropriate. However the programme
was not truly regional in its approach and we agree that that the RAP Monitoring
Framework was over-ambitious. Looking beyond the RAP period, we are developing new
strategies in Moldova and Central Asia which take account of the lessons learned from this
evaluation as well as some key recommendations.
7.3 The report provides useful advice on country graduation issues.We accept that the emphasis
as graduation approaches should be on programme sustainability and working closely with
donor partners. We agree that programme management issues should not dominate
preparations for graduation, although in practice there is not necessarily a rigid distinction.
Since the evaluation we have made encouraging progress in Armenia on this issue and are
working to ensure similar success stories elsewhere.
7.4 We do not accept the observation that graduation decisions were dominated by progress to-
wards MIC status. DFID has a corporate commitment to spend 90% of its money in Low
Income Countries (LICs).When a country is approaching MIC status, we make judgments
over whether UK bilateral support should continue.We consider a range of indicators,
including governance, social dimensions, comparative advantage and other donor activity,
particularly the multilaterals.
7.5 We also believe that the lead-in time for graduations should be decided on a case by case
basis and we do not accept that resources should automatically increase in the run up to
graduation.What we increasingly try to do is ensure that our existing staff strike the right
balance between managing the administration of exiting and managing relations for
sustainability.
7.6 We consider the comments that we ignored Russia’s regional impact to be overstated. Some
attempts were made to address this issue but we accept that progress was limited.We have since
refocused our attention on this agenda via our new approach to our partnership with
Russia.
7.7 The report’s comments that we neglected the RAP’s pro-poor growth objective does not
take full account of our work in the region. For example, we are supporting regional
development programmes in all five countries.These aim to promote growth in more deprived
areas. The report does not take full account of our work with the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) in the region either. For example, we actively
support the EBRD’s Early Transition Countries Initiative which promotes private sector
development in all CASCM countries.
Management Response
61
7.8 We would have liked the report to have said more about our strategies for increasing our
engagement with the European Commission to promote aid effectiveness.This is central to
our approach in the European Neighbourhood countries in particular.
7.9 We accept that we have not implemented the original RAP objective of mainstreaming
HIV/AIDS in all our programmes.This is because we took a decision to focus on Central Asia
where the epidemic is fastest growing and where key sections of the population can be
targeted. Similarly the RAP trade objective was not pursued because early in the RAP
period we concluded we did not have a comparative advantage in this area.
7.10 We are currently developing a new strategy for Central Asia, taking account of fragile states
contexts and sub-regional linkages.We have already strengthened our in-country staffing and
devolved the management of our programmes from London to country offices in support of
this.
7.11 The report’s recommendation for a sub-regional conflict coordinator is already being taken
forward in the South Caucasus through the Conflict Prevention Pool mechanism.
7.12 The report makes a number of recommendations for Middle Income Countries and small
bilateral programmes which are helpful. We endorse the recommendations on small scale
strategic impact funds and the building of partnerships.The report advises against budget
support and largeTA programmes in small countries.We acknowledge the need for caution,
although we have found that this can sometimes be a useful way of engaging with key reform
programmes and in developing constructive relationships with the multilaterals.We also
recognise the need for caution in becoming too involved in promoting aid effectiveness
principles, especially where staffing resources are limited. However, donor harmonisation is
at the heart of our approach in Central Asia, in line with fragile states working principles.
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ANNEX 1: TERMS OF REFERENCE 
EVALUATION OF DFID COUNTRY/REGIONAL PROGRAMMES - 2007-08 
1. Introduction 
1.1 DFID’s performance management system is supported by periodic independent evaluations at project, 
programme, sector and thematic level. Evaluation Department (EvD) carry out four to five Country or 
Regional Programme Evaluations (CPEs or RPEs) annually. These terms of reference (ToRs) set out 
the scope of work for the 2007/08 period. 
1.2 The C/RPEs provide important accountability and lesson learning functions for DFID. The primary 
audience for the evaluations is the UK government and DFID senior managers including heads of 
country offices. All evaluation reports are published externally. 
1.3 Countries/ Regions proposed for evaluation in 2007/08 are Central Asia, South Caucasus and Moldova 
(CASCM) region, Pakistan, West Balkans Region, Zambia and Sierra Leone. Each evaluation will use 
the countries’ most recent Country Assistance Plans (CAP)/Regional Assistance Plans (RAP), and 
related policy documents. 
1.4 While country-led approaches are central to the way that DFID works, socio-political and 
environmental contexts will influence the progress and form of the development process. The C/RAPs 
articulate the country offices’ plans for operationalising corporate objectives within the country 
context, and in most cases they will build upon or reflect the national Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Paper (PRSP). These plans are therefore the logical starting point for the evaluation. 
2. Overarching objectives 
2.1 The main objectives of the country programme evaluations are to assess: 
? Country strategy and links to poverty outcomes and DFID’s corporate objectives  
? Choice of aid instruments, other interventions and aid effectiveness 
? DFID’s role as a development partner  
2.2 The C/RPEs will assess the DFID country/regional programmes in terms of standard criteria although 
these may be customised to a degree for individual studies. The generic evaluation matrix can be seen 
at Annex A37. It is based on DAC evaluation criteria and considers: 
? The relevance of country programme objectives and the logic behind them, given domestic 
policy objectives for poverty reduction, as well as DFID’s own corporate level objectives  
? The effectiveness of the overall programme in achieving the objectives set out in the country 
strategy, including DFID’s choice of aid instruments, harmonisation with other stakeholders, 
policy dialogue and influencing 
? The efficiency with which programme plans are translated into activities, including human 
resource and office management, collaboration and harmonisation with other stakeholders, 
policy dialogue and influencing, the use of financial instruments 
2.3 And to the extent possible: 
• Sustainability – are the reforms/ changes supported by DFID’s country programme moving in 
the right direction and are they likely to be sustained? Has local capacity been built? Has 
transparency and accountability improved? 
• Outcome – What did the country/regional programme achieve the objectives set? Did the 
positive outcomes DFID achieved justify the financial and human resources used in the 
programme? 
                                                 
 
37 Annexes to the ToRs are not attached. The Matrix for the CASCM RAP follows as a separate annex. 
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• Attribution – Given the direction of travel and external factors, overall how far did the 
country/regional programme make a positive contribution to poverty reduction? How good a 
development partner was DFID? 
• The success with which the programme had mainstreamed the cross-cutting issues of poverty, 
gender, HIV/AIDS and environment in all of its activities. What were the variables influencing 
the process of inclusion? What was the impact on the achievement of wider programme 
objectives?  
3. Methodology, Outputs & Timing 
3.1 The consultants will produce one study report and executive summary for each country or region. The 
report shall be approximately 30-40 pages long (excluding annexes) and will include lessons and 
recommendations for both the country programme and DFID corporately. The evaluation summary 
(EvSum), should be approximately 4 pages, and will include the response from the relevant DFID 
office/Department, which EvD will obtain. 
3.2 The other outputs required from this contract include:  
• Inception reports detailing the way in which each individual C/RPE is to be carried out and 
showing the customised evaluation matrix. 
• A presentation of preliminary findings to country offices before the end of the fieldwork for each 
study. 
• A publishable synthesis report pulling together findings across individual C/RPEs; this may 
cover all countries in the year, but is likely to attempt to synthesise like-studies (e.g. regional 
programmes or ‘fragile states’). 
• DFID also requires access to the evaluation team’s interim evidence summaries, e.g. completed 
matrices, although it is not expected that these should be of publishable quality.  
3.3 Each evaluation will involve an ‘inception visit’ and ‘fieldwork mission’. EvD and the consultant team 
leader will undertake the inception visit. A team of 3-6 consultants will undertake the fieldwork, 
generally involving up to 3 weeks in each country/region. In the case of regional programmes, the 
inception phase may be undertaken in the UK and the fieldwork may be organised a little differently to 
visit a number of countries.  
3.4 The ‘inception visit’ has four key objectives: 
i. Ensuring staff in the DFID country office are fully informed about the evaluation, its purpose 
and how it will work; 
ii. Ensuring country/regional office staff have an opportunity to feed in key questions they want the 
evaluation to address and decide whether they wish to undertake self-evaluation as part of the 
process. 
iii. Determining the exact nature of the individual evaluation and resolving key methodological / 
practical issues. 
iv. Ensuring the evaluation team has access to all relevant contacts - including all those who have 
worked in the country/ regional programme over the fieldwork period and all relevant partners. 
3.5 Between the inception visit and fieldwork the consultants will amend the standard evaluation 
framework for the study, to address any country-specific issues raised during the inception visit. An 
inception report containing this matrix will be signed off by the country/regional office.  
3.6 If the DFID country office does wish to undertake self-evaluation they may be encouraged to produce 
a log-frame for the entire country/regional programme, detailing the logic of their interacting projects 
and programmes and assessing what has been achieved. If the country office does not undertake this 
work, the evaluation team may attempt to create a similar log-frame as part of the evaluation approach. 
3.7 EvD will provide supporting documentation relevant to each C/RPE to the consultants in good time. 
This will include project documentation and relevant documentation about the design, implementation 
and monitoring/ evaluation of the country/ regional strategy and individual programmes (but not 
background policy information). Prior to undertaking fieldwork, the evaluation team need to be 
familiar with the DFID programme, the country context and the full range of DFID policy papers that 
are relevant to the country programme.  
Annexes 
 
67 
3.8 The consultant is responsible for identifying and engaging a team of consultants appropriate to each 
country/regional context from within the consortium. Across the team, there must be good evaluation 
skills, understanding of DFID and the local context, and ability in the languages of the country/ies. The 
team should cover all the major sectors or thematic areas of the country/regional programme and 
should include at least one locally based consultant as a full team member. The consultant is 
responsible for setting up and planning the main field visit. If EvD wish DFID staff members to 
accompany the consultant C/RPE team, additional terms of reference specifying the roles and 
responsibilities will be developed. 
3.9 During the main fieldwork the sector specialists and evaluation team leader will interview DFID staff 
(current and past) and partners (in government, multilaterals, other donors, civil society, etc.) about all 
aspects of the programme over the five year evaluation period – using checklists and stakeholder 
matrices as appropriate. Web based surveys of staff and other stakeholders (e.g. other donors and 
NGOs) will also be trialled on a pilot basis. The evaluators will systematically scrutinise the available 
documentation and supplement this where possible, and then use all evidence gathered to complete the 
evaluation matrix. One matrix should be completed for each sector and the evaluation team leader (and 
deputy) will use these to compile the final report. Fieldtrips outside the capital city are not a standard 
part of a C/RPE but may be used if applicable.  
3.10 Before leaving each country the evaluation team should discuss findings with the Head of Office/Team 
Leader or their nominated representative, make a presentation to the country office on emerging 
findings.  
3.11 Within 4 weeks of the fieldwork finishing, a high quality draft report of 30-40 pages (excluding 
annexes and with an Executive Summary) will be submitted to EvD. Following initial checks within 
EvD this will be sent to the country office and staff there invited to correct any factual errors and make 
comments. Although country/regional offices may challenge findings they disagree with, and 
sometimes have additional information to support a claim, EvD will support the evaluation team to 
ensure that the report remains a true independent evaluation. A second draft report and evaluation 
summary will be produced taking account of relevant comments. These will be subject to external 
quality assurance against agreed criteria. 
3.12 The consultants will highlight for EvD any information collected pertinent to the questions in the 
methods note for the ‘multilateral effectiveness summaries’. 
3.13 The Synthesis Report will be guided by a workshop, scheduled for late 2007/ early 2008, focused on 
emerging themes. 
3.14 The consultants will work to the strict deadlines set out in Annex B and the timeliness of the delivery 
of reports is of the essence. Any changes to these deliverables must be agreed in advance with EvD. 
Team composition and timelines will be agreed prior to commencement of each of the country studies, 
including the necessity of any follow up visit to the country if major issues remain unresolved. The 
consultancy should start in May 2007.  
3.15 An ‘optional extra’ within the C/RPE programme is the possibility of producing short papers for a 
couple of key areas of interest to the country/regional office. These recognise that the evaluation will 
gather more detailed information than will be presented in the final report. Such ‘sector papers’ will be 
agreed during the inception visit and produced by individual sector specialists at about the same time 
as the first draft C/RPE report. The costs of this work are supplementary to the main contract. 
4. Competence and Expertise Required 
4.1 One consultancy organisation or consortium will be appointed to deliver the outputs described above.  
4.2 A managing consultant with extensive evaluation experience and a track record of managing 
country/strategic level evaluations will be required to manage the planning and delivery of the 
C/RPEs. This individual will be expected to have strong written and oral communications skills as 
he/she will play a role in communicating lessons learned both to country programme personnel and to 
a wider DFID audience. 
4.3 Each C/RPE should have a named team leader with expertise in evaluation methodology and 
monitoring and performance management issues. This must include understanding of the complexities 
of country/regional programme evaluation. The Team Leader must also have up to date knowledge of 
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DFID policies and performance, planning and data systems. Access to our online systems will be 
provided. 
4.4 Each C/RPE team will be made up of a combined skill set covering governance, economics, social and 
institutional development and human resource management and the number of team members will be 
appropriate to the country programme. There is not one model that will work for each country/ region 
being evaluated, so flexibility in team composition is essential. The team members for each country 
evaluation will need expertise in evaluation methodology and familiarity with development issues in 
the C/RPE countries. They should also have up to date knowledge of DFID policies and systems and 
relevant experience in cross-cutting issues like gender mainstreaming, HIV and AIDS and the 
environment. The team must include a strong national/regional component.  
4.5 The consultancy team will have responsibility for: 
• maintaining ethical standards in implementing the evaluation  
• the timely production of evidence based conclusions, lessons and recommendations to 
demanding quality standards  
• managing logistics in each country/region 
5. Reporting and Dissemination 
5.1 The consultants will report to the Country Programme Evaluation Team Leader or the Deputy 
Programme Manager in DFID Evaluation Department. 
5.2 Reports will be published and distributed, electronically and in hard copy, to a wide ranging internal 
and external audience. The consultants should be prepared to present their findings to DFID staff and 
others as appropriate. Specific disseminations arrangements will be determined on completion of each 
country report and synthesis. 
DFID Evaluation Department May 2007 
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ANNEX 2: EVALUATION MATRIX CASCM V3 
Region covered in this matrix: Central Asia, South Caucasus and Moldova (DFID Region within Europe and Central Asia Department) 
EVALUATION CRITERIA KEY QUESTIONS Findings and Evidence Base 
(Chapter 1: Introduction and Methods)  
Context - Period is 2002-2007 To form Chapter 2 of report: Context 
The political situation. Key events over period including factors beyond control of development partners, MDG progress (and variation by 
gender, rural/ urban, ethnic group etc.), importance of aid to the individual countries and the  region and no. of donors active in each country 
within the region (including the role of China and Russia as donors)  key strategies/ reviews/documents that influenced DFID’s work at country 
and regional level 
 
I. Relevance - How far did DFID’s strategic approach allow it to remain relevant?  To form Chapter 3 of report: The 
Relevance of DFID’s Regional Strategy 
(i.e. RAP,. earlier CSPs  
Overall rating of programme relevance 6. Excellent38 5. High39 4 Substantial40 3. Modest41 2. Low42 1. Poor43 
Justification for rating (one sentence max.):  
Overall strategy and 
areas/sectors selected for 
intervention 
1. Throughout the evaluation period and as the context evolved, did DFID have clear and focused regional, 
country, and (where relevant) sector strategies that explained the rationale for interventions supported? (e.g. 
options considered, analysis done, choices made and why, etc.) Was the regional strategy relevant to this 
group of countries and how far was regional definition/identity taken into account? Did DFID contribute to 
wider strategic thinking? 
2. Over the period, how far were strategies (and their constituent objectives) aligned with development needs 
and policy priorities of each of the countries within the region, (e.g. aligned with the PRSP where available? 
Related to off-track MDGs? etc.); how far were strategies owned by country offices and aligned with the 
strategies of other DPs? 
3. How far were strategies based on a realistic analysis of each of the countries and the regional situation / 
PRS? (What evidence is available for this? –key studies, etc) 
4. To what extent were strategies in line with corporate priorities? (e.g. Fragile states policy,  Conditionality 
paper, Middle Income Country Strategy, cross-Whitehall working and relevant sector strategies, and where 
relevant other corporate guidance, such as working in conflict and working with the conflict prevention 
 
RAP (and earlier CSPs), Country 
Strategies (CIPs and Joint Country 
Strategies where relevant), PRSP, Govt. 
Strategies, DFID Policy Papers 
                                                 
 
38 Excellent - This means the performance exceeds expectations – thus fulfils all requirements and moves beyond with reflection and good lessons – a model programme 
39 High - In line with all expectations – thus meets the requirements in all aspects with some reflection 
40 Substantial – Meets most criteria but there are some areas for development and identifiable gaps in performance 
41 Modest - some criteria but marked areas for development/gaps in performance with limited evidence of lessons learnt 
42 Low - Meets few criteria and has larger areas where improvement is required 
43 Poor - Does not any meet criteria, no lesson learning or reflection on programme performance 
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EVALUATION CRITERIA KEY QUESTIONS Findings and Evidence Base 
pools) 
5. Were changes to strategies appropriate given the context or were there too many/ too few adaptations? Did 
changes take account of country, sub-regional and regional issues? 
Risk Management  6. How systematically did DFID assess the external risks (i.e. political governance, economic and fiduciary) 
and the internal factors influencing the country / regional strategy? 
7. How comprehensive were plans to minimise the identified risks? 
Risk annexes of RAP (and previous 
CSPs), evaluations, etc 
Portfolio profile 8. What interventions did DFID support over the evaluation period? (did these fit with the strategic priorities?) Brief description of interventions 
DFID’s choice of 
interventions 
9. What mix of interventions was intended and how did this change over the evaluation period? Was there a 
sufficient balance between use of long term and shorter term instruments? What differences were there 
between countries? 
10. To what extent did choices about interventions and approaches reflect the political economy and governance 
context of each of the countries, the region overall, and DFID policy? 
 
DFID’s partnership working 11. How did DFID approach working with: a) Government (central and local), b) civil society, c) other 
individual donors – both bilateral and multilateral? d) key regional institutions e) cross Whitehall working 
(were there explicit strategies?, what was the basis of any influencing agenda?, was the balance right? Any 
highlights in ways of working?) 
12. To what extent did DFID seek to strengthen harmonisation across the donor community in each of the 
countries and across the region? 
13. How well did DFID consult with and communicate its aims and objectives to development partners at 
country and regional level? 
IDP agreements 
DFID consultation process records and 
Publications 
DFID’s approach to cross-
cutting themes 
14. Did DFID have a strategy for mainstreaming cross-cutting issues such as gender, social exclusion, 
HIV/AIDS and environmental protection? (was this consistent with corporate policy issues?) 
Written or unwritten strategies 
Level and allocation of 
resources 
15. Were strategies appropriate to the level of resources anticipated? 
16. How far did planned spending and use of staff time reflect strategic objectives? 
17. Was geographic coverage to narrow / wide for resources available? 
RAP Part 3, Staffing levels & gaps 
Regional finance data from Finance 
Officer 
Results focus 18. How far were DFID’s planned interventions sufficiently results-focused and monitorable?  
19. How far were the results of reviews used to reconsider design/ direction of work and resourcing and staff 
allocation priorities? 
20. How relevant and effective was the RAP monitoring framework and how were its results used? 
21. How far were results (including MDG progress) taken into account when taking decisions on graduation / 
scaling up? 
PRISM documents 
Monitoring Framework outputs 
II. Effectiveness and III. Efficiency - How successful was DFID in terms of engagement in development processes and delivering results in a timely 
and efficient manner? 
 
To form Chapter 4 of the report: 
Programme Effectiveness & Efficiency 
Overall rating of programme effectiveness 6. Excellent 5. High 4 Substantial 3. Modest 2. Low 1. Poor 
Justification for rating (one sentence max.):  
Overall rating of programme efficiency  6. Excellent 5. High 4 Substantial 3. Modest 2. Low 1. Poor 
Justification for rating (one sentence max.):  
Delivering on strategy 22. How far were objectives set out in strategies achieved in practice (CSP/RAP/CIP performance objectives, 
and other strategic outcomes)? What explains any areas of divergence? To what extent were these 
File records on programme strategy, 
interviews in Country Office and 
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EVALUATION CRITERIA KEY QUESTIONS Findings and Evidence Base 
predictable? 
23. How effectively did DFID respond to new policy directives and manage strategic risks that emerged at 
country and regional levels? 
24. How effectively did DFID respond to changing objectives at country level (Govt and other DPs)? 
London 
RAP monitoring framework outputs 
Results  25. How far were the objectives and performance indicators for individual DFID interventions achieved 
(drawing on data from project, programme reviews, PRISM scores, RAP monitoring data, etc)? 
26. What explains key successes and failures with regard to programme objectives?  
PRISM /Quest 
RAP monitoring framework outputs 
Efficiency 27. Was DFID’s actual disbursement in line with expectations and plans? Were there any significant changes or 
delays? 
28. How was staff time spent? (influencing/ policy work, Project/ programme work, field work, corporate 
reporting/ activities) 
29. Was the skill mix, SAIC/UK mix, continuity of staffing, and training/staff support, appropriate to the 
country/ regional context and strategy? 
30. Was the organisational structure informed by the RAP and its delivery? In particular were country 
office/London relationships efficiently managed? 
31. How efficient was cross department and cross DFID working? 
Disbursement record from PRISM 
Finance Officers data 
Possible web survey of staff; specific 
focus in all DFID interviews; DPs’ 
views. 
HR Mission (2004) and subsequent 
actions/policies 
Aid effectiveness 32. How effective was the mix of interventions (investment modalities/aid instruments, policy influence, ‘silent 
partnerships’ etc.) in achieving objectives? Were the different interventions used sufficiently complementary 
at country and regional level? 
33. How effective has DFID been in pursuing its development agenda with partners including other parts of the 
UK Government (especially FCO and MOD around GCPP), National Government, other donors, IFIs and 
Multilateral Agencies, Civil Society, NGOs? 
34. Has DFID operated in accordance with principles of aid effectiveness? (and emerging principles of aid 
effectiveness in fragile states/middle income country contexts where appropriate?) 
35. How well has DFID communicated its results / lessons/ good practice internally and externally? 
 
DFID’s delivery on cross-
cutting themes 
36. How well were issues of gender, social exclusion, HIV/AIDS and environmental protection (including 
climate change) actually integrated across the programme? 
 
IV – VI. Impact and Sustainability - What are the key impacts DFID has helped achieve? To form Chapter 5 of the report: 
Development Impact  
Overall rating of programme impact 6. Excellent 5. High 4 Substantial 3. Modest 2. Low 1. Poor 
Justification for rating (one sentence max.):  
Overall rating of programme sustainability 6. Excellent 5. High 4 Substantial 3. Modest 2. Low 1. Poor 
Justification for rating (one sentence max.):  
Outcomes and sustainability 37. What are the key impacts of each of the five objectives across the region (i.e. by country and sub region)? 
38. To what extent has the policy and governance environment (e.g. accountability, action on corruption) been 
strengthened?  
39. What is the evidence to show that DFID has helped contribute to specific development outcomes and PRSP 
achievements? (PSA/ DDP/ direct project/ programme impacts and ‘indirect’ benefits around policy 
dialogue) 
40. Are the development changes or reforms supported by DFID’s country/ regional programmes likely to be 
sustained/ difficult to reverse? (To what extent has local capacity been built? To what extent will the DFID 
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EVALUATION CRITERIA KEY QUESTIONS Findings and Evidence Base 
agenda be continued by other donors especially EC and EU partners?)  
41. Has DFID added value through gains in aid effectiveness? E.g. contributing analysis/ tools/ support on 
harmonisation? 
Lessons and Recommendations - What lessons can DFID draw from the evaluation for informing future country, regional or corporate planning and 
operations?  
To form Chapter 6 of the report: Lessons 
and Recommendations 
Strengths and weaknesses of 
DFID 
42. What are the key strengths demonstrated by the CASCM region and its country offices? 
43. What are the key weaknesses demonstrated by CASCM and its country offices? 
 
Lessons 44. How well have lessons been learned and used within the region? 
45. What lessons (from positive and negative findings) can be drawn for DFID’s future work in these 
countries/this region? I.e. lessons related to graduation – graduation decisions and the process of 
implementation, working in Embassies and with SAIC only staffed offices, work in MICs and LICs with 
small programme investments, scaling up in Central Asia? 
46. Are there distinctive lessons from this region that are relevant more widely for DFID? 
 
Recommendations What recommendations should be made based on the evaluation findings?  
Evaluation matrix CASCM v3 Inception Note 5th July 2007 
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ANNEX 3: PEOPLE INTERVIEWED 
Name Designation 
DFID 
Pauline Hayes Head of ECAD 
Ian Thomas Internal Audit Team Leader 
John Hogan ECAD Departmental Finance Officer 
Bill Kilby Team Leader  
Robin Gorna South Africa previous Head of HIV/AIDS Team in Policy Division (by phone) 
CASCM  
Jim Maund Team Leader 
Roy Trivedy Former Team Leader (by phone) 
Melissa Harrold Deputy Head 
Teresa Dumasy Former Deputy Head/GCPP Consultant 
John Carpenter Deputy Programme Manager 
Carol Norman Deputy Programme Manager 
Brian Penny Deputy Programme Manager 
Felicity Malcolm Programme Officer 
Matt Lesslar Programme Officer 
Andrea Membry Assistant Programme Officer   
Darren Bush Assistant Programme Officer 
Kyrgyz Republic  
Jason Lane Head of Office 
Aida Tashirova Programme Manager 
Esen Turusbekov Programme Officer 
Kunnura Raiymbekova Programme Officer 
Anara Ashiralieva Programme Assistant 
Tajikistan  
Dylan Winder Head of Office (by phone) 
Mirza Jahani Governance Adviser (by phone) 
Sobir Kurbanov Economics Adviser (by phone) 
Moldova  
Alla Skvortova Head of Office 
Silvia Apostol Development Officer 
Natalia Murahovschi Development Assistant  
Georgia  
George Katcharava Head of  Office (by phone) 
Armenia  
Artashes Darbinyan Head of Section 
Ara Hovsepyan Ex-Head of Section/Chief Executive Officer Millennium Challenge Account 
Armenak Darbinyan Governance Sector Manager/Director Economic Research Institute 
Viktoria Gevorgyan Development Officer 
Yekaterina Mamayeva Development Assistant 
CASCM Advisers  
Valsa Shah Economic Adviser 
Magdalena Banasiak Infrastructure and Engineering Adviser 
Freddie Carver Assistant Governance Adviser 
Natasha Mesko Health Advisor 
Emily Poskett Statistics Adviser 
Satyendra Prasad Governance Advisr 
Teresa Durant Social Development Adviser 
Sam Yates Social Development Adviser (currently on maternity leave) 
Jill Fletcher Former Statistics Adviser (by phone) 
Gwyneth 
Chittleborough 
Former Economist (by phone) 
Angelika Brustinov Consultant/Project Manager Legal Empowerment of the Poor UNECE 
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Name Designation 
LONDON  
Mike Nawarynsky Deputy Director PDRN, Ministry of Defence 
Teressa Dumasy Strategic Advisor GCPP, based in FCO 
Andrew Page  GCPP Committee FCO 
Dr Bhavna Dave Chair Centre of Contemporary Central Asia and the Caucasus 
Dr Anna Matveeva Visiting Fellow Crisis State Research Centre LSE 
James Montgomery  Project Manager, GRM International London  
MOLDOVA 
John Beyer  Ambassador, British Embassy  
Andrei Popov Director, Association for Foreign Policy 
Boris Popaduic Executive Director, Moldova Social Investment Fund 
Andrew Bird Principal Consultant, Mokoro 
Elena Nikulina Senior Economist Public Sector and Institutional Reforms, World Bank 
Valeriu Prohniţchi Director General, Expert Grup.  
Alex Oprunenco Director Programme International Relations, Expert Grup 
Gheorghe Cojocari Member, Court of Accounts 
Elisaveta Foca Vice-president, Court of Account 
Igor Boţan Executive Director, Adept 
Igor Grosu  National Consultant Participation Policies Secretary EGPRSP Participation Council, 
UNDP/MoE 
Natalia Catrinescu Head of Macroeconomic Department, Ministry of Economy  
Nicolae Beşliu Manager, Social Network of NGOs 
Liviu Gumovschi Executive Director and Manager of Rural Investments and Services Project, Consolidated 
Agriculture Projects Managements Units (CAPMU) 
Tatiana Udrea Deputy Head, Division for Technical Assistance Coordination, Ministry  of Economy & Trade  
Sergen Neicovcen Development Manager, CONTACT 
Margaritta Mămăligă Previous Manager, Peace Building Framework  
Pavel Cabacenco Deputy Manager, Peace Building Framework  
Vitalie Valcov Director General, Bureau National of Statistics 
Martin Kasper  1st Secretary, European Commission. 
Cristina Moşneaga Programme Manager, European Commission 
Oleg Cara Vice Director General, Bureau National of Statistics 
Nina Lupan Vice President, Ministry of Finance 
Viorel Gherciu Loan Guaranteed Fund 
ARMENIA 
Anthony Cantor UK Ambassador UK Embassy, Armenia 
Richard Hyde  Deputy Head of Mission UK Embassy 
Artsvi Minasyan MNA 
Arevik Petrosyan MNA, Chairperson Standing Committee on Human Rights Defence and Public Affairs 
Aram Badalyan Deputy Head of Staff Deputy Minister  
Pavel Safaryan Deputy Minister, Ministry of Finance and Economy (MFE) 
Vache Terteryan Deputy Minister Minister of Territorial Administration (MTA) 
Bagrat Yesayan Deputy Minister Ministry of Education and Science (MES) 
Hovhannes Azizyan Head, PRSP Secretariat 
Salpi Ghezarian Special Assistant to the Minister of Foreign Affairs MoFA 
Lilit Saroyan Head of Dept of the International Cooperation Ministry of Territorial Administration 
Svetlana Davtyan Head of Staff, Tavush Regional Administration  
Vahag Bazikyan Deputy Head Gegharkumik Regional Administration Armenia 
Consuelo Vidal UN Resident Coordinator/UNDP Resident Representative 
Alexander Avanessov UNDP Deputy Resident Representative 
Aristomene Varoudakis Country Manager World Bank 
Naira Melkumyan Senior Operations Officer World Bank 
Aghassi Mkrtchyan Economist World Bank 
Vigen Sargsyan External Affairs Officer World Bank 
Susanna Hayrapetyan Senior Health Specialist World Bank 
Anahit Aghabalyan Expert, GTZ 
Karlen Avetisiyan Representative Nogorno Karabkh in Armenia 
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Name Designation 
Karen Zadoyan President Association of Young Lawyers of Armenia, Civil Society 
Maya Barkhudaryan Civil Society Institute Resource Centre, International Alert Consortium Initiatives 
Armen Keshishyan Country Director OPM/DFID Armenia Regional Development Programme 
Ian Wylie Structure and Organisation Adviser, PWC/DFID Public Sector Reform Programme 
Armen Khudaverdyan Deputy Team Leader, PWC/DFID Armenia Public Sector Reform Programme 
Garik Khachikyan Structure and Organisation Specialist, PWC/DFID Public Sector Reform Programme 
Vache Qalashyan President Union of Armenian Government Employees 
Dzonik Margaryan Head of Staff, Ministry of Labour and Social Issues 
Karl Fickenscher Country Director, USAID 
Kathryn Ennis Consulting, ATOS 
Tevan Poghosyan Executive Director International Centre for Human Development 
Armen Galstyan Head of Project International Centre for Human Development 
KYRGYZ REPUBLIC 
Ainura Ibraimova Deputy Minister, Ministry of Health 
Sabyrjan Abdikarimov  Deputy Minister, Ministry of Health 
Azmat Dikambaev Head of Economic and Social Policy Department, President’s Administration 
Nurmamat 
Mullakeldiev 
Head of Dept. for Rural Water Supply, Ministry of Agriculture, Water Resources and 
Processing Industry 
Ainagul Isakova Head of the Unit for Coordination and Monitoring in HIV/AIDS area, the Government’s Office 
of the Kyrgyz Republic, CMCC 
Carina Skareby Charge d’Affaires, Delegation of the European Commission 
Roger Robinson Country Manager World Bank 
Ashraf Malik  ADB Country Director  
Hanspeter Maag Country Director Swiss Cooperation Office  
Tim Schaffter Representative UNICEF 
Ken Mc Namara Acting Country Representative USAID 
Daniyar Ilebaev Project Management Specialist/Office of Economic Growth, USAID 
Jyldyz Ourbaeva Donor Coordination Specialist, The Donor Community in the Kyrgyz Republic 
Chinara Jakypova Director Institute for Public Policy former Minister of Education 
Elmira Ibriamova Executive Director ARIS 
Michael Hall  Director, Central Asia Project, International Crisis Group 
Dr Tim Epkenhans Director OSCE Academy 
Bolotkan Sydykanov National Coordinator, CARHAP, Soros-The Kyrgys Republic Foundation  
Melitta Jakab Resident Health Policy Advisor, World Health Organization. 
Pravona Jijny Aids Facility NGO 
Talgat Subanbaev Programme Manager GFATM AIDS component, GFATM 
Zamirbek Malabekov Programme Coordinator, DFID GSAC support project 
Mark Sillins Budget and Audit Manager, DFID GSAC support project 
Zulfiya Tairova  Regional Monitoring and Evaluation Advisor, GRM International 
Altynai Altybaeva Regional Programme Assistant, GRM International 
Baktybek Shamkeyev Director RDC-Elet Public Foundation 
Ularbek Turdubekov Service Promotion Manager, RDC-Elet Public Foundation 
Aibar Sultangaziev Director, “Right to Life” trust-point 
Nigora Abidjanova  CARHAP National Coordinator, OSI Tajikistan 
Others 
Patricio Marguez CAAP, Team Leader, World Bank, Washington (by phone) 
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ANNEX 4: COUNTRY VISIT NOTES 
As feedback to the CASCM team the RPE team prepared contemporary brief visit 
notes following each of the three country visits. These notes record the main issues 
raised during the visits and focus more on the current situation leaving the main report 
to set the historical and wide policy context. Full interview notes were not available 
when these visit notes were prepared so the complete picture, in particular the views 
of the key interviewees from Government, development partners and civil society 
contacts are not incorporated. 
The intention of the notes was to give immediate feedback to the CASCM team 
enabling them to comment on the impressions gained. Following presentation and 
circulation of these notes the CASCM team provided a full response which has been 
used to clarify and correct factual errors. Otherwise the notes are presented here as 
they were prepared as working documents from the evaluation team. 
Armenia Visit Note 
RELEVANCE 
Evidence of economic and political transition though there is still a way to go. Civil 
society weaknesses and inequality especially in rural areas where poverty is endemic 
and structural.  
• Strategy 
– CSP – RAP – Graduation. A clear direction pursued through programme 
focusing with reducing portfolio. 3 key programmes all with a governance 
focus on support to public sector planning and management  
– GCPP as vehicle for both programmes is appropriate, given that both will 
continue beyond DFID closure in Armenia/Georgia. 
• Analysis 
– Little evidence of new analytic work – role is to manage well to graduation 
rather than opening up new questions 
– Project level analysis (especially ARDEP and Programme Budgeting) 
technically strong 
• Interventions 
– SIF less well used and not seen as a strategic instrument, TA solid and 
contractor dominated (as opposed to stronger DFID hand in The Kyrgyz 
Republic), office less evident – ‘lost’ in the Embassy, staff changes have 
broken continuity in some areas (e.g. DP engagement).  
– Both GCPP (CMI and CI) programmes go some way to meet RAP 
Objective 3 - “contribute to the resolution of conflicts and peace building”. 
However, for these programmes, conflict resolution is more a goal than an 
objective; their prime objective is to change perceptions of stakeholders 
from all sides of the conflict through enhanced opportunities for dialogue. 
– The ‘broad church’ civil society approach to dialogue, involving NGOs, 
journalists, analysts and think tanks, coupled with an open forum dialogue 
among parliamentary politicians from all sides, is strategically appropriate. 
There has been no breakthrough in the Minsk negotiations. Also, this is 
one of the few opportunities to involve Nagorno-Karabakh stakeholders in 
a dialogue often perceived as simply bilateral (Azerbaijan-Armenia) 
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• Harmonisation 
– Joint working is weaker than elsewhere (e.g. DFID/WB PSR approach not 
joined up; ARDEP and the EC still following different models though 
some synergies have been built), there is good liaison but coordination has 
suffered from staff changes on all sides) 
• Alignment 
– Well aligned and highly appreciative response from Govt partners 
– DFIDs past and current role seen as critical; a loyal and trusted partner; 
graduation accepted but concerns about continuity 
EFFECTIVENESS & EFFICIENCY 
• Delivery 
– Main medium is the three substantive TA projects, content and process has 
become more sophisticated moving from tools and techniques (MTEF) to 
more challenging systemic contributions (e.g. regional planning, 
programme budgeting) 
– Project-focused approach undermined wider strategic thinking and 
possible synergy within TA projects, despite strong conceptual and 
operational links. PSR Programme could have capitalised on PBP and 
emerging priorities in PRSP II  
– PSR Programme lacked contextual analysis to be effective – no links with 
the demand side of governance (eg. The Kyrgyz Republic), delivery of 
technical assistance too hands off given the scope of the project, too much 
focus on organisational changes rather than institutional capacity building. 
• GCPP Specifics 
– Some partners (and, indeed, the FCO in Yerevan) expressed doubts over 
the extent to which a programme such as CI has ‘regional’ significance, 
and whether there has been too-great an emphasis on a coordinated 
approach through Tbilisi (e.g. regional briefings/meetings/training/etc). 
Apart from generic lessons, each conflict is distinct, requiring dedicated 
resources and unique analysis.  
– There are differing views over the efficacy of the political strand of CI (i.e. 
the Parliamentary Initiative led by LINKS). The May 2007 Annual Review 
reports positively on this, in contrast to views held by FCO Armenia that 
this strand adds little to what is already underway through regular political 
channels. The evaluation finds that greater clarity of purpose and outcome 
may have been achieved through having one agency and/or in-country 
coordinator to more closely link the three central strands of the CI. As it 
was, these strands were mutually independent, rarely met, and lacked 
strategic guidance over the interrelationship between them.  
– Both CI and CMI are ‘process’ projects; yet there is no established 
logframe with tangible indicators of progress, other than the generic 
logframe. Breaking the project into its constituent parts and establishing 
set targets for each would avoid the apparent habit of glossing over the 
weaker links of CI.  
– Retaining a balanced, neutral approach to the analysis and methods used 
by CI and CMI may require closer supervision by DFID than has 
previously been the case. Civil society partners are sometimes dominated 
by strong individuals, with many years experience as interlocutors and 
‘spokespersons’ for one or another point of view over the conflict. This is 
understandable, but the latitude they have, for instance, in choosing 
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implementing partners, project expenditure etc., is substantial, with little 
monitoring, supervision or consultation with DFID-Armenia beyond the 
originals project formulation.  
• Efficiency 
– Office 
• Deep roots with good institutional memory but some loss of 
confidence and direction with changes of staff 
• FCO do not view locally engaged staff in the same way as DFID so 
there are different attitudes to confidential material and delegated 
authority 
• Early decision for designing stand-alone TA projects undermined 
Office’s ability to play a more substantive policy role with other DPs 
and Government – yet good success in influencing PSR in PRSP II.  
• Seen by most DPs as ‘part of Embassy’ positive integration but some 
role confusion around conflict and graduation 
– Staff 
• Skilled and committed, though some inconsistencies and signs of not 
being open to change 
• Need for more support to ensure confident and proactive approach to 
graduation process rather than project administration 
– TA 
• Strong contractor identity, some evidence of frustration at solutions not 
being accepted without question and irritation at high expectations that 
cannot be met within the timeframe 
• Results focused but (especially PSR) somewhat formulaic in approach 
– GCPP 
• Some confusion over respective roles of DFID-Armenia, FCO and 
DFID-London with respect to project liaison and reporting. DFID is 
the designated GCPP “lead” for both CI and CMI, but the key partners 
within these programmes often report either directly to FCO (London) 
or to DFID-London. DFID-Armenia staff have not received clear 
instructions as to what their responsibilities are with respect to the 
GCPP, although their broad remit is to ‘monitor’ projects. 
– Effectiveness 
• Given increased complexity and high expectations there is a concern at 
effectiveness within DFID and amongst consultants but a much more 
positive response from Govt partners. A more realistic appreciation of 
what has been achieved may enable more effective delivery in the final 
months 
• Are you experiencing premature grieving over closure that is blocking 
effective graduation planning? 
IMPACT & SUSTAINABILITY 
- Evidence of impact in terms of government systems and more efficient 
planning and financial management processes 
- Positive evidence of benefits of alignment principle with strong 
endorsement of DFID approach and contribution form all GoA 
interviewees 
- Civil society impact may be less strong and more sustainable support to 
stand alone civil society developments may have been more appropriate 
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- Sustainability will depend on government ownership, programme 
continuity and consistency – Some success in influencing PSRP II – good 
government momentum to continue PSR, more is needed to integrate 
elements of TA projects into other DPs programme.  
LESSONS 
- Scaling up to graduation is possible but increasing complexity and 
sophistication of inputs needs careful planning 
- MIC status is not the only indicator of development progress. Even with a 
positive decision to graduate poverty, civil society strength, and 
democratisation are features to address 
- Conflict is best addressed specifically and in a coordinated way. Conflicts 
are situation specific and a regional instrument may be appropriate but 
regional delivery is not.  
RECOMMENDATIONS 
– A more proactive approach to the graduation process is required. It has 
been accepted – the issue now is effective implementation of a closure 
plan that moves beyond the present sound and appropriate practical 
arrangement to prepare for an effective closure, continuity of relationship 
and sustainability of key contributions. 
– There will be little change at project level in the last year the focus at 
country level needs to be on continuity, harmonisation and alignment for 
the future. Deep engagement with EC, World Bank and other partners as 
necessary with a strengthening of the Yerevan Office to achieve this. 
– For GCPP in situations like this there is a role for a dedicated coordinator 
(possibly co-funded by DFID/FCO/partner NGO) to oversee and monitor 
the CI for Armenia-Azerbaijan-NK at a process and operational level and a 
more sophisticated logframe with ‘process’ performance indicators 
assigned to each of the three elements within CI (and for CMI). 
The Kyrgyz Republic Visit Note 
RELEVANCE 
Good Given Context – Fragile State, Poor Country, High levels of corruption and 
criminality, strong economic role of China (even more significant in Tajikistan) and 
continued significances of Russia and Kazakhstan, reducing significance and role of 
West 
• Strategy 
– CIP and RAP subordinate to declared country led approach; CDP and 
JCSS determine strategic approach tho’ both donor/DFID influenced 
– Apparent broad balanced programme but underneath clear selection of 
sectors where change is possible – health, rural dev, finance, water 
– Long term commitments – health, rural livelihood/development. 
– Focused TA for policy level capacity and competence building within 
multi-donor – institutional development not just technical 
– PPG: VIP and SLLPC – Sound and appropriate design  
– Gov: Health and Economic Development, Public Finance Management, 
civil society – accountability and voice with an approach well informed by 
the INTRAC  
– Conflict: No Focus – despite relevance 
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– AIDS: (Sub) Regional Programme 
– Regional Development: No Focus 
• Analysis 
– ‘hands on analysis’ ‘analysis in practice/action’ i.e. analytic support to 
harmonised developments (JCSS) and Govt leadership (CDS) 
• Interventions 
– SWAp, TA Projects, joint investments, policy role 
– Institutional Development NOT JUST technical 
– Integration of project level TA with policy level role of Office 
• Harmonisation 
– Very strong facilitating role. 
– Endorsement and appreciation from Govt and DPs 
– Role in development and implementation of JCSS 
• Alignment 
– Priority given to programme being Country Led 
– CDS seen as guiding current and future work 
EFFECTIVENESS & EFFICIENCY 
• Delivery 
– Range of interventions – Strategic Fund, TA Projects, Investment 
with/parallel to other DPs, TA,  
– High visibility – combining strong expertise with high-level policy 
engagement through multi-donor framework 
– Again a strategic and country focused approach 
– Strong role of country office in project management and TA linkages 
• Efficiency 
– Office 
• Efficient and well regarded 
• Seen as playing a critical role by DPs and Govt 
– Staff 
• Identity and role of head of office has high profile not personally but as 
DFID which strengthens the presence and creates a strategic direction 
• Personalities are key but strength of team is evident 
• No Embassy presence and DFID identity is as development agency not 
part of UK PLC 
– TA 
• Well integrated with the programme 
• Strong sector management  
• Contractor identity less evident (than Armenia and Moldova), national 
consultants integrated and (e.g. RDC) sustainable role 
• Communications issues for Contractors who are not devolved (GRM) 
• Efficient use and coordination of adviser inputs in-country. However is 
this a function of devolution or independence 
– Overall 
• Donor coordination essential to compensate for crowding effect and 
avoid duplication of work 
• DFID facilitation of coordination, harmonisation and alignment is 
highly effective 
• Effectiveness 
– Sector engagement pursued very well 
– Pro-active programme adjustment to new country and donor priorities  
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– Health long term effective delivery, gradually moving up stream with solid 
DP engagement leading to SWAp 
– RWS harmonisation and technical support merging to excellent effect with 
a ‘single’ WB/ADB project and a 10 Year Govt strategy 
– Similar strategic development in support for finance and economic 
management 
IMPACT & SUSTAINABILITY 
• Impact 
– Strongest impact at policy and policy capacity level 
– Some concern at quality of M&E for measuring beneficiary impact 
(especially for HIV/AIDS interventions and to a lesser degree wider 
poverty impact) though evidence of good practice in RWSS sector and 
with VIP 
– Impact assessment at country and across sub region for HIV/AIDS needs 
to be developed at project and (3-Ones) country level 
– Sector selectivity could have impact and sustainability distortions but other 
DPs seem to balance this  
• Sustainability 
– Some sub optimal practices at activity level – artificial NGOs, top up 
salaries, ex politicians as consultants – but acceptable as short cuts within 
the current context 
– Need for long term investment by western donors given the fragility at 
political levels 
– Support for mid/senior level bureaucrats is appropriate and embeds policy 
capacity but sustainability is a risk 
LESSONS 
– Model of policy level capacity building demonstrates good practice 
– Achievements only possible because of strong understanding of the 
context. 
– Sector and champion identification ensures sustainability in a fragile 
environment 
– Long term commitment to a sector yields benefits 
– Harmonisation and alignment achieved but with a focus on clear change 
targets 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
– Need for a post RAP and Sub-Regional vision and DFID focused direction 
to support the country level focus 
– More attention to impact through JCSS and CDS monitoring (with other 
DPs) and at project level to complement the strength of policy capacity 
and harmonisation 
– Maintain the sector focus and clarity but explore the development of 
support to civil society to increase accountability and voice across sectors 
Moldova Visit Note 
RELEVANCE 
• Strategy 
– There has been increasing relevance in the Moldova programme as it has 
moved from the KHF ? CSP ? RAP. The CSP was, by its own 
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admission, more ‘niche’ and also more project-shaped, with a particular 
focus on rural livelihoods initiatives. It did however intend to use these as 
demonstration model that could be scaled up +/or inform policy. 
– The RAP is less ‘niche’, but more focused on big economic development 
and governance (state machinery) themes. To a large extent, this is an 
easier call now, as GoM has the policy documents in place to which DFID 
can align (EGPRSP/NDP). Also strong pull of EU helps point everyone in 
the same direction (though EC not always coordinating well with other 
donors). 
• Increasingly focused & strategic portfolio 
• Increasingly aligned to GoM priorities & harmonised with DPs 
• Reflects status of Moldova’s transition.  
• RAP not so clear to stakeholders/partners who were clearer about 
DFID’s aim and plans with the CSP. RAP is shallow on M. 
• DFIDM felt the RAP less flexible than the CSP (previously more 
able to respond to Govt – BUT flipside less coherent programme) 
– Europe – is one of the key issues in M. There is a strong desire to integrate 
and eventually accede. The EU-Moldova Action Plan maps out a route 
towards this. It invites M “to enter into intensified political, security, 
economic and cultural relations with the EU, enhanced cross border co-
operation and shared responsibility in conflict prevention and conflict 
resolution. One of the key objectives of this action plan will be to further 
support a viable solution to the Transnistria conflict.” DFID supports this 
through all its projects, especially those with a focus of creating a modern 
public sector. DFID also supporting civil society consultations on the Plan. 
These are high relevant activities. 
– PPG: in the first ~3 years of the period to 05/06 relevant support to rural 
economy; then perceived switch to social assistance (coincided with 
change of adviser) – lost some support from GoM. (this comment from 
RISP/CAPMU, who are continuing the work with WB and Sida finding. 
Interesting that Sida plugging gap left by DFID. Sida also plugged gap left 
by DFID in MSIF). Some unsustainable activities (MSIF – parallel lower 
level structures; S-RISP – TPAC 100% DFID support) 
– Now RDP…Feeling in the M office that rural did drop out of the 
programme. Regional development law passed in Dec ’06 – provided the 
springboard for the regional development programme. At PCN stage.  
– Gov:  Very relevant & targeted programmes: Promotion of effective & 
transparent PFM through MTEF and CoA, ISAS, Joined up activity with 
WB (CAR, PRSC) less convincing – genuine commitment to 
comprehensive Central Administration Reform? Why budget support? 
– Large area of work under Governance relates to “Statement of Intent 3. 
Improving national and local capacity to provide services to poor.” This 
relates to the rural/ regional programmes such as RISP/SRISP and the 
livelihoods programme, which can (are?) also seen as PPG programmes. 
– Early on saw civil society as important and provided funding to strengthen 
(but sustainable?) 
– Conflict: DFID is “lead “agency on the PBF (2003-07). This is an 
umbrella for 4 projects/components (a fifth was dropped in 2nd year). 
Strategy to combine civil society interface, training, conflict debate, media 
support and ‘young leaders’ seminars has proved relevant & innovative. 
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• Analysis 
– Relevant programmes, built on national priorities and good diagnostic 
studies (e.g. Briefing papers for new social assistance project very well 
received. [OPM]. CV: MTEF, ISAS, etc) 
– SCA is a DFID strength, and work on TN issue seen as relevant and 
ground-breaking (1st donor) 
– As with most FSU states, Moldova had elements of fragility. Hence in the 
CSP, and now under the RAP, Saw civil as relevant & appropriate entry 
point, and decided to support 
– DFID’s recognised strength is conflict analysis and M&E. SCAs 
conducted twice for PBF. Good participative process 
– DFID has (through SCAs) recognised differences in the political milieu of 
Transdnistria, opening the possibility for ‘regime change’ and using civil 
society as an inroad. Meanwhile, major capacity constraints in the Ministry 
of Reintegration (only 12 persons) which lacks a clear strategy.  
• Instruments 
– Appropriate mix of interventions: TA + Strategic Fund (CSOs, TA) – but 
doubt on relevance of BS under PRSC 
– Shift towards programmes that support move towards EU integration is 
relevant. But working with EU as a donor slows and constrains activity. 
– DFID is recognised for being able to mobilise small amounts of funding 
for strategic purposes, such as TA to draft TORs for a new programme. 
However, DFIDM were concerned that the SIF didn’t result in them 
becoming other donors’ fire brigade.  
– PBF has been flexible in initiating new ideas. Good learning opportunities 
for NGOs, civil society institutions.  
• Harmonisation 
– Discussions started in 03/03. Formalised as Dev P’ship F/W in late 2005 
with Sida’s impetus. UNDP have been supporting secretariat, but probs – 
funing stopped in Feb ’07.. No one else stepping fwd to lead.  
– Coordination mainly at sector level 
– Better coordination of ‘big donors’ evident, but DFID less visible. (EU flet 
coordination not working [eg in PFM progs], though he was very new) 
– this is a relatively high transaction cost activity in its own right. We are 
unsure about harmonisation for its own sake as the programme moves 
towards graduation. DFID has rightly (and unusually) decided not to lead 
on this in M. The question is whether staff time would be better spent on 
more visible activities 
– We believe that across the whole of CASCM, DFID is not meant to solo-
fund any projects. Joint-funding is only one element of harmonisation, but 
brings its own challenges – e.g. DFID might have  
– Bank prefers DFID to do some stand alone projects (e.g. PFM programme) 
– all pooled finding can be constraining. 
– DFID has a good relationship with the FCO in-country 
• Alignment 
– EGPRSC & EU integration – main drivers, DFID involved ad supporting, 
e.g. civil society participation in EGPRSP 
– Moldova has agreed an ENP Action Plan. It has considerable resources 
attached (EUR 200?). DFID support to its implementation…  
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– Donor Group on Civil Society meets every 3 months. DFID funded 
administrator for this in 2003/04 (from Strategic Fund). Also, two NGOs 
funded in support of EU inception, but duration (3 months) was too short. 
– Appointment of EU Special Representative to Transdnistria (2005) 
accelerated interest in PBF, including presentations in Brussels Conference 
in November 2005 
– Through the ENI, EU has committed to EUR2 million for ‘apolitical’ (!) 
Transdnistria projects, using some PBF organisations. Good ‘leverage’ by 
PBF/DFID 
– Donor coordination in general may be weakened by being intra-donor, 
excluding government. Also lacks coordination at sectoral levels, 
including M&E.  
EFFECTIVENESS & EFFICIENCY 
• Delivery 
– CSP, RAP programmes to date, and SIF, mostly good, but slowing? New 
regional development and social assistance programme have had long 
design phases (since 2005?) 
– Slow turnaround on ‘PBF Mark 2’ (one year in the making), causing 
continuity problems. GCPP funding cannot allow project staff, so GOF 
must now cover this. 
– Doubts that BS an efficient way of supporting poverty reduction strategy – 
GoM does not need aid money. To do with frontloading? 
• Efficiency 
– Office 
• DFID moved into M in 2000 (1st from Moscow, then Bucharest). 
Office opened in embassy in 2002. Evidence is that a country-
presence gives good contacts with Govt and partners. Fingers well 
on pulse.  
– Staff 
• professional, well-recognised and well-respected; facilitatory 
approach 
• balance UK and Moldova demands 
• under-resourced office (esp post-CASCM with less London 
support). Additional resourcing pressures brought by more 
harmonised and less project-based working. E.g. Silvia as ‘gender 
champion’ 
• Initial weaknesses between PBF and higher-level political dialogue 
(through Ambassador); no regular briefings. But now DFID is 
invited to inter-departmental meetings 
– TA 
• professional, understood needs, results-focused  
• Training, materials, and regional seminars most valued 
• Effectiveness 
– RAP has been pursued well 
– SIF has been use very effectively, e.g. funding 1 urgent mission for TA for 
development of NDP, under slower moving WB programme. However, 
need to avoid being a fire brigade and also being driven into ‘short-
termism’ (esp in NGO arena – Expert Group: 3 months for civil society 
consultations on NDP) 
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– DFID themselves had some concerns about the poverty orientation in 
RISP. This coincided with RAP and change in adviser, but also possibly 
demonstrates unclear thinking about how PPG objective can be obtained.  
– DFID did not funded 2nd phase of MSIF due to concerns about parallel 
structures. However, this was the right approach at that stage of 
development of post-soviet governance systems. 
– Ground-breaking peace-building work in TN has opened space for other 
donors, e.g. ENPI support to TN NGOs (JBt?) 
– Unclear that harmonisation has improved efficiency (high transaction 
costs, slower responses) 
– Multi-donor funds: DFID loses some visibility, transaction costs, donors & 
Govt values DFID of funds seed funds to kick-start. General acceptance 
that ‘visible’ projects have multiplier effects which may be lost as DFID 
graduates. 
– ENPI vs. PRSC 
– some problem with sequencing – and sub-objective (linking MTEF with 
PRSP when the latter is no way operational – downsizing public 
administration, but no measures to address staff retrenchment) 
IMPACT & SUSTAINABILITY 
• Impacts mainly evident from projects supported earlier in the period, and 
being rural livelihoods and capacity development projects, results evident 
more quickly: nos. of businesses, jobs, created, etc. (RISP) 
• 44 community development plans from MSIF.  
• However the impacts from these programmes limited to local level – 
eventually hard to scale as Govt institutions for the regions not in place (only 
now [Dec ‘06]. 
• GCPP/DFID is the only donor project in Transdnistria, a rare platform for 
dialogue and inclusiveness at regional and national levels. The approach is to 
obtain ‘critical mass’ in solving the conflict, which is why civil society is so 
important.  
• The ‘soft’ approach has inherent weakness of poor process impact indicators. 
• With six well-developed NGOs in Transdnistria (through CONTACT 
component of PBF), a question arises over sustainability since these NGOs are 
still fragile. Institutional development is critical to avoid simple project 
delivery by NGOs, but realignment of PBF may not capitalise on gains already 
made. 
LESSONS 
• Conflict analysis strong at ‘centre’ of PBF, but skills not transferred to 
partners, as no TA component (for capacity development & skills transfer) 
• Some structural issues may undermine gains (e.g. staff turn-over in Govt) – 
sequencing, e.g. PSR before PFM capacity building 
• Work on institutional memory has been successful, e.g. manuals & library in 
ISAS – needs to be bankrolled in all TA projects, given high staff turnover in 
public administration 
• TA projects leaving too soon: often capacity substitution rather than capacity 
development (local consultants)  
• New programmes (e.g. SAP) may be too much too soon – Qs about absorptive 
capacity in GoM. Consultants out-number civil servants (ditto in Ministry of 
Re-integration – 12 people).  
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• Long-term perspective on civil society OD & capacity building not always 
evident. Also need to understand impacts of funding gaps (e.g. PBF 1 ? 2) 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
• Strategic Impact Fund 
– Clearer link between SIF and PBF (even though PBF is GCPP). 2 civil 
society funding streams, while civil society is one set of issues (capacity 
related) 
– DFID’s ability to respond rapidly & flexibly is a key strength. The SIF 
epitomises this. Some of its features constrain. Suggest revise the ‘3 month 
limitation’ 
• Need to map out alternative support to NGOs & link to other donors ? smooth 
transition (NGOs need advance notice e.g. Contact) 
• Planning 
– Donors, and most Govt knew of plans to graduate, in general sense. 
Everyone keen to learn more 
– Bank will miss grant funds and expertise. Not quite clear to Bank why 
exiting – they just change the terms of engagement (different loan rates) as 
country’s status improves.  
– Need for post-RAP document: a Moldova CAP / mini-CAP? Not worth 
investing in a JAS type document. 
• Mix of aid instruments: 
– Short-term, high impact, visible projects/TA 
– + PRSC 
– Question about impact of PRSC: small portion of GoM budget (and DFID 
loses visibility) 
• PBF momentum, included robust M&E system, requires a ‘hands-on’ approach – 
i.e. in-country coordinator. Should not be delegated to regional post because of 
particularities of each conflict. 
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ANNEX 5: NET OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE 
FLOWS TO CASCM COUNTRIES 2001-2005 
Total Annual Net Official Development Assistance Disbursements 
(million US$) 
Year 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Total % of 
total 
Recipient                                    
Donor               
Armenia               
EBRD 0.47 0.23 0.76 1.37 0.16 2.99 0.25% 
Sweden 0.86 1.05 1.61 2.32 1.57 7.41 0.62% 
Switzerland 1.77 2.3 2.2 3.07 2.23 11.57 0.97% 
UK 2.38 1.67 3.15 6.56 6.22 19.98 1.68% 
Japan 5.18 11.36 7.02 4.68 5.37 33.61 2.83% 
Netherlands 7.86 7.18 9.91 9.22 11.64 45.81 3.86% 
EC 10.17 28.88 16.44 28.23 23.42 107.14 9.02% 
IDA 55.03 66.11 77.39 77.75 31.39 307.67 25.91% 
United States 77.95 114.3 74.19 73.14 53.63 393.21 33.11% 
All others 91.75 126.49 133.47 125.2 89.03 565.94 47.65% 
All Donors 198.39 293.46 248.75 253.79 193.27 1187.66 100.00% 
Azerbaijan               
UK 1.15 0.47 0.29 0.16 0.04 2.11 0.16% 
Sweden 0.07 0.36 0.31 0.47 1.16 2.37 0.18% 
EBRD 1.08 2.08 2.3 3.05 2.44 10.95 0.85% 
Switzerland 0.99 5.65 2.53 3.05 5.58 17.8 1.39% 
Netherlands 2.59 4.06 3.86 3.5 5.47 19.48 1.52% 
EC 12.78 22.37 24.56 10.61 26.02 96.34 7.52% 
United States 30.91 61.53 49.27 47.58 44.12 233.41 18.22% 
IDA 27.56 56.92 74.74 49.17 45.63 254.02 19.83% 
All others 53.86 54.03 62.89 48.73 84.72 304.23 23.75% 
Japan 100.97 141.84 79.82 9.64 8.25 340.52 26.58% 
All Donors 231.96 349.31 300.57 175.96 223.43 1281.23 100.00% 
Georgia                
EBRD 1.72 1.87 1.83 2.68 1.38 9.48 0.65% 
Sweden 1.99 2.02 2.42 4.12 4.19 14.74 1.01% 
UK 5.69 3.87 3.41 3.12 3.34 19.43 1.33% 
Switzerland 2.3 4.51 6.92 8.01 5.88 27.62 1.89% 
Netherlands 3.3 8.89 5.03 7.53 11.99 36.74 2.51% 
Japan 15.48 18.6 16.42 10.59 7.33 68.42 4.68% 
EC 23.48 10.86 28.31 36.15 35.86 134.66 9.21% 
IDA 63.11 58.88 43.46 64.38 59.23 289.06 19.77% 
All others 88.58 69.7 42.87 85.65 107.27 394.07 26.95% 
United States 94.34 133.31 74.95 92.26 73.3 468.16 32.01% 
All Donors 299.99 312.51 225.62 314.49 309.77 1462.38 100.00% 
Kazakstan                
IDA .. .. .. .. .. 0 0.00% 
Switzerland 0.28 0.12 0.29 0.09 1.04 1.82 0.17% 
Sweden 0.58 0.48 0.51 1.15 0.8 3.52 0.32% 
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UK 0.85 1.13 1.88 1.76 1.65 7.27 0.66% 
Netherlands 2.15 2.01 2.51 3.32 2.36 12.35 1.12% 
EBRD 3.09 3.34 2.84 2.93 2.1 14.3 1.30% 
EC 4.41 5.7 6.87 10.23 7.42 34.63 3.14% 
United States 56.01 74.01 47.81 56.39 57.11 291.33 26.41% 
All others 36.58 71.32 70.99 61.08 90.58 330.55 29.97% 
Japan 43.93 30.13 136.27 130.76 66.17 407.26 36.92% 
All Donors 147.88 188.24 269.97 267.71 229.23 1103.03 100.00% 
Kyrgyz Republic                
Sweden 0.9 0.84 0.97 2.53 2.52 7.76 0.70% 
EBRD 0.95 1.82 1.95 2.65 2.28 9.65 0.87% 
Netherlands 1.79 1.66 4.76 3.07 3.12 14.4 1.30% 
UK 2.39 4.47 7.07 6.29 9.36 29.58 2.68% 
Switzerland 4.9 13.85 8.6 10.42 9.31 47.08 4.26% 
EC 11.24 12.83 10.05 22.94 17.99 75.05 6.80% 
Japan 23.15 8.12 31.23 26.69 20.95 110.14 9.98% 
IDA 26.66 33.4 31.85 24.1 35.51 151.52 13.73% 
United States 28.08 51.66 40.06 39.9 41.4 201.1 18.22% 
All others 88.85 56.97 63.3 122.5 126.01 457.63 41.46% 
All Donors 188.91 185.62 199.84 261.09 268.45 1103.91 100.00% 
Moldova                
EBRD 0.28 0.24 0.47 0.73 0.71 2.43 0.35% 
Switzerland 1.97 2.15 3.27 3.22 5.33 15.94 2.30% 
UK 2.53 3.32 5.31 4.86 2.96 18.98 2.74% 
Japan 8.15 5.91 4.3 3.33 3.71 25.4 3.66% 
Sweden 2.55 4.57 4.55 7.22 8.52 27.41 3.95% 
Netherlands 15.15 3.47 4.91 5.6 8.3 37.43 5.40% 
EC 4.64 11.27 8.48 10.04 40.44 74.87 10.80% 
IDA 14.16 21.87 15.9 17.68 24.78 94.39 13.62% 
United States 43.51 56.91 41.7 32.76 30.49 205.37 29.63% 
All others 29.42 31.97 29.05 34.06 66.51 216.41 31.22% 
All Donors 122.36 141.68 117.94 119.5 191.75 693.23 100.00% 
Tajikistan                
Netherlands 0.57 0.58 1.11 1.19 0.89 4.34 0.45% 
EBRD 0.62 0.72 1.34 1.53 1.42 5.63 0.58% 
UK 0.93 3.27 1.09 1.52 4.4 11.21 1.16% 
Sweden 0.97 2.02 1.78 3.12 4.56 12.45 1.28% 
Switzerland 6.97 5.23 13.41 17.04 9.95 52.6 5.42% 
Japan 4.61 26.96 4.77 6.58 9.93 52.85 5.45% 
EC 28.89 12.81 25.29 21.76 35.96 124.71 12.86% 
IDA 34.76 9.61 13.43 54.97 36.69 149.46 15.41% 
United States 40.41 75.88 47.1 47.5 57.55 268.44 27.68% 
All others 50.54 31.24 38.52 87.94 80.02 288.26 29.72% 
All Donors 169.27 168.32 147.84 243.15 241.37 969.95 100.00% 
Turkmenistan                
IDA .. .. .. .. .. 0 0.00% 
Netherlands 0.21 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.01 0.37 0.18% 
Switzerland .. 0.01 0.78 .. .. 0.79 0.39% 
Sweden 0.96 .. .. .. .. 0.96 0.47% 
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UK 0.12 0.24 0.67 0.11 0.05 1.19 0.58% 
EBRD 1.03 0.31 0.23 0.11 0.05 1.73 0.84% 
EC 2.63 2.34 1.9 0.29 0.97 8.13 3.97% 
Japan 16.42 11.37 6.8 2.22 0.13 36.94 18.03% 
United States 14.12 12.14 6.51 6.54 9.55 48.86 23.84% 
All others 36.27 14.07 10.2 27.93 17.49 105.96 51.71% 
All Donors 71.76 40.52 27.16 37.24 28.25 204.93 100.00% 
Uzbekistan                
UK 0.04 0.14 0.14 0.37 0.96 1.65 0.17% 
EC 1.12 0.71 1.12 0.66 0.49 4.1 0.43% 
Netherlands 0.76 1.37 0.59 1.45 0.55 4.72 0.49% 
Sweden 1.34 1.54 2.58 2.92 2.54 10.92 1.14% 
Switzerland .. .. 0.21 4.51 7.11 11.83 1.24% 
United States 1.28 3.43 5.87 9.9 6.6 27.08 2.84% 
EBRD 6.11 7.36 5.08 3.1 9.18 30.83 3.23% 
All others 61.32 60.27 47.38 61.73 52.92 283.62 29.70% 
Japan 30.92 40.16 63.22 99.75 54.44 288.49 30.21% 
IDA 50.24 74.27 68.36 61.24 37.54 291.65 30.54% 
All Donors 153.13 189.25 194.55 245.63 172.33 954.89 100.00% 
data extracted on 23/08/2007 from OECD.Stat   
At current prices   
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ANNEX 6: DFID BILATERAL AID TO CASCM COUNTRIES 
2001/02 TO 2005/06 
Amount (£ thousands) 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06
Central Asia Republics           
Kazakhstan 612 716 1,230 672 802
Kyrgyz Republic  1,829 3,456 4,200 4,487 7,162
Tajikistan 1,978 358 688 1,359 2,766
Turkmenistan 59 161 36 28 20
Uzbekistan 397 490 559 613 277
Total Central Asia Republics  4,875 5,182 6,713 7,160 11,027
Total Asia44 488,921 542,787 784,456 807,385 943,120
        
Europe       
Armenia 1,479 1,178 2,746 3,453 3,887
Azerbaijan 367 259 159 49 14
Georgia 2,446 2,349 2,087 1,741 2,438
Total South Caucasus 4,292 3,786 4,992 5,243 6,339
Moldova 1,584 3,354 2,433 2,571 1,498
Total Europe 96,183 84,502 70,440 59,858 42,054
  
TOTAL CASCM countries 10,751 12,321 14,138 14,973 18,864
Source: DFID Department Report 2007 Annex 2, Tables A3.3 and A3.4.
                                                 
 
44 In DFID’s 2007  Annual Report table A3.3, Asia includes: Middle East, South Asia, Far East, Central Asian 
Republics, and Asia Regional programmes. 
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ANNEX 7: SCHEMATIC SUMMARY OF CASCM RAP 
PURPOSE 
To enhance effective and coordinated engagement by the international community to 
propose and support country driven, results oriented, poverty reduction efforts 
▲ 
APPROACH 
• increase the focus of the programme • support nationally led PRSP processes • work with others to promote effective donor coordination 
• support effective medium and short term interventions • improve DFID’s organisational structure • systematically learn and use lessons 
▲                                                                                                          ▲ 
COUNTRY THEMATIC OBJECTIVES 
• Tajikistan • Kyrgyz Republic • Moldova • Armenia • Georgia 
 
REGIONAL OBJECTIVES 
      ▲                                    ▲                                         ▲                                    ▲                                  ▲ 
Country Theme 1: To 
improve governance and 
the institutional 
environment for poverty 
reduction 
Country Theme 2: 
To promote pro-poor 
sustainable growth 
 
Country Theme 3: 
To contribute to the 
resolution of conflicts 
and peace building 
Regional Issue 1: 
To counter the 
spread 
of HIV/AIDS 
 
Regional Issue 2: 
To improve regional 
trade and cooperation 
 
Main Outcomes: 
• more effective and 
transparent public 
financial management 
systems 
• reduced corruption and 
increased transparency 
• improved 
accountability and 
responsiveness of 
governments to their 
citizens 
• improved delivery of 
basic services to poor 
people 
 
Main Outcomes: 
• better understanding by 
governments and 
donors of Constraints 
on pro-poor growth and 
how to overcome them 
• IFIs actively engaged in 
PRSPs and taking 
account of poverty and 
social impacts of their 
work 
• poor people gaining 
increased benefit from 
growth 
 
Main Outcomes: 
• more joined up UK 
Government working 
and stronger 
coordination between 
international actors 
• greater safety, 
security and access to 
justice for citizens 
improved context for 
poverty reduction 
 
Main Outcomes: 
• all country offices 
engaged and 
mainstreaming 
HIV/AIDS 
• risk averted of 
major HIV/AIDS 
epidemic in Central 
Asia 
• major human 
disaster prevented 
 
 
Main Outcomes: 
• improvements in 
Regional cooperation 
contributing to pro-poor 
economic growth in the 
region 
• policy relevant lessons 
learnt on extractive 
industries and 
transparency; 
maximizing 
development impacts of 
pipelines; cooperation of 
EC with New 
Neighbours 
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ANNEX 8: COMPARIONS OF CASC SP AND RAP 
OBJECTIVES 
2000-03 CASC OBJECTIVES 2004-07 RAP OBJECTIVES 
CASC SP country level objectives: RAP country level objectives 
good central and local public administration, with a 
focus on social protection systems, and the 
development of community-based solutions to 
reinforce social cohesion 
To improve governance and the institutional 
environment for poverty reduction 
• more effective and transparent public financial 
management systems 
• reduced corruption and increased transparency 
• improved accountability and responsiveness of 
governments to their citizens 
• improved delivery of basic services to poor 
people 
an enhanced enabling framework for economic 
growth including measures to encourage sustainable 
rural livelihoods, while ensuring access to essential 
services for the poorest, and adequate environmental 
protection  
To promote pro-poor sustainable growth 
• better understanding by governments and 
donors of constraints on pro-poor 
growth and how to overcome them 
• IFIs actively engaged in PRSPs and taking 
account of poverty and social impacts 
of their work  
• Poor people gaining increased benefit from 
growth 
health systems which provide affordable quality 
health care to all levels of society, particularly the 
poorest. 
To contribute to the resolution of conflicts and 
peace building 
• more joined up UK Government working and 
stronger coordination between 
international actors  
• greater safety, security and access to justice for 
citizens 
• improved context for poverty reduction 
CASC SP regional objectives RAP regional objectives 
democracy and respect for human rights, in particular 
through strengthened civil society, to help empower 
citizens in both rural and urban areas 
To counter the spread of HIV/AIDS 
• all country offices engaged and mainstreaming 
HIV/AIDS 
• risk averted of major HIV/AIDS epidemic in 
Central Asia 
• major human disaster prevented 
the integration of the countries of the region into 
global economic frameworks 
To improve regional trade and cooperation 
• improvements in regional cooperation 
contributing to pro-poor economic 
growth in the region  
• policy relevant lessons learnt on: extractive 
industries and transparency; maximising 
development impacts of pipelines; cooperation of 
EC with New Neighbours 
improved regional stability through measures to 
prevent and reduce conflict 
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ANNEX 9: PRSP PROGRESS IN CASCM COUNTRIES 
Table A: CASCM Countries Progress with PRSP Process in 2004 
Country Stage of PRSP Lead Authority PRGF? MTEF? 
Armenia Full PRSP Ministry of Finance Yes Yes 
Azerbaijan Full PRSP Ministry for Economic Development Yes Yes 
Georgia Full PRSP State Chancellery Yes No 
Kazakhstan Poverty Reduction Programme 2003-2005 
Ministry of Economy and 
Budget Planning No No 
Kyrgyz 
Republic Full PRSP 
Ministry of Finance/ 
Presidency Yes Underway 
Moldova Full PRSP Ministry of Economy No Underway 
Tajikistan Full PRSP Presidential Working Group Yes MTBF 
Uzbekistan 
Comprehensive Strategy for 
the Improvement of Living 
Standards of the People of 
Uzbekistan  
Cabinet of Ministers and 
Ministry of Economy No No 
RAP Table 3 page 9. 
Table B: Current CASCM PRSP Status 
Country Stage of PRSP Current Status DFID Role 
Armenia 
PRSP linked to three year 
MTEF and national budget 
to be performance based 
across Govt. 
Approval of 2007-09 
MTEF delayed due to 
May 2007 elections 
Key role through project 
support to MTEF and Poverty 
Based Budgeting since 2000 
linked to APSREP and 
ARDEP 
Georgia 
National Development 
Plan/PRSP reflected in 
budget with MTEF 
2007-2010 MTEF 
approved Oct 2006, 
increased capacity of 
MoF 
With other DPs, coordinates 
and monitors 
Kyrgyz 
Rep. 
MTBF approved and linked 
to annual budget with 
unified submission process, 
second NPRS not yet linked 
to budget 
Unified budget 
submission process 
further improved; next 
task JCSS/CDS joint 
monitoring 
S-GSAC project supporting 
MoF at technical level; DFID 
(joint) donor lead on 
coordination of PFM 
Moldova 
MTEF extended and 
sustained by GoM in line 
with EGPRSP 
2007-09 MTEF drafted 
and approved by Govt.; 
civil society 
participation 
Short term consultancies, 
coordination with GoM and 
other DPs 
Tajikistan 
PRSP developed, effective 
monitoring system in 
process 
PRSP2 approved work 
on linking to MTEF 
continuing 
Consultant support to MoF to 
roll out MTEF and for PRS 
preparation, support to SSC 
through basket fund with WB 
and Sida 
2007 Country Results Framework 
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ANNEX 10: CASCM SPEND BY SECTOR 2004/5 – 2006/7 
Table A: Spend by sector/countries as a proportion of overall spend in the sector 
2004-5 % 2005-6 % 2006-7 % Total 2004-7 %
FRAMEWORK 16,110,000 22,786,000 19,687,000 58,583,000
SPEND 17,318,624 20,878,775 17,838,732 56,036,131
SECTORS
Agriculture
Kyrgyz Republic 567,107 33% 696,529 38% 1,618,298 80% 2,881,934 52%
Moldova 806,103 47% 801,930 44% 20,359 1% 1,628,392 29%
Georgia 288,962 17% 330,820 18% 391,521 19% 1,011,303 18%
Tajikistan 44,633 3% 44,633 1%
Total 1,706,805 1,829,279 2,030,178 5,566,262
Business and Financial
Regional 2,109,272 65% 2,562,578 63% 1,081,826 67% 5,753,676 64%
Armenia 460,659 14% 972,693 24% 532,284 33% 1,965,636 22%
Tajikistan 483,495 15% 463,817 11% 947,312 11%
Moldova 176,616 5% 176,616 2%
Georgia 78,000 2% 78,000 1%
Total 3,230,042 4,077,088 1,614,110 8,921,240
Conflict and Humanitarian
Regional 54,000 79% 19,330 100% 46,392 100% 119,722 90%
Azerbaijan 7,103 10% 7,103 5%
Tajikistan 6,903 10% 6,903 5%
Armenia 10 0% 10 0%
Total 68,016 19,330 46,392 133,738
Education
Regional 58,838 100% 58,838 100%
Total 58,838 58,838
Energy
Kazakhstan 293,682 53% 117,193 56% 410,875 54%
Kyrgyz Republic 253,538 45% 81,085 39% 334,623 44%
Regional 1,016 0% 11,313 5% 12,329 2%
Azerbaijan 9,245 2% 9,245 1%
Total 557,481 209,591 767,072
Environment
Regional 432,513 100% 265,927     100% 79,926 100% 778,366 100%
Total 432,513 265,927     79,926 778,366
Health and Welfare
Kyrgyz Republic 1,583,877 62% 3,966,088 73% 1,834,804 66% 7,384,769 69%
Georgia 776,229 31% 1,443,559 27% 927,773 34% 3,147,561 29%
Moldova 92,116 4% 1,189 0% 93,305 1%
Uzbekistan 72,524 3% 72,524 1%
Regional 17,441 1% 534 0% 17,975 0%
Total 2,542,187 5,411,370 2,762,577 10,716,134  
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Misc Community
Tajikistan 171,199 15% 1,400,740 92% 2,090,911 56% 3,662,850 57%
Moldova 990,248 85% 128,463 8% 1,612,771 44% 2,731,482 43%
Total 1,161,447 1,529,203 3,703,682 6,394,332
No Project Specific
Uzbekistan 49,274 15% 276,300 63% 325,574 43%
Tajikistan 63,471 20% 13,119 3% 76,590 10%
Georgia 30,931 10% 32,976 8% 63,907 8%
Kyrgyz Republic 42,028 13% 20,959 5% 62,987 8%
Kazahkstan 23,273 7% 34,690 8% 57,963 8%
Armenia 32,014 10% 21,604 5% 53,618 7%
Turkmenistan 28,082 9% 20,485 5% 48,567 6%
Azerbaijan 29,038 9% 13,823 3% 42,861 6%
Moldova 20,129 6% 3,610 1% 23,739 3%
Total 318,240 437,566 755,806
Public Administration
Armenia 2,091,494 40% 1,678,599 37% 1,243,917 19% 5,014,010 31%
Kyrgyz Republic 768,093 15% 1,384,082 30% 1,366,841 21% 3,519,016 22%
Georgia 580,002 11% 522,359 11% 1,999,998 30% 3,102,359 19%
Moldova 204,880 4% 403,312 9% 1,344,987 21% 1,953,179 12%
Tajikistan 233,919 5% 324,994 7% 497,151 8% 1,056,064 6%
Kazakhstan 355,406 7% 233,477 5% 588,883 4%
Regional 456,560 9% 6,755 0% 105,367 2% 568,682 3%
Uzbekistan 491,579 9% 343 0% 491,922 3%
Total 5,181,933 4,553,921 6,558,261 16,294,115
Statistics
Tajikistan 195,482 27% 85,000 37% 600,000 100% 880,482 56%
Kyrgyz Republic 338,486 46% 143,671 63% 482,157 31%
Moldova 200000 27% 200,000 13%
Total 733,968 228,671 600,000 1,562,639
Tourism
Kyrgyz Republic 309,989 100% 309,989 96%
Regional 14,581 100% 14,581 4%
Total 14,581 309,989 324,570
Water
Kyrgyz Republic 1,014,529 100% 695,856 100% 1,710,385 100%
Total 1,014,529 695,856 1,710,385
Social Development
Regional 514,104 100% 394,385 100% 908,489 100%
Total 514,104 394,385 908,489  
Notes: 
1. Public Administration accounts for the highest proportion of the spend (30%) in the region over the three year 
period followed by health and welfare (20%) and business and financial (16%). Annual totals for spend in 
public administration increase over the three year period by 40% while totals in most of the sectors fluctuate. 
2. Only two other sectors experience increases over the three year period. Spend in miscellaneous community 
projects more than double over the period and overall this sector accounts for 12% of total spend. Agriculture 
accounts for a slightly smaller proportion (10%) but also experiences an increase over the 3 year period. 
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Table B: Spend by sector and proportion of total spend in each CASCM country 
2004-5 % 2005-6 % 2006-7 % Total 2004-7 %
Armenia
Public Administration 2,091,494 81% 1,678,599 63% 1,243,917 70% 5,014,010 71%
Business & Financial 460,659 18% 972,693 36% 532,284 30% 1,965,636 28%
No Project Specific 32,014 1% 21,604 1% 53,618 1%
Total 2,584,167 2,672,896 1,776,201 7,033,264
Georgia
Health & Welfare 776,229 46% 1,443,559 60% 927,773 28% 3,147,561 43%
Public Administration 580,002 35% 522,359 22% 1,999,998 60% 3,102,359 42%
Agriculture 288,962 17% 330,820 14% 391,521 12% 1,011,303 14%
Business & Financial 0% 78,000 3% 78,000 1%
No Project Specific 30,931 2% 32,976 1% 63,907 1%
Total 1,676,124 2,407,714 3,319,292 7,403,130
Kyrgyz Republic
Health & Welfare 1,583,877 35% 3,966,088 57% 1,834,804 36% 7,384,769 44%
Public Administration 768,093 17% 1,384,082 20% 1,366,841 27% 3,519,016 21%
Agriculture 567,107 12% 696,529 10% 1,618,298 32% 2,881,934 17%
Water 1,014,529 22% 695,856 10% 0% 1,710,385 10%
Statistics 338,486 7% 143,671 2% 0% 482,157 3%
Energy 253,538 6% 81,085 1% 0% 334,623 2%
Tourism 0% 0% 309,989 6% 309,989 2%
No Project Specific 42,028 1% 20,959 0% 0% 62,987 0%
Total 4,567,658 6,988,270 5,129,932 16,685,860
Moldova
Misc Community 990248 40% 128463 10% 1612771 54% 2731482 40%
Public Administration 204880 8% 403312 30% 1344987 45% 1953179 29%
Agriculture 806103 32% 801930 60% 20359 1% 1628392 24%
Statistics 200000 8% 0% 0% 200000 3%
Business & Financial 176616 7% 0% 0% 176616 3%
Health & Welfare 92116 4% 1189 0% 0% 93305 1%
No Project Specific 20129 1% 3610 0% 0% 23739 0%
Total 2490092 1338504 2978117 6806713
Tajikistan
Misc Community 171,199 14% 1,400,740 61% 2,090,911 66% 3,662,850 55%
Public Administration 233,919 20% 324,994 14% 497,151 16% 1,056,064 16%
Business & Financial 483,495 40% 463,817 20% 0% 947,312 14%
Statistics 195,482 16% 85,000 4% 600,000 19% 880,482 13%
No Project Specific 63,471 5% 13,119 1% 0% 76,590 1%
Agriculture 44,633 4% 0% 0% 44,633 1%
Conflict & Humanitarian 6,903 1% 0% 0% 6,903 0%
Total 1,199,102 2,287,670 3,188,062 6,674,834
Regional
Business & Financial 2,109,272 67% 2,562,578 76% 1,081,826 63% 5,753,676 70%
Social Development 0% 514,104 15% 394,385 23% 908,489 11%
Environment 432,513 14% 265,927     8% 79,926 5% 778,366 9%
Public Administration 456,560 15% 6,755 0% 105,367 6% 568,682 7%
Conflict & Humanitarian 54,000 2% 19,330 1% 46,392 3% 119,722 1%
Ed 58,838 2% 0% 0% 58,838 1%
Health & Welfare 17,441 1% 534 0% 0% 17,975 0%
Tourism 14,581 0% 0% 0% 14,581 0%
Energy 1,016 0% 11,313 0% 0% 12,329 0%
Total 3,144,221 3,380,541 1,707,896 8,232,658  
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Notes: 
1. Spend in public administration accounts for either the largest or the second largest proportion of spend in each 
of the CASCM countries. Over the three year period, its proportion has increased in each of the countries, with 
the exception of Tajikistan. In Armenia it accounts for the majority (70%) of the overall spend. 
2. Over the three year period, health and welfare account for just over 40% of spend in Georgia and the Kyrgyz 
Republic. However, there has been no spend is this sector in Moldova since 2004/05 and none at all in Armenia 
or Tajikistan. Miscellaneous community projects account for greatest proportion of spend in Moldova and 
Tajikistan, 40% and 55%, respectively. 
3. Agriculture spend varies tremendously from 60% of the overall spend in Moldova in 2005/6 to Tajikistan 
where it accounts for 1% of spend over the three years and Armenia where there has been no funding in this 
sector. Agriculture is the sector with the third highest spend in Georgia, the Kyrgyz Republic and Moldova but 
over the three year period it never accounts for more than a quarter of the overall spend. 
4. Business and Financial projects account for 70% of regional projects over the three years. In Armenia it is the 
sector with the second highest spend and in Tajikistan the third. Regionally, the second and third highest spend 
sectors are social development and environment which have no funding in individual counties. 
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ANNEX 11: MONITORING FRAMEWORK 
Table A: Statements of Intent for each RAP Objective 
Country Objective 1: 
To improve governance 
and the institutional 
environment for poverty 
reduction 
Country Objective 2: 
To promote pro-poor 
sustainable growth 
Country Objective 3: 
To contribute to the 
resolution of conflicts 
and peace building 
Regional Objective 1: 
To counter the spread 
of HIV/AIDS 
Regional Objective 2: 
To improve regional 
trade and cooperation 
1.1 Promote effective and 
transparent public financial 
management 
 
2.1 Multi-laterals and IFIs 
are actively involved in 
government led PRS 
processes (or equivalent) 
taking into account the 
poverty and social impact 
of their work 
3.1 Support to peace 
building initiatives in 
country 
4.1 Ensure that in Central 
Asia (3 countries) HIV/AIDS 
programmes/projects are 
aligned to national 
government responses, 
spending resources effectively 
and in accordance with 3 1’s 
principle. 
5.1 Ensure EC policies (in 
particular the ENP and 
TACIS) contribute more 
effectively to political, social 
and economic reforms (across 
the region). 
1.2 Improve the accountability 
and responsiveness of 
government to their citizens. 
2.2 Promote equitable sub-
national development. 
  5.2 Governments adopt 
market-led economic growth 
policies to facilitate their 
integration into the multi-
lateral trading system 
1.3 Improve national and local 
capacity to provide (basic) 
services to poor people. 
   5.3 More effective DFID 
activity and engagement in 
selected regional programmes 
and cross-border activities 
1.4 Support to prioritising, 
implementing, co-ordinating 
and monitoring nationally led 
strategies. 
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Table B: Status of RAP Objectives by Country as at March 2007 as reported in CRF July 2007 
    Objective 
 
 
 
      Country 
Country Objective 1: 
To improve governance 
and the institutional 
environment for poverty 
reduction 
Country Objective 2: 
To promote pro-poor 
sustainable growth 
Country Objective 3: 
To contribute to the 
resolution of conflicts 
and peace building 
Regional Objective 1: 
To counter the spread 
of HIV/AIDS 
Regional Objective 2: 
To improve regional 
trade and cooperation 
Armenia 1.1 Poverty Based 
Budgeting (PBB 
1.2 PBB, ARDEP, 
APSREP 
1.3 Minimal role of 
ARDEP, limited role of 
APSREP & PBB 
1.4 PRSP Monitoring 
Working Group 
2.1 Contribution to 
WB PER in health, 
monitoring of EBRD 
etc. 
2.2 To early for RDP 
impact, ARDEP role 
in regional 
development section 
of PRSP 
3.1 Approved project 
on ENP Action Plan 
under GCPP, 
Consortium Initiative 
to disseminate results 
nil 5.1 Joint work with EC 
on ENPI 
5.3 Approve Project by 
Eurasia Foundation. 
Project on Waste 
management submitted 
to Defra 
Georgia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1 Support to MoF for 
Budget and expenditure 
monitoring, DP 
coordination 
1.2 Support to civil 
registration reform; 
Sustainable Livelihoods in 
Adigeni and Adjacent 
Rayons Phase 2 
(SLAARII) Ext supports 
civil society participation; 
Components of PSFM 
RSP on hold, TI Georgia 
presents Govt efficiency 
study 
1.3 Support to PHC model 
development. But slow 
progress; PHC service 
delivery model 
2.1 EBRD financing 
instruments contribute 
to Govt led pro-poor 
growth 
2.2 n/a 
3.1 GCPP post 
committee plays 
greater role in 
selection and 
monitoring – 
committee meets on 
regular basis; CMI 
project progressing 
well; IA, BBC, IWPR 
and other DCPP 
projects contribute to 
this output; influence 
FCO to organise 
meetings with other 
stakeholders. 
n/a 5.1 DFID/FCO support 
thro’ recommendation 
of ENP consultant; civil 
society and media 
engagement in ENP 
process; DFID ENP 
engagement plan; info 
shared on GCPP by 
DFID as and when but 
FCO lead and main EC 
contact. 
5.2 n/a 
5.3 n/a 
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Georgia cont’d strengthened but not 
endorsed by GoG.; OPM 
support to Public Health 
Dept. in health promotion, 
policy and strategy. 
1.4 Donors aligned with 
Govt owned development 
strategy 
Moldova 1.1 2007-09 MTEF 
drafted and approved by 
GoM; consultant to Court 
of Accounts; co-ordination 
of GoM and donors 
involved in strengthening 
budget and Public 
Expenditure Mgt. 
1.2 Support to 
participation in EGPRSP 
1.3 Joint Social Assistance 
system development PM 
and logframe approved. 
1.4 Contribution to 
improved co-ordination 
and harmonisation with 
other donors; budget 
support to GoM through 
PRSC; lead on SWAP in 
social protection 
2.1 Study on 
relationship between 
poverty and migration; 
regular contribution 
with EBRD, WB and 
EC; influence thro’ 
joint projects – PAR, 
PFM, PRSC, SA, RD, 
Court of Accounts 
(CoA), Early 
Transition Country 
Initiative (ETC). 
2.2 Design of regional 
development. Project; 
national conf. 
disseminates good 
practice 
3.1 PBF contribution 
to EU actions on 
strengthening civil 
society; lessons made 
available to civil 
society; some cross 
Whitehall engagement  
lessons shared thro’ 
GCPP June conf.; 
SCA implemented. 
4.1 nil 5.1 DFID programme 
activities are in 
cooperation with EC, 
communication with 
EC, info shared with 
EUSR on PBF. 
5.2 nil 
5.3 nil 
Tajikistan 
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Tajikistan 
Cont’d 
1.1 TA to MoF/WB, 
updating Fiduciary Risk 
Assessment. 
1.2 Support to PRS prep. 
Support to SSC through 
basket funding with WB 
and Sida. 
1.3 Beneficiary impact 
Assessment showed 
positive outcomes. GoT 
not to take IDA financing 
for NSIFT so DFID will 
not fund either. TPAC 
project continues to 
support. 
1.4 Support to PRS 
monitoring and aid 
coordination/effectiveness. 
JCSS to be agreed by end 
2007. 
2.1. TA thro’ 3 sets of 
consultants to support 
development of PRS, 
joint donor/Govt 
dialogue, consultants 
on MTEF. 
2.2 ETC to sharpen 
poverty focus of 
EBRD, ADB/DFID 
working on TA to 
state investment 
committee., possible 
joint project on rural 
roads 
3.1 DFID/GCPP 
support by NGOs 
through GCPP 
Russia/CIS strategy 
4.1 nil 5.1 nil 
5.2 nil 
5.3 nil 
Kyrgyz Republic 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1 S-GSAC supports 
MoF – now extending to 8 
ministries; DFID (joint) 
donor lead on PFM; 
Strategic Fund (EITI) data 
delayed due to audit 
delays. 
1.2 Civil society 
involvement in regional 
HIV/AIDS project; civil 
society partners active in 
NPRS engagement; NPRS 
M&E framework good; 
strategic fund joint work 
with FCO 
  4.1 See under 1.2  
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Kyrgyz Republic 
Cont’d 
1.3 Health Sector Strategy 
on SWAp principles; 
RWSS strategy owned by 
Dept. with strong donor 
co-ordination. 
1.4 Joint donor/Govt 
dialogue with active DFID 
role; JCSS approved by 
WB and to go to ADB 
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ANNEX 12: PROGRESS AGAINST MDGS IN CASCM COUNTRIES 
MDG Indicator Armenia Azerbaijan  Georgia Kazakhstan  Kyrgyz Rep. Moldova  Tajikistan Turkmentistan  Uzbekistan 
1. Proportion of population 
below $1 (1993 PPP) per 
day * 2.0 3.7 6.5 2.0 2.0 2.0 7.4   2.0 
1 Eradicate extreme 
poverty and 
hunger 
Population below $2 a day 
($ 1993 PPP) - 2003 ‡ 39.5 4.7 84.6 16.4 18.6 31.1 84.6   2.4 
2 Achieve universal 
primary education 
6. Net enrolment ratio in 
primary education † 86.2 84.6 93.1 99.0 94.6 88.2 97.4     
3 Promote gender 
equality and 
empower women 
9. Ratio of girls to boys in 
primary, secondary and 
tertiary education † 1.04 0.98 1.01 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99   0.99 
4 Reduce child 
mortality 
13. Under-five mortality rate 
† 29 89 45 73 67 16 71 104 68 
5 Improve maternal 
health 
16. Maternal mortality ratio 
per 100,00 live births ± 9.3 19.9 45.1 50.0 53.5 33.6 45.0   26.9 
People living with HIV, 15-
49 years old, percentage † 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 1.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 
6 Combat 
HIV/AIDS, 
malaria and other 
diseases 
Infection rates per million 
people # 9.5 13.9 19.5 48.4 25.3 60.5 6.7   70.4 
7 Ensure 
environmental 
sustainability 
30. Proportion of population 
with sustainable access to an 
improved water source, 
urban and rural + 92 77 82 86 77 92 59 72 82 
Key: Exceptions:  
* - UNstat 2003 MDG1 - Azerbaijan 2001 MDG3 - Uzbekistan 2004 
+ - UNstat 2003 MDG2 - Georgia 2004 MDG5 - Kazakhstan 2001 
† - UNstat 2003   
‡ - World Bank (2005) Global Monitoring Report 2005: Millennium Development Goals; From Consensus to Momentum. (cited in WB ECA Progress Report) 
± - TMD TransMONEE Database (2002); UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre, Florence, Italy (cited in WB ECA Progress Report) 
# - European Centre for the Epidemiological Monitoring of AIDS (2003) 
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